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Abstract 
Investment advisory encounters are strained by information, knowledge and 
interest asymmetries between client and advisor. These are detrimental to 
advisory quality and client satisfaction, leading to an unfavorable client 
perception of investment advisory services. This situation is disadvantageous 
for both clients and financial service providers. Clients increasingly turn to 
other information sources and fail to reap advisory services’ potential 
benefits for their investment decisions; financial service providers fail to 
exploit personalized advisory services as one the most promising 
differentiation strategies against competitors and struggle with low client 
satisfaction and retention. 
This dissertation suggests a novel approach for these issues: addressing 
asymmetries in investment advisory encounters with transparent, shared IT 
artifacts. Hence, it is based on the following thesis: Shared collaborative IT 
artifacts are a feasible and useful means to improve transparency of 
investment advisory encounters and, thus, to increase client satisfaction. 
The dissertation supports this thesis along three research essays: Essay I 
provides an empirical investigation of the status quo of Swiss investment 
advisory services. It suggests that investment advisory encounters are 
asymmetric and affected by a lack of transparency regarding the process and 
its information, leading to poor advisory quality and low client satisfaction. 
To overcome these issues, the dissertation introduces the solution approach 
of shared collaborative IT artifacts. While Essay I presents the basic 
building blocks of such an approach, Essay II and III demonstrate the 
feasibility of addressing process, information and cost transparency with 
such artifacts, presenting their underlying design considerations as well as 
their prototypical implementations. Furthermore, they provide experimental 
evidence of such artifacts’ usefulness – results show that the constructed 
shared collaborative IT artifacts indeed are useful means to improve 
transparency in investment advisory encounters; they also demonstrate that 
providing such artifacts relates to increased client satisfaction compared to 
traditional investment advisory encounters. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Gespräche zur Anlageberatung zwischen Beratern und Kunden sind durch 
Asymmetrien geprägt, welche sich in Unterschieden der Akteure bezüglich 
der verfügbaren Informationen, vorhandenem Wissen und verfolgten 
Interessen zeigen. Diese Ungleichheiten können zu einer unvorteilhaften 
Kundenwahrnehmung der Beratungsdienstleistung führen, welche sich 
insbesondere in gering wahrgenommener Transparenz über 
Beratungsabläufe und –informationen äußert. Dies wiederum kann sich 
negativ auf die empfundene Beratungsqualität und Kundenzufriedenheit 
auswirken. Es zeigt sich, dass diese Situation für Kunden wie 
Finanzdienstleister nachteilig ist: während erstere sich zur 
Informationsbeschaffung vermehrt anderen Informationsquellen zuwenden, 
lassen Finanzdienstleister das Potential ungenutzt, sich über qualitativ 
hochwertigere Beratungsleistungen gegenüber den Mitbewerbern zu 
differenzieren. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht den neuartigen Ansatz, Probleme der 
Asymmetrie in Anlageberatungsgesprächen mit transparenter, geteilter 
Informationstechnologie (IT) zu begegnen. Sie stützt sich dabei auf folgende 
These: Geteilte, kooperative IT-Systeme sind  praktikabel und nützlich, die 
Transparenz von Anlageberatungsgesprächen zu verbessern und dadurch 
die Kundenzufriedenheit zu erhöhen. 
Diese These wird entlang dreier Essays gestützt: Das erste Essay untersucht 
mit empirischen Mitteln den Status quo Schweizer 
Anlageberatungsdienstleistungen. Aus den Erhebungen wird abgeleitet, dass 
Anlageberatungsgespräche eine geringe Transparenz bezüglich des 
Beratungsprozesses und der ausgetauschten Informationen aufweisen; dies 
kann die Beratungsqualität und die Kundenzufriedenheit beeinträchtigen. Um 
diese Probleme zu adressieren, präsentiert die Arbeit einen Lösungsansatz 
basierend auf geteilten, kooperativen IT-Systemen. Während Essay I die 
Bausteine des Ansatzes skizziert, zeigen Essay II und III die Praktikabilität 
solcher Systeme anhand prototypischer Entwicklungen, welche die 
Transparenz des Beratungsprozesses und der ausgetauschten Informationen 
– insbesondere auch bezüglich Kosten – adressieren. Die Essays präsentieren 
dabei auch experimentelle Nachweise der Nützlichkeit solcher Systeme. Die 
Resultate zeigen, dass geteilte, kooperative Systeme in der Tat nützliche 
Mittel darstellen, die Transparenz in Anlageberatungsgesprächen zu 
erhöhen; ebenfalls legen die Evaluationsergebnisse dar, dass die Nutzung 
iv 
solcher Systeme die Kundenzufriedenheit im Vergleich zu traditionellen 
Anlageberatungssituationen erhöhen kann. 
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1 Introduction 
Investment advisory encounters are strained by information, knowledge and 
interest asymmetries between client and advisor. These are detrimental to 
advisory quality and client satisfaction, leading to an unfavorable client 
perception of investment advisory services. This situation is disadvantageous 
for both clients and financial service providers. Clients increasingly turn to 
other information sources and fail to reap advisory services’ potential 
benefits for their investment decisions; FSPs fail to exploit personalized 
advisory services as one the most promising differentiation strategies against 
competitors and struggle with low client satisfaction and retention. 
This dissertation suggests a novel approach to counteract these issues: 
addressing asymmetries in investment advisory encounters with shared, 
collaborative IT artifacts transparently mediating the client-advisor 
interaction. Thus, the underlying main thesis of this dissertation reads as 
follows:  
Shared collaborative IT artifacts are a feasible and useful means to 
improve transparency of investment advisory encounters and, thus, to 
increase client satisfaction. 
The dissertation seeks to support this thesis along three research essays. The 
essays are tightly connected to the thesis: Essay I provides an empirical 
account of the asymmetric nature of investment advisory encounters, their 
prevailing transparency issues and the resulting low client satisfaction; Essay 
II and III demonstrate the feasibility of addressing different aspects of 
transparency with shared collaborative IT artifacts by providing design 
considerations and showing their prototypical implementation; they also 
provide experimental evidence of their usefulness in increasing transparency 
and client satisfaction. 
We shall commence by presenting the context of this research (next section). 
In Section 1.2 we will then introduce the status quo of investment advisory 
services and their main issues. Section 1.3 will proceed with the 
dissertation’s main contribution: the novel approach to address issues of 
investment advisory services by supporting client-advisor encounters with 
shared collaborative IT artifacts. An outline of the main research questions 
as well as the structure of the dissertation will conclude the introduction 
(Section 1.4). 
1. Introduction 
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1.1 Context of this Research 
This dissertation’s research is mainly based on two successive projects with 
which the author was involved. The first research project incorporated a 
large study on investment advisory quality of Swiss financial service 
providers and was conducted in cooperation with Solution Providers in 2008. 
The author of this dissertation was significantly involved in designing and 
executing this project, as well as principally responsible for analyzing its 
results. The project’s main findings were reported in Mogicato et al. [2009] 
and Schwabe and Nussbaumer [2009]. Results on advisory quality reported 
in Essay I of this dissertation are mainly based on revised and extended 
analyses of data gathered in course of this project; Essay I further includes 
data on client information behavior, which were also collected in course of 
this project and reported in Nussbaumer et al. [2009; 2011]. 
The first project provided the corner stones of the dissertation’s appreciation 
of current issues in investment advisory encounters; the solution approach of 
increasing transparency, however, was developed and evaluated as part of a 
second research project entitled “Investment Advisory Services 2.0”. This 
project was conducted from 2010 to 2012 as a joint project of University of 
Zurich, UBS and Zurich University of the Arts; it was co-financed by the 
Swiss commission for technology and innovation (CTI). The project’s goal 
was to investigate the concept and effects of IT-supported and transparent 
investment advisory encounters, as they are also discussed in Nussbaumer 
and Schwabe [2010]. The author of the dissertation was involved as 
operative project leader and principal investigator of the concept of 
transparent IT support as well as its effects on client perception. The 
project’s findings were reported in Nussbaumer et al. [2011; 2012b; 2012c] 
as well as Schmidt-Rauch and Nussbaumer [2011]. Partly based on these 
previous publications, Essay II of this dissertation summarizes the project’s 
concepts and results. 
The third Essay’s concept of cost transparency emerged from empirical 
findings of the first research project. It was further developed and evaluated 
in cooperation with à Porta [2010]. While the latter work focuses on the 
organizational ramifications of (cost-) transparent business models and their 
effects, Essay III of this dissertation focuses on the principles of 
collaborative IT artifact design to enable cost transparency in client-advisor 
encounters. A shortened and adapted version of Essay III was published in 
Nussbaumer et al. [2012a]. 
1. Introduction 
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1.2 Issues of Investment Advisory Services 
Investors seek investment advice for numerous reasons, e.g., because of a 
lack of financial knowledge, interest or time [Financial Services Authority 
2002:15–17] or to find “assurance of doing the right thing” [Cocca et al. 
2009:33]. Such advisory encounters, however, are strained by several 
characteristics that are detrimental to advisory quality, including 
information, interest and knowledge asymmetries [Golec 1992; Oehler and 
Kohlert 2009; Sharma 1997].  
Information and knowledge asymmetries result from the client typically 
being a layperson seeking advice from an expert advisor, i.e., thus being 
generally less knowledgeable and informed. Thus, she cannot be sure 
whether the advisor actually gathers and provides all relevant information to 
recommend appropriate solutions to her investment needs. Such asymmetries 
can also be conceptualized as transparency issues [Nussbaumer and Matter 
2011], relating to the difficulties of the client to comprehend or see through 
the advisor’s information base (information transparency), including the 
costs of the advisory service and its results (cost transparency), as well as 
understanding the advisor’s activities from the initial problem statement to 
the final recommendation (process transparency).  
The relationship between clients and advisors can be additionally strained by 
potential conflicts of interests (interest asymmetries) that may affect the 
trustworthiness of the advisor [Inbar and Tractinsky 2011; Nussbaumer and 
Schwabe 2010]. Advisors might exploit the lack of transparency by, e.g., 
superficial information gathering and provision or, even worse, 
recommending products that are unsuitable for the specific client’s needs but 
profitable in terms of fees and provisions. 
Unsurprisingly, these inherent issues are also reflected in the low reputation 
of such services in research [e.g., Evers et al. 2000; Hackethal et al. 2012; 
Mullainathan et al. 2011; Oehler and Kohlert 2009] and consumer reports 
[e.g., Stiftung Warentest 2007; Stiftung Warentest 2010]. In a recent study 
(reported in Essay I), we found that also for Swiss financial service providers 
– after all, ranking among the leading global institutes for private banking 
and wealth management [Birchler et al. 2011] – client satisfaction with such 
services is low.  
While Swiss financial service providers increasingly try to improve advisory 
quality by establishing standardized advisory processes [Mogicato et al. 
2009] – and in this way seek to also improve client satisfaction as well as to 
differentiate themselves from competitors [Buhl and Kaiser 2008] –, their 
1. Introduction 
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clients seem to acknowledge the low advisory quality by infrequent and late 
usage of such services [Nussbaumer et al. 2009; Nussbaumer et al. 2011]. 
This leads to an unsatisfying equilibrium, where both FSPs and clients 
cannot seem to reap the services’ potential benefits. FSPs miss the 
opportunity to differentiate themselves with superior service quality 
(potentially improving client satisfaction and retention, share of wallet etc.); 
clients are inhibited of efficient and effective financial advice, for which 
interpersonal advisory services may be most appropriate as a starting point 
of information search [Ellis et al. 2002]. 
In general, two main solution approaches to these problems prevail. First, 
from an agency perspective, solutions have been predominantly sought in 
pre-contract (i.e., pre-encounter) strategies, e.g., screening or signaling 
[Bergen et al. 1992]. Screening relates to the client principal gathering 
information about the potential agents, i.e., FSPs or advisors, to determine 
their “true” characteristics. Signaling involves additional action of the agent, 
aiming to signal to principals that he is superior to other agents (e.g., in 
respect of qualifications). Besides the higher costs for either clients or 
advisors involved in such activities, they only provide conditions to cope 
with ambiguity before the encounter rather than to actually reduce existing 
asymmetries in the encounter [Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000:153]. 
Second, legal frameworks have been developed to address existing 
asymmetries in financial advisory services in a top-down manner and 
establish uniform regulations for consumer protection. For European 
markets, the most prominent example is the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive [MiFID; European Commission 2004]. Basic duties of 
allegiance, due diligence and information disclosure have also been defined 
for Swiss FSPs [FINMA, Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht 2008; Roth 
2009]. Such legal duties require FSPs to establish basic transparency, e.g., 
that the advisor collects all relevant client information and in turn provides 
her with all relevant information for the potential investment decision 
[Oehler and Kohlert 2009:98]. However, research has frequently pointed to 
weaknesses and failures of the legal frameworks [Jungermann and Belting 
2004; Kohlert 2009], arguing that they show little effect on advisory practice 
because of their generic nature – being neither comprehensive nor specific 
enough – and their unrealistic assumptions regarding the client’s prior 
knowledge and ability to comprehend the provided information [Oehler and 
Kohlert 2009:98–99]. 
Thus, both solution approaches fail to adequately address existing 
asymmetry and transparency issues in client-advisor interactions of 
1. Introduction 
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investment advisory services. Indeed, little research has pointed to bottom-
up approaches of alleviating the prevailing issues of investment advisory 
services at their locus of emergence – the client-advisor encounter. While in 
current FSP advisory practice information technology (IT) plays a minor role 
– especially in supporting client-advisor encounters [Schwabe and 
Nussbaumer 2009], which are mainly based on pen and paper –, we attribute 
IT an important role in alleviating current issues of advisory encounters. For 
quite some time, research on group support has highlighted the possibilities 
of collaborative IT systems in joint task- and problem-solving [Fjermestad 
and Hiltz 2000; Mittleman et al. 2008; Nunamaker et al. 1996]. However, 
only more recently did research suggest such collaborative IT systems to 
have great potential to enhance advisor-client interaction, e.g., in the 
domains of travel counseling [Novak and Schmidt 2009; Rodden et al. 2003] 
or advisory services for citizens [Schenk and Schwabe 2010].  
In investment advisory services, which are strained by information, 
knowledge and interest asymmetries, such shared collaborative IT systems 
could mediate client-advisor interaction and transparently provide relevant, 
comprehensible information regarding advisory content, process activities 
and costs. This could allow for enhanced transparency towards the client, 
while restricting the advisor to engage in hidden information or hidden 
action, paving the way for more satisfying advisory encounters [Nussbaumer 
and Schwabe 2010]. The dissertation’s main contribution is to investigate the 
feasibility and utility of such a solution approach.  
1.3 General Idea of the Dissertation’s Solution Approach 
As indicated above, the general solution approach of pre-contract strategies 
does not actually reduce transparency issues of investment advisory 
encounters. Top-down regulations, on the other hand, already point to a 
promising direction: they in fact obligate FSPs to increase transparency of 
their investment advisory services. Due to their lack of specificity, however, 
they show limited actual effects in improving information exchange between 
client and advisor.  
Thus, in this dissertation we propose a novel bottom-up approach to increase 
the transparency of investment advisory services: introducing shared 
collaborative IT artifacts into client-advisor encounters. The idea is to equip 
investment advisory encounters with an IT artifact that mediates the client-
advisor interaction and provides a common reference of discussion. The 
shared informational resources allow visualizing and exploring relevant 
information regarding the advisory activities (process transparency: what 
1. Introduction 
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activities are performed and why?), the information processed therein 
(information transparency: what information is used for what purpose?) as 
well as their effects, e.g., regarding recommendations and their costs. Thus, 
the first hypothesis of this dissertation is:  
H1: Supporting investment advisory encounters with shared collaborative IT 
artifacts improves the client’s perceived transparency compared to the 
traditional encounter. 
As the information carrier is shared and may be used and monitored by both 
parties, the advisory process and its accomplished results should not only be 
more transparent and comprehensible for clients but also allow for improved 
client involvement and control. As such, the client should be enabled to take 
more control of the process and its results, i.e., co-creating and personalizing 
the solutions. We therefore hypothesize: 
H2: Supporting investment advisory encounters with a shared collaborative 
IT artifact increases the client’s perceived controllability compared to the 
traditional encounter.  
Client dissatisfaction with current investment advisory services is often 
related to their lack of transparency and personalization as well as the 
perceived low assurance regarding the advisor’s interests and goals (see 
Essay I). The basic characteristic of sharing all relevant information should 
also influence this problem of interest asymmetry – the advisor is hindered to 
omit important activities (e.g., ensuring compliance to existing regulations) 
and restricted from opportunistically hiding important information. Overall, 
addressing the current problems and potential causes of client dissatisfaction 
with shared collaborative IT artifacts should improve the client’s perception 
of the encounter and increase her satisfaction:  
H3: Supporting investment advisory encounters with a shared collaborative 
IT artifact increases the client’s satisfaction compared with the traditional 
encounter. 
Based on our general idea of transparent advisory support, we have 
developed several iterations of IT artifacts for mediating the client-advisor 
interaction (Essays II and III). In experimental evaluations we could show 
that shared collaborative IT artifacts are able to significantly improve the 
encounter’s process, information and cost transparency, as well as increase 
the client’s perceived controllability compared to the traditional pen and 
paper advisory encounters. Finally, we also found that such mediating 
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artifacts can significantly increase the client’s overall satisfaction with the 
investment advisory encounter.  
1.4 Research Questions and Outline 
To support its underlying thesis, the dissertation builds on three main 
research questions, which are addressed in three research essays. In general, 
we answer the research questions from the perspective of Swiss investment 
advisory services, investigating issues in advisory practice of Swiss FSPs 
and validate and evaluate our solution approach with Swiss advisors and 
clients. We argue, however, that our observations and conclusions regarding 
the general asymmetry issues in investment advisory services are 
generalizable and applicable to other countries as well, with research 
pointing to similar issues for European financial markets (e.g., Germany 
[Hackethal et al. 2012; Oehler and Kohlert 2009], United Kingdom 
[Atkinson et al. 2007], Austria [Hanke et al. 2006]) as well as the United 
States [Krishnan et al. 1999; Mullainathan et al. 2011]. 
The first research question relates to an investigation of the status quo of 
investment advisory services, focusing on the prevailing issues in client-
advisor interaction and existing solution approaches: What are the prevailing 
issues of client-advisor interaction in investment advisory services? 
We will investigate this question in the context of Swiss investment advisory 
services in Essay I. Its results support the premise of the dissertation’s thesis 
that investment advisory encounters are strained by transparency issues that 
lead to low client satisfaction. Essay I provides the dissertation’s starting 
point of argumentation for the investigated problems and the proposed 
solutions. Further research questions of the essay relate to the general role of 
investment advisory services for Swiss investors, the investment advisory 
quality of Swiss financial service providers and the clients’ as well as FSP 
stakeholders’ assessment therewith, and the role of IT support in investment 
advisory services. 
The second main research question concerns the dissertation’s proposed 
solution approach to the prevailing issues of investment advisory services: 
What are the design principles of shared collaborative IT artifacts to 
address transparency issues in investment advisory encounters? 
Answers to this question will support the thesis’ proposition that shared 
collaborative IT artifacts are a feasible means to improve transparency in 
investment advisory encounters. The dissertation investigates this question 
1. Introduction 
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as part of Essay II and Essay III, where the former is concerned with the 
design requirements of establishing process and information transparency; 
the latter provides design considerations to address cost transparency with 
shared collaborative IT artifacts.  
Finally, the third research question relates to the influence of the 
dissertation’s solution approach on investment advisory encounters: What 
are the effects of shared collaborative IT artifacts on the client-advisor 
interaction in investment advisory encounters? 
The answers to this question will be concerned with the efficacy and 
usefulness of the dissertation’s solution approach in addressing transparency 
issues of investment advisory encounters; they seek to support the thesis’ 
proposition that shared collaborative IT artifacts are a useful means to 
improve transparency and to also increase client satisfaction. The 
dissertation will provide support for the usefulness of its solution approach 
both in Essay II, regarding the usefulness of process- and information-
transparent artifacts, and Essay III, concerning the usefulness of cost 
transparent collaborative IT artifacts. 
The dissertation’s essays are based on several peer-reviewed papers in which 
we have previously discussed some of these questions. Details on the 
previous and on-going publications and their relation to the research essays 
are provided in Section 3, which also gives an overview of the three essays 
along with their main findings. 
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the general 
research paradigms and methodologies that guided the research process. In 
Chapter 3, we will provide an overview of the dissertation’s three essays, 
and summarize their research questions and findings. We will provide a 
conclusion of the dissertation with its main contributions in Chapter 4. In 
Chapter 5, we discuss the limitations of this research and point to some 
promising directions of future research. Finally, Chapters 6-8 are dedicated 
to the three research essays.  
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2 Methodology 
Information Systems (IS) research is typically characterized by two 
paradigms, behavioral science and design science research. While the goal of 
behavioral science is to “develop and verify theories that explain or predict 
human or organizational behaviors” [Hevner et al. 2004:75], design science 
seeks to develop innovative, useful solutions for practical problems “to 
extend the boundaries of human and organizational capabilities” [Hevner et 
al. 2004:75].  
The dissertation’s thesis – “Shared collaborative IT artifacts are a feasible 
and useful means to improve transparency of investment advisory encounters 
and, thus, to increase client satisfaction.” – features a particular stance 
pointing to design science, as it stresses the investigation of feasibility and 
usefulness of a specific class of IT artifacts. As such, the dissertation is 
construction-oriented and follows an applied research / engineering mode of 
inquiry, using scientific knowledge to create technological artifacts that 
solve an important practical problem [Briggs and Schwabe 2011]. 
Hevner et al. [2004] define three pillars of a design science research: the 
environment (problem space & application domain), the pillar of actual 
design research (building design artifacts and justify/evaluate them), and the 
knowledge base (theories, frameworks, methods etc., drawn from both the 
foundations of design science and the application domain). Between these 
pillars, Hevner [2007] identifies three research cycles: (1) the relevance 
cycle, which initiates design science research with requirements from the 
environment and evaluates the artifact in the application domain with field 
tests, (2) the rigor cycle that provides knowledge to the research project from 
the knowledge base and returns the research results, and (3) the design cycle, 
which is concerned with the construction and evaluation of the artifact, 
whereas it builds on requirements of the relevance cycle and the theories and 
methods provided by the rigor cycle.  
The dissertation’s research is generally based on these notions of design 
science research. As design science research is a research paradigm rather 
than a research methodology [Baskerville 2008; Iivari 2007], however, it 
does not provide specific guidelines in respect of the research process and its 
methods. Such a methodology for conducting design science research in IS 
has been proposed by Peffers et al. [2007]. They suggest performing design 
science research along six subsequent activities from problem identification 
to reporting the validated solution. After having (1) identified a practical 
problem and shown its importance, iteration loops of a solution-finding 
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process are initiated, where each loop (2) defines the respective solution’s 
objectives, (3) designs and builds the artifact, (4) demonstrates how the 
artifact may be used to solve the problem identified in step 1, (5) evaluates 
its efficiency and effectiveness and, if the artifact fulfilled the solution 
objectives, (6) communicates the results in scholarly publications. If the 
artifact failed to fulfill the objectives in step 5, a consecutive iteration may 
be initiated, starting either with revised objectives of the solution, re-
engineering of the artifact design or its implementation, or with applying the 
previous artifact in more suitable contexts to show its usefulness.  
While this methodology provides an appropriate research process for the 
design research paradigm, it is generic regarding the particular methods used 
to analyze, design and evaluate the design artifacts. Such methods are 
needed to substantiate and perform the research process. We therefore 
concretized Peffer’s et al. [2007] research process with the practical design 
process suggested by Rosson and Carroll [2002], which bridges the gap from 
design science paradigm and methodology to specific methods of performing 
design activities from analysis to evaluation. The relationships between 
paradigms, methodologies and methods and their levels of concretization are 
summarized in Figure 2-1.  
 
Figure 2-1: Research paradigms, methodologies and methods 
Most generally speaking, our research process followed the design science 
paradigm [Hevner 2007; Hevner et al. 2004], whereby the justification of our 
design science research was mostly based on methods that are often 
attributed to the exploratory research paradigm [Stebbins 2001]. As these 
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research paradigms are abstract and do not incorporate methodologies of 
how to conduct the actual research process, we opted for the paradigm-
compatible general research approach suggested by Peffers et al. [2007], 
instantiating its process with practical guidelines of scenario-based 
development [Rosson and Carroll 2002]. 
Following these methodologies along our research cycles (or iterations), we 
applied different qualitative and quantitative methods according to the 
specific research phases. While, for example, we started our investigations 
with an in-depth analysis of the status quo (using mostly, but not exclusively, 
qualitative methods), along the research process the applied methods became 
increasingly quantitative (e.g., controlled experiments for evaluations).  
In the following, we will present how we built our actual research process 
and its methods upon the introduced methodologies and paradigms. We will 
proceed along the main activities of the design science research 
methodology, i.e., definition of problem and solution objectives, design and 
development and evaluation.  
2.1 Definition of Problem and Solution Objectives 
According to the methodology of Peffers et al. [2007], the first activity of a 
design science endeavor is dedicated to identifying a problem and justifying 
the value of a solution. For the general analysis of current issues of Swiss 
investment advisory services, we engaged in comprehensive exploratory 
research [Stebbins 2001], including qualitative and quantitative methods 
(focus groups, interviews, surveys). A detailed presentation of the methods 
as well as the results can be found in Essay I (Chapter 6).  
Based on this general analysis, we initiated a total of four design cycles of 
building IT-based solutions that address some of the most prevailing 
transparency issues in advisory services. Three design cycles were dedicated 
to the design and implementation of shared IT artifacts addressing process 
and information transparency (presented in Essay II, Chapter 7), while 
another design cycle investigated the design of cost transparency (presented 
in Essay III, Chapter 8).  
To iteratively design and develop the solutions in the design cycles, we 
employed the scenario-based approach advocated by Rosson and Carroll 
[2002]. It is based on close collaboration with actual users to acknowledge 
their problems, requirements and possible solutions. In an iterative manner, 
scenario-based development starts with the creation of problem scenarios in 
the form of short stories that mirror the researchers’ understanding of the 
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situation and may be easily understood and validated by users. We used this 
approach to (1) further detail our findings from comprehensive exploratory 
research with feedback from clients and advisors and observations of their 
activities, as well as (2) summarize them in succinct descriptions of advisory 
practice. For the validation of the scenarios (and other outputs of the design 
process, see below) a total of six key users (3 advisors, 3 clients) was 
involved.  
2.2 Design and Development 
In this activity, the solution artifact is created. In design science research, the 
solution artifact may not only refer to a technological artifact (such as a 
software application), but also to “constructs, models, and methods applied 
in the development and use of information systems” [Hevner et al. 2004:13]. 
Indeed, the artifacts created in our design cycles do not only refer to the 
technological software artifacts but also to their embedded principles as well 
as methods of how to use the artifact in client-advisor encounters.  
Similar to its procedure regarding problem analysis, the scenario-based 
approach suggests that all design and implementation phases of the 
development process should incorporate actual users to iteratively validate 
and evaluate their outcomes. The design objectives are described and 
validated with activity scenarios (stories about the anticipated usage of the 
solution artifact), upon which further activities of information design, user 
interface design as well as interaction design are built. These designs again 
are iteratively validated by actual users (advisors and clients), starting with 
low-fidelity paper-based prototypes and evolving to high-fidelity, functional 
prototypes. Such an approach allows for inexpensive and rapid improvement 
of the artifact’s design and its implementation. 
2.3 Evaluation  
Design science artifacts have to be rigorously evaluated via appropriate 
evaluation methods [Hevner et al. 2004; March and Smith 1995; Witte 1997] 
such that their utility, quality, and efficacy can be demonstrated [Hevner et 
al. 2004:16]. The scenario-based approach distinguishes between formative 
and summative evaluation [Rosson and Carroll 2002:228]. Formative 
evaluation relates to the iterative (validation) feedback of key users and its 
incorporation to improve the artifact design. Summative evaluation refers to 
a comprehensive assessment whether the artifact fulfills its design goals and 
concludes the design cycle. 
2. Methodology 
13 
Several methods have been proposed for the summative evaluation of design 
artifacts, such as observational (case or field) studies, action research, 
surveys, analytical analyses, functional or structural testing, descriptive 
argumentation and experimental methods including controlled experiments 
or simulation [Cleven et al. 2009:4; Hevner et al. 2004:18; Riege et al. 2009; 
Siau and Rossi 2011]. In respect of its underlying thesis, this dissertation 
aims to show that shared collaborative IT artifacts are a useful means to 
improve transparency and increase client satisfaction in investment 
encounters – as compared to the traditional encounter. Controlled 
experiments are an appropriate means to test such propositions by allowing 
validating design artifacts against the outcomes the designer sought to 
improve; experiments allow measuring the degree to which the design 
objectives have been achieved [Briggs and Schwabe 2011]. In design science 
research, one experimental treatment typically relates to using the designed 
artifact of interest, whereas other treatments may include previously 
designed technological artifacts or control conditions featuring no 
technological artifact [Briggs and Schwabe 2011:7]. To validate the solution 
artifacts’ usefulness and utility (and support the dissertation’s thesis), we 
evaluated each design cycle with such experimental designs (see also the 
detailed presentation of the respective designs in Essay II and Essay III). 
2. Methodology 
14 
  
3. Overview of Research Essays 
15 
3 Overview of Research Essays 
The dissertation seeks to support its main thesis along three comprehensive 
research essays (Chapter 6 to 8). In this chapter, we provide a summary of 
the individual essays with their main findings. For each essay we will also 
provide an overview of their associations with previous and current 
publications.  
3.1 Essay I: Investment Advice and its Role for Investors – A Case 
for Advisory Support 
The first essay is dedicated to address the dissertation’s first research 
question: What are the prevailing issues of client-advisor interaction in 
investment advisory services? It reports results from exploratory research 
into the status quo of Swiss investment advisory services as well as their role 
for investors. The essay provides insights into the status quo of investment 
advisory practice from multiple theoretical and practical stakeholder 
perspectives. It includes an investigation of several dimensions of expected 
and experienced advisory service quality from the views of clients and FSP 
stakeholders (advisors, managers, IT managers) as well as in-depth research 
on the role of such services for investor information search.  
Arguing for the importance of advisory services from both a FSP and client 
perspective, the essay splits its investigation of the status quo into two 
further research questions. In respect of the first question – What are the 
clients’ expectations and why do FSPs fail to meet them? – it finds that client 
expectations are high in any surveyed dimension (e.g., personalization, 
assurance, IT support), but that their experiences of advisory practice are less 
than satisfying. Even though they correctly estimated their expectations, FSP 
stakeholders were not aware of the actual gaps between client expectation 
and experience and highly overestimated their satisfaction with investment 
advisory services.  
Regarding the essay’s second research question – What is the role of 
investment advisory services and what alternatives do clients employ? – 
results show that clients actually do not make exceeding usage of FSP 
investment advice. They are accustomed to use a multitude of alternative 
information sources to support their investment decisions, with professional 
Internet sources, media and personal environment being most frequently 
used. FSP advice, on the contrary, is perceived as rather inaccessible, 
inefficient, and ineffective as well as lacking trust and comprehensibility. 
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While most clients nevertheless use FSP advice for their information search, 
they mostly do so very late in the search process, using it as an exit rather 
than an entry point to their information search.  
These premises lead to an equilibrium that is unsatisfying for both FSPs and 
clients. FSPs miss opportunities of differentiating themselves from 
competitors with superior investment advisory services; being provided with 
unsatisfactory services, clients are retained to reap the potential benefits of 
advisory services especially in the early phases of problem identification 
(including the reduction of uncertainty and personalized information 
aggregation), where information behavior research suggests personal 
information sources to be most effective and efficient. 
Concluding, the essay finds that the most prevailing issues of investment 
advisory services relate to their lack of personalization and client influence, 
lack of advisor assurance, and, enforcing these problems, lack of 
transparency. Based on this observation, the essay outlines possibilities of 
improving the unsatisfying equilibrium between clients and FSPs by 
addressing the current issues of client-advisor encounters with shared IT 
support. 
The research presented in Essay I is based on data collections which have 
been – for the most part – gathered in 2008 as part of a large study on 
investment advisory quality in cooperation with Solution Providers 
[Mogicato et al. 2009]. Findings regarding investment advisory IT support 
were published in Schwabe and Nussbaumer [2009], while findings 
regarding the information behavior of Swiss investors were presented in 
Nussbaumer et al. [2009; 2011]. Finally, the basic concept of shared IT 
support in investment advisory encounters was also discussed in 
Nussbaumer and Schwabe [2010].  
3.2 Essay II: Designing for Process and Information Transparency 
in Client-Advisor Encounters – The Case of Investment 
Advice 
The second essay demonstrates the feasibility and usefulness of shared 
collaborative IT artifacts in improving process and information transparency 
of investment advisory encounters, providing answers to the dissertation’s 
second and third main research questions. 
The essay relates issues of investment advisory services to problems of 
advisory services in general. It suggests that typical information, knowledge 
and interest asymmetries in client-advisor encounters may be addressed by 
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increasing transparency concerning (1) the disclosure of what activities are 
performed and why (process transparency) as well as (2) the revelation of 
what information is used for what purpose and with what effect (information 
transparency). To this end, the essay introduces a design theory for shared, 
transparent IT artifacts that mediate encounters of clients and advisors. The 
article demonstrates feasibility and utility of such an approach along three 
consecutive design science research cycles which aim to introduce process 
and information transparency in investment advisory services. From these 
build-and-evaluate iterations general design principles of shared transparent 
IT artifacts are then derived.  
Experimental evaluations of the iteratively built IT artifacts demonstrate that 
such support may also have detrimental effects on client-advisor encounters; 
indeed, the first iteration artifact lead to inferior results compared to the 
traditional, unsupported encounters. Only after incorporating experiences 
and findings of a second design iteration, the third iteration artifact showed 
to enable significantly superior encounters compared to the traditional 
situation. Encounters supported with the artifact showed increased process 
and information transparency as perceived by clients; furthermore, supported 
encounters showed improved client perception of encounter controllability. 
Overall, the clients’ satisfaction could be significantly improved in the 
artifact-supported encounter compared to the traditional encounter.  
Based on the incorporation of experiences and findings along multiple 
design iterations, which ultimately led to a design artifact conforming with 
its design goals, the essay stresses the importance of the concatenation of 
design cycles. 
Essay II builds on and includes findings from a research project that was 
conducted from 2010 to 2012 at University of Zurich in cooperation with 
UBS and Zurich University of the Arts (co-financed by the Swiss 
commission for technology and innovation). In parts, the project’s concepts 
and findings reported in Essay II were previously published; the general 
issues of advisory encounters were partly discussed in Schmidt-Rauch and 
Nussbaumer [2011]. The design and evaluation of the first design cycle were 
reported in Nussbaumer and Matter [2011] and the differences between the 
first cycle and the third cycle were also discussed in Nussbaumer et al. 
[2012b]. 
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3.3 Essay III: Designing for Cost Transparency in Investment 
Advisory Service Encounters 
The final essay is concerned with answering the dissertation’s second and 
third research question in respect of cost transparency. It investigates the 
feasibility of designing shared collaborative artifacts to improve cost 
transparency in investment advisory encounters, and demonstrates the 
usefulness of such artifacts in experimental evaluations. 
Introductorily, the essay suggests that an important lack of transparency in 
investment advisory services relates to cost information. It argues that cost 
transparency in client-advisor encounters is relevant for at least two reasons. 
First, when buying or selling financial products according to the advisor’s 
recommendation, transaction costs as well as the costs associated to a 
specific product (e.g., buy and sell charges, management fees) play a vital 
role as they directly influence the portfolio’s effective return. Second, the 
potential conflicts of interest in investment advisory services expose the 
client to potential moral hazard of the advisor. The advisor may exploit 
informational deficiencies of the client by, e.g., recommending products that 
are unsuitable for the client’s financial situation and needs but profitable in 
terms of fees.  
Swiss FSPs, however, are still refraining from establishing cost transparency 
in their investment advisory encounters. The article ascribes this to two 
major reasons; first, given that IT is hardly used in Swiss investment 
advisory services, FSPs also lack appropriate information systems that could 
support the complex task of providing dynamic cost information in the 
client-advisor encounter. Second, FSPs often consider cost transparency as 
being detrimental to existing business models, i.e., providing free-of-charge 
advice that is cross-subsidized by selling products, which in turn involve a 
multitude of subsidiary costs. Possible solutions to this problem – e.g., 
provision of fee-based advice – are avoided by most FSPs, often based on 
their belief that clients lack willingness to pay for services that were 
complimentary before (or still are complimentarily provided by 
competitors). 
Based on these premises, the essay is dedicated to a complete design cycle of 
introducing cost transparency in investment advisory encounters, using 
shared and transparent IT artifacts. First, the essay demonstrates the 
feasibility of designing and implementing such an artifact that provides cost 
transparency for collaborative portfolio composition between clients and 
advisors.  
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Based on findings in the literature, the essay proposes that introducing a 
cost-transparent artifact into the advisory encounter may relate to increased 
client satisfaction as well as increased client willingness to pay for the advice 
received. Utility and efficacy of the artifact in respect of these proposed 
effects are investigated in an experimental evaluation. The evaluation 
involves 12 client participants and 2 real FSP advisors passing two advisory 
settings (one being supported with the designed cost-transparent artifact, one 
with a similar artifact lacking cost information) and evaluating the perceived 
differences. Results indicate that encounters provided with the designed cost-
transparent artifact were significantly more satisfying for clients as 
compared to encounters supported with the artifact lacking cost 
transparency. Furthermore, even though clients indeed tend to prefer less 
expensive products in the cost-transparent setting, they showed significantly 
increased willingness to pay for this setting.  
The essay does not only demonstrate the feasibility of providing cost 
transparency in client-advisor encounters but also shows that such 
transparency relates to increased client satisfaction and willingness to pay; 
this may challenge the common belief of FSPs that transparent, fee-based 
advisory services would neither be accepted by clients nor be economically 
viable. 
The general concept of cost transparency presented in Essay III emerged 
from a large study on investment advisory quality reported in Essay I. It was 
further developed in cooperation with à Porta [2010], in context of which the 
presented prototype system was implemented and evaluated. A shortened 
and adapted version of Essay III was published in Nussbaumer et al. [2012a]. 
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4 Conclusion 
Investment advisory services of FSPs are strained by several asymmetries 
between clients and advisors. Based on their layperson-expert relationship, 
advisors are generally more knowledgeable than their clients and equipped 
with specialized information provided by the FSP. While clients may seek 
help from advisors exactly because of such informational deficiencies, 
information exchange is also strained by potential conflicts of interests 
between the advisor and the client. Such conflicts arise where advisors are 
incentivized to increase revenue and his commissions by selling products 
that are more expensive but maybe less appropriate for the client. These 
asymmetries are detrimental to information exchange and, as a result, 
advisory quality. Clients find that investment advisory services lack 
comprehensibility and transparency, regarding the advisor as a “black box”; 
they do not consider the investment advisory encounter to be personalized 
and incorporating their situation and needs, perceiving little possibilities to 
influence or control the advisory process and its results; finally, clients find 
their investment advisor rather untrustworthy and are dissatisfied with his 
efforts of providing investment recommendations. 
Counteracting these problems, the dissertation proposed the novel solution 
approach of shared collaborative IT artifacts. The idea was to introduce 
shared and transparent collaborative IT artifacts into client-advisor 
encounters, mediating the parties’ interaction with a common reference of 
discussion. The shared informational resources are used to visualize and 
provide means of exploring relevant information regarding advisory 
activities (to enable process transparency), the information processed therein 
(information transparency) as well as their effects, e.g., regarding the 
advisor’s recommendations and their costs. 
With this approach we aimed to investigate the following thesis: shared 
collaborative IT artifacts are a feasible and useful means to improve 
transparency of investment advisory encounters and to increase client 
satisfaction. 
In support of this thesis, we conducted several design cycles of shared IT 
artifacts enabling process transparency, information transparency and cost 
transparency. We demonstrated the feasibility of implementing shared 
transparent IT artifacts to support investment advisory encounters between 
clients and advisors. Experimental evaluation of the designed IT artifacts 
showed their utility and efficacy and fully supported our three hypotheses: 
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H1: Supporting investment advisory encounters with a shared collaborative 
IT artifact improves the client’s perceived transparency compared to the 
traditional encounter. 
Introducing a shared collaborative IT artifact as a transparent information 
reference of client-advisor interaction improved the client’s perceived 
process transparency and information transparency compared to the non-
supported (traditional) encounter. The results of the final evaluation showed 
that the artifact significantly improved the client’s perceived 
comprehensibility regarding the advisory activities as well as the information 
used therein.  
H2: Supporting investment advisory encounters with a shared collaborative 
IT artifact increases the client’s perceived controllability compared to the 
traditional encounter.  
Our experimental evaluations showed that providing the investment advisory 
encounter with a shared collaborative IT artifact with transparent 
information access positively affects the client’s perceived influence on the 
encounter and its results, i.e., its controllability. In the final evaluation, the 
clients found the IT-supported advisory encounter significantly more 
controllable compared to the traditional, unsupported encounter. We also 
found some evidence that controllability may be positively correlated to the 
client’s (perceived) own interaction with the shared system [Nussbaumer, P., 
Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012c, under review]. 
H3: Supporting investment advisory encounters with a shared collaborative 
IT artifact increases the client’s satisfaction compared with the traditional 
encounter. 
The dissertation’s thesis was that alleviating the current issues of asymmetric 
client-advisor interaction would also positively affect the most prevalent 
consequence of these issues – the client’s low satisfaction with investment 
advisory services. Our evaluation showed that improving process and 
information transparency as well as introducing cost transparency with 
shared IT artifacts significantly increased the client’s satisfaction compared 
to the traditional, unsupported encounter. An overwhelming majority of 
client participants (87.5%) significantly preferred the artifact-supported 
situation over the traditional situation.
1
 
                                           
1
  Refers to the evaluation of the third design iteration of our information- and process-
transparent artifact (reported in Essay II).  
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According to these results, the dissertation’s thesis is fully supported – 
shared collaborative IT artifacts indeed are a feasible and useful means to 
improve transparency of asymmetric client-advisor encounters and to 
increase client satisfaction.  
In supporting this thesis, the dissertation offers several contributions. We 
have extended existing research on investment advisory services by 
providing novel insights and explanatory approaches to their prevailing 
issues. On that account, we combined traditional perspectives of advisory 
quality and agency relationships with the novel aspect of the client 
information behavior. Our multi-perspective framework provided a deeper 
understanding of the current unsatisfying equilibrium between the client’s 
needs and expectations and the respective services provided by FSPs. These 
insights contribute both to the domain of Information Science (applying 
established theories of information behavior in new practical contexts) as 
well as Information Systems (providing new explanatory approaches to 
established problems and pointing to IT-based solutions). 
The dissertation’s several research cycles regarding the design, 
implementation and evaluation of IT-supported artifacts were based on and 
contributed to several research domains. As a contribution to IS and CSCW 
research, the dissertation provides several re-usable design principles of 
introducing transparency in (asymmetric) client-advisor encounters. These 
principles encompass patterns and anti-patterns of how to support dyadic 
interaction with collaborative IT tools under restrictions of information and 
interest asymmetry. As such, we suggest that the principles are not only 
applicable for the domain of investment advisory services but as well for 
other asymmetric (advisory) situations (e.g., insurance advisory services, 
medical counseling etc.). Furthermore, the dissertation provides 
contributions in demonstrating the feasibility of incorporating and 
implementing such principles into shared IT artifacts, also providing one of 
the few showcases of practical organizational use of multi-touch tabletop 
computers. With our experimental evaluations we also provide empirical 
insights into effects of transparency on client behavior, which so far have 
been mostly theoretically addressed. 
These scientific contributions are facilitated and supported by the 
dissertation’s interdisciplinarity, combining research from diverse domains – 
e.g., Marketing research (service design), Economics and Finance research 
(agency relationships, behavioral biases of investors), Information Science 
(models of information behavior), Social Sciences (judge-advisor system 
research), and, of course, Information Systems (design science) – and 
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integrating their isolated perspectives into a single, comprehensive solution 
approach. 
Another strength of the dissertation can be found in its presentation of a 
practical design research process. The design process integrates different 
research methodologies and methods into an iterative, user-centered process 
of building and evaluating design artifacts, and features fundamental 
concatenation and integration of findings from previous into subsequent 
design cycles. 
Overall, shared collaborative IT artifacts have proven to be a feasible and 
useful way to address current issues in investment advisory encounters, 
significantly increasing both the client’s perceived comprehensibility and 
satisfaction. Rather than following a top down approach of regulations, we 
believe that this approach is a promising first step of improving investment 
advisory services from bottom up, at the locus of their main issues – the 
advisory encounter. 
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5 Limitations and Future Work 
While necessarily showing some limitations, our research opens up many 
possibilities for further research directions. In the following, we will discuss 
the most important limitations as well as their points of contact with 
promising future work. 
Generalizability. While this dissertation was motivated by observations of 
Swiss investment advisory services, the applicability of our investigations in 
respect of how to address transparency issues with IT and its utility are not 
limited to the Swiss market. We argue that the issues of Swiss investment 
advice are general features of asymmetric client-advisor interaction that 
prevail in other countries and financial markets as well – given the investors’ 
typically low financial literacy and their (assumed) general preference for 
transparency, IT support for transparent, comprehensible interaction should 
be generally beneficial to alleviate asymmetries in investment advisory 
services. This should also hold true for alternative business models that may 
be less affected by conflicts of interests (and are more prevalent outside 
Switzerland), e.g., by separating advice from product sale.  
On a generic level, the design principles presented in this dissertation should 
also be applicable in other domains of asymmetric client-advisor interaction, 
especially for sales-oriented services (e.g., insurance advice, travel 
counseling) but also in domains where conflicts of interests are typically less 
apparent for the client (e.g., medical advice). Furthermore, abstracting from 
the domain-specific functionality, the primitives of the developed user 
interface and interaction designs may be a helpful starting point also for 
other domains that aim to support client-advisor interaction without 
neglecting or even disturbing the parties’ social interaction. 
Samples of participants. In our lab studies, we could evaluate the artifacts 
with experienced advisors from a Swiss partner bank, greatly improving the 
validity of our test consultations. Sampling actual affluent clients, however, 
was not possible. Thus, we recruited our evaluation participants using 
convenience sampling, leading to quite diverse samples regarding age, 
occupation as well as financial and computer literacy; however, a rather 
large proportion (46%) of the participants was university students. While we 
cannot claim that our participants were affluent clients, every individual was 
at least a potential affluent client. Thus, we provided realistic background 
settings for our client participants to allow them acting as affluent clients, 
e.g., by assuming that they had inherited a larger amount of money. Clients 
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did not report to have had problems in assuming such a role, neither did we 
find according indications in our observations. Furthermore, our results did 
not show significant effects of any demographic variable on the clients’ 
valuation of the different advisory encounters.  
Target client segments. A related question arises in respect of our assumed 
target segment of affluent clients. In our research, we focused on this 
segment for two main reasons; (1) this client segment is of increasing 
interest for FSPs and therefore increasingly targeted with specific investment 
advisory services; (2) the typical amount of an affluent client’s assets and the 
related complexity of potential investments generally justifies the effort of 
rather time-consuming advisory services, as compared to smaller retail 
investments that are typically limited to only a few and less complex solution 
alternatives. 
Indeed, FSPs often argue that in-depth or holistic advice (incorporating all 
relevant aspects of the client’s personal situation) is too expensive (i.e., time-
consuming) for most of their clients, with actual costs not being covered by 
the related provisions and fees [Kaas et al. 2002]. However, we do not intend 
to imply that transparent advisory encounters should be reserved for affluent 
clients. To the contrary, and following the argumentation of Jungermann and 
Belting [2004:254], we believe that improvements of advisory services 
should be beneficial for FSPs and clients also in lower segments, such as 
retail clients. While holistic comprehensive advice may be indeed be time-
consuming, efficiency should increase after the initial encounter, as for the 
following encounters advisors and clients may build upon and, if necessary, 
adapt already gathered basic information (e.g., regarding the client’s 
financial situation, preferences, needs and goals). As our research indicates, 
information gathering and adaptation may be effectively supported with IT. 
Using such an approach also for retail clients could counteract high 
fluctuations of client depots caused by poor advisory quality (or the client’s 
perception thereof) and also allow FSPs to effectively differentiate against 
their competitors. Based on the dissertation’s findings, future research could 
investigate the premises of according IT support and investment advisory 
service design.  
Organizational implementation. Asymmetries issues in client-advisor 
encounters addressed by this dissertation are mostly related to FSPs and their 
advisors taking advantage of their uninformed clients; as such, our research 
focused on means to alleviate these problems from the clients’ perspective. 
However, conception, design and development of the IT artifacts were 
5. Limitations and Future Work 
27 
accomplished in close cooperation also with FSP stakeholders, notably 
investment advisors. While both the FSP managers and advisors were 
enthusiastic about the developed IT artifacts (with 75% of the advisors 
clearly preferring the IT-supported encounter over the traditional after a total 
utilization of only a few hours in our last evaluation), this might not 
necessarily be a strong indicator of actual usage in the real organizational 
environment. As our initial investigations on IT usage had shown [Schwabe 
and Nussbaumer 2009], advisors are reluctant to use IT in practice for a 
number of reasons, including usability and functionality issues but also being 
potentially related to conflicts of interest. Thus, while our approach shows 
great potential in lab studies, future work should also investigate the 
premises and requirements of rolling out such IT support in actual advisory 
practice, especially regarding organizational change management.  
Design and technological instantiation. To demonstrate the feasibility and 
utility of our solution approach, we have relied on tabletop technology 
featuring large displays and multi-touch interaction for multiple users. 
However, instantiations of the concept could be developed for other 
technology as well, e.g., for portable hardware like tablet computers. 
Interesting future work relates to the applicability of our transparency design 
principles in technological environments that are restricted, e.g., regarding 
smaller display sizes or single-user interaction. 
Other potential future research relates to the appropriate visualization of 
financial information in investment advisory encounters. For our research 
prototypes, we based the visualizations on depictions that are commonly 
used by FSPs and thus are familiar to most clients. However, there might be 
more appropriate visualizations, e.g., adapting to the client’s knowledge and 
prior experience. Future research could investigate such alternative 
visualizations and their effects on perceived transparency and 
comprehensibility. 
Finally, further open questions relate to the role of client interaction. Even 
though we designed our prototypes for direct client interaction, we found 
that clients were reluctant to operate the shared system by themselves and 
tended to prefer mediated interaction; nevertheless, the client’s perceived 
interaction with the system positively related to her perceived control of the 
encounter, which might be an antecedent of client satisfaction [Nussbaumer, 
P., Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012c, under review]. Further research is 
needed to clarify the role of direct client-artifact interaction and their effects 
on the clients’ perception of the advisory encounter. 
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Limitations of the approach. Other approaches suggest alleviating current 
problems of investment advisory services either with pre-contract strategies 
or strict regulations. This dissertation focused to more directly address the 
prevailing issues of information, knowledge and interest asymmetries. There 
are, however, some limitations to this; while we found that with our solution 
approach clients indeed perceived the advisory encounter as more 
transparent and comprehensible, we only assessed their subjective 
perception. While our observations support their perception of increased 
information exchange quality in the IT-supported settings, we cannot 
conclude that the participants’ objective comprehension actually increased. 
Future research could investigate the relations between the clients’ perceived 
increased transparency of advisory encounters and the potential objective 
learning effects. 
Similar to other approaches, our solution approach cannot per se neutralize 
interest asymmetries between client and advisors. Transparent and shared IT 
support may only alleviate the ramifications of conflicts of interests between 
the parties in that the shared information space impedes the advisor to 
obviously take advantage of the client, e.g., by increasing her risk profile to 
be able to recommend riskier (and more expensive) products. Such 
impediments, however, are also a function of the implemented system 
functionality and whether the advisor is actually obliged to use the system or 
specific functionality. It is easily conceivable that IT support may also 
further facilitate moral hazard. Thus, alignment of interest must be 
accomplished on the organizational level, e.g., through alterations of the 
prevailing business models or other means to adapt the advisors’ incentive 
structures. 
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6 Essay I: Investment Advice and its Role for 
Investors – A Case for Advisory Support 
Abstract 
In private banking and wealth management, investment advisory services 
represent an important interface between clients and their financial service 
providers (FSPs). Such services can fulfill significant roles for both the 
clients (e.g., aggregation of relevant information, resolving complexity of 
investment decisions, arranging transactions) and their FSPs (e.g., 
differentiation through individualized service offerings, cross selling). 
Research and the media have frequently suggested low quality of investment 
advisory services, mostly related to inherent information and interest 
asymmetries between clients and advisors. Nevertheless, the majority of 
investors still seem to turn to advisors to support their investment decisions. 
This apparent equilibrium, however, should be neither satisfying for the FSP 
(lack of differentiation because of low client satisfaction and retention) nor 
the client (suboptimal advice). While several studies provide insights into the 
existing problems of advisory practice and their theoretical underpinnings, 
the motivational grounds of the parties’ behaviors have not received much 
attention. Why do FSPs not attempt to differentiate themselves from 
competition by providing better advisory quality? What role does investment 
advice play for clients and what alternatives do they use? 
In this essay, we address these questions with insights from a comprehensive 
exploratory study of advisory services of Swiss FSPs, which followed a 
multi-phase and multi-perspective approach to investigate behaviors and 
perceptions of clients and important FSP stakeholders (advisors, sales 
managers, information technology managers). Results show that clients are 
indeed dissatisfied with FSPs’ advisory services. Regarding the “why”, 
however, we find some novel explanations. On the one hand, the FSPs’ 
efforts to improve advisory quality seem to be based on inaccurate 
estimations of the clients’ actual experience. On the other hand, we find that 
most investors use advisory services in spite of their alleged low quality – 
they are, however, flanking their FSP’s advice with information gathered 
from a wide variety of other information sources, such as the Internet. 
We will discuss these findings along with their implications of how to 
improve advisory services as to allow both the FSPs and the clients to reap 
their potential benefits. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The financial meltdowns of the past few years have demonstrated that 
relationships between financial services providers (FSPs) and their clients 
are fragile. Many clients withdrew their capital and abandoned their banks, 
holding them responsible for their monetary losses. In times of shattered 
markets, advisor-client relationships become increasingly strained and 
complex, since the client’s confidence and trust in her financial advisor may 
be tightly connected to changes in the market and the respective gains and 
losses. Investigations of client satisfaction with investment advisory services 
[e.g., Stiftung Warentest 2007; Stiftung Warentest 2010; Weingarth 2002; 
Wolffensberg 2006] shows evidence that this relationship has a long history 
of problems that extend beyond the scope of volatile financial markets. The 
clients’ trust is undermined by an obvious agency conflict [Eisenhardt 1989; 
Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000], as well as a lack of transparency regarding 
the advisory process and its results [Black et al. 2002]. While the former 
suggests that advisors might often act in their own interests and may in fact 
do little to improve their clients’ financial situation [e.g., Hackethal et al. 
2012; Kramer 2009], the latter relates to the services’ lack of 
comprehensibility regarding the advisor’s actions and information, leading to 
the clients’ notion of the advisor acting as a “black box” [Oehler and Kohlert 
2009:93].  
In recent years, Swiss FSPs have placed considerable effort into establishing 
and restructuring advisory processes to improve their quality and increase 
client satisfaction, and also plan to further focus on improving their services 
in the future [Lechner et al. 2009]. Such proceeding seems timely, as for 
FSPs differentiation against competitors may be best achieved with superior, 
personalized client service that is difficult to imitate [Buhl and Kaiser 2008]. 
Indeed, operating in one of the leading worldwide destinations for wealth 
management, Swiss FSPs enjoy international reputation of excellent client 
service and value delivery [Birchler et al. 2011; Bretschger et al. 2007]. 
However, prior surveys on advisory quality including Swiss FSPs and clients 
provide evidence that the clients’ service expectations are seldom met 
[Andersen 2002]. Consequently, the following question arises: What are the 
clients’ expectations and why do FSPs fail to meet them? 
Intuitively, the status quo of investment advisory services should have some 
implications on the behaviors of both clients and FSP stakeholders. On the 
one hand, given the increasing competition through far reaching regulations 
and increasingly demanding clients [Crosby et al. 2011], FSPs would be 
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expected to comprehensively address their clients’ critique as a means of 
differentiation. On the other hand, given the generally low quality of advice, 
clients would be expected to principally avoid financial investment advice 
provided by their FSPs. Research, however, finds that the majority of clients 
turn to their advisors for investment decisions [Bluethgen et al. 2008; Cocca 
et al. 2009; Ernst et al. 2009]. In using advisory services, they often seek to 
counterbalance their lack of financial knowledge (or interest), to save time 
and effort or to gain feedback and reassurance for their own investment 
ideas. This raises the question of the role of investment advisory services for 
clients, i.e., whether they actually obtain their information mainly from such 
– rather dissatisfying and untrustworthy – services or use other information 
sources as well: What is the role of investment advisory services and what 
alternatives do clients employ? 
In this essay, we attempt to address these questions with results from 
comprehensive exploratory research into investment advisory services of 37 
Swiss FSPs, triangulating findings from mystery shopping episodes, focus 
groups, interviews and online surveys. We focus on so-called “affluent” 
clients with minimum investments from 50’000 to 500’000 Swiss francs. 
This segment marks the bottom end of the private banking market and is, 
given its potential growth, increasingly considered a lucrative market by 
FSPs [Molyneux and Omarini 2005]; we also found most of the surveyed 
FSPs to have established structured advisory processes to target this growing 
segment with consistent and efficient services. 
In this research, we sought insights in multiple aspects and from multiple 
perspectives. In addition to investigate the aspect of investment advisory 
service quality, we were also interested in the practical information 
technology (IT) support of such services. Given the exceptional importance 
of IT systems in FSP practice (e.g., transaction handling), we wanted to 
investigate their role for investment advice, as well their potential influence 
on advisory quality. Furthermore, addressing the question of why they use 
financial advice despite its ambiguous quality, we were interested in aspects 
of the clients’ general decision-making processes – especially their 
information-seeking behaviors and the role advisory services play therein. 
We considered these aspects from several perspectives, surveying both 
advisory clients as well as different FSP stakeholders, such as sales 
managers (responsible for defining advisory processes), IT managers 
(responsible to adequately support the advisory processes) and advisors 
(responsible to perform advisory processes at the FSP-client interface).  
6. Essay I: Investment Advice and its Role for Investors 
32 
Our results show that FSP stakeholders indeed take a quite different view on 
the clients’ service experience and therefore fail to meet them. Consequently, 
we find that clients are rather dissatisfied with advisory service quality, 
especially regarding their personalization, assurance and transparency. We 
were also surprised to find that technological means to address such issues 
were not implemented in any of the investigated FSPs; even though clients 
explicitly voiced their expectation of supportive IT systems to visualize and 
simulate investment decisions, FSP stakeholders not only show different 
perceptions but also exhibit detrimental incentives for such IT support. 
Finally, we find that these issues may lead to an idiosyncratic usage of 
advisory services. Most clients seem to use advisory services infrequently 
and comparatively late in their information search processes; consequently, 
financial advice marks the exit rather than the entry point to information 
search. To support their early phases of investment decision making, 
however, clients gather relevant information from a wide variety of other 
information sources, such as newspapers, magazines or the Internet. Given 
that human intermediaries are superior to other information systems in 
uncovering and meeting information needs [Ellis et al. 2002], however, the 
late usage of advisory services actually restrains clients in fully exploiting 
their potential benefits.  
In general, this essay answers its research questions from the perspective of 
investment advisory services in Switzerland as one of the leading wealth 
management markets. However, our observations and conclusions regarding 
the general problems of Swiss investment advisory services may be 
generalizable and applicable to other countries as well, with our results on 
advisory quality pointing to issues that other researchers have also found for 
European financial markets (e.g., Germany [Hackethal et al. 2012; Oehler 
and Kohlert 2009], United Kingdom [Atkinson et al. 2007], Austria [Hanke 
et al. 2006]) as well as the United States [Krishnan et al. 1999; Mullainathan 
et al. 2011]. 
The research reported in this essay is based on a large study on investment 
advisory encounters, which was conducted in cooperation with Solution 
Providers in 2008. The results are based on completely revised and extended 
analyses of data on investment advisory quality reported in Mogicato et al. 
[2009] and Schwabe and Nussbaumer [2009] as well as of data collections 
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on client information behavior previously reported in Nussbaumer et al. 
[2009; 2011].
2
 
The essay will proceed as follows; in Section 6.2, we will provide some 
background on investment advisory services along our main phenomena of 
interest, including introductions into advisory service processes, their IT 
support as well as their role for investor information seeking. We will 
conclude Section 6.2 with a brief summary of the main research questions 
against this literature background. Section 6.3 will provide a detailed 
presentation of the research model as well as the methods we applied to 
address the research questions. Results are then presented in Section 6.4 and 
discussed in Section 6.5. We will conclude the essay in Section 6.6 with 
some implications in respect of how to improve investment advisory 
services. 
6.2 Background 
Swiss FSPs rank among the leading institutes for private banking and wealth 
management with the two major banks UBS and Credit Suisse housing the 
largest private banking departments in the world [Birchler et al. 2011:4]. Not 
surprisingly, banking is also important for Swiss economy, making up 18% 
of the nation’s aggregate economic value and also supporting other 
economic sectors in increasing their productivity [Bretschger et al. 2007:16].  
However, not only since the latest collapse of the financial markets, FSPs are 
facing fundamental challenges in performing their services. Increasing costs 
from implementing new regulations as well as cost pressure from increased 
competition increasingly lead to diminishing margins – according to a recent 
study, 88% of the surveyed private banks believe the intensity of competition 
to increase and only 14% were confident to be able to sustain profitability 
and gross revenue [Lechner et al. 2009:7].  
For FSPs to persist in such competition, research finds the most promising 
strategy in differentiation, e.g., by offering highly personalized services 
which cannot easily be compared or imitated due to their dynamics and 
complexity [Buhl and Kaiser 2008]. Indeed, FSPs seem to be increasingly 
aware of the importance of such services; according to business surveys, 
they consequently plan to shift their future focus on client service and value 
delivery, acknowledging that the client “is cautious, smart, less loyal and 
expects excellent service and clear value” [Crosby et al. 2011:2] and expects 
comprehensive advice in respect to her investment objectives [Lechner et al. 
                                           
2
  The specific sections are referenced throughout the essay. 
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2009:17]. Reports on advisory quality and client satisfaction, however, 
suggest that the fundamentals of such services have not yet been established 
and advisory services fall short of the FSPs’ promises.  
To investigate the gaps between the client expectations and FSP practice as 
well their potential solution, we seek insights from several different 
perspectives. While our research centers on the quality of investment 
advisory services, including the implemented advisory processes and their IT 
support, we also integrate a perspective that is seldom discussed in this 
context – the general role and aptitude of advisory services for client 
information search and decision making.  
We will discuss the related background in the following, starting with an 
overview of investment advisory services (Section 6.2.1) and proceeding 
with analyzing the role of IT in such services (Section 6.2.2). We will then 
look at the role of investment advisory services for the investors’ 
information search of investors (Section 6.2.3). Section 6.2.4 concludes this 
section with our related research questions. 
6.2.1 Financial Investment Advisory Services 
The term “financial advisory service” relates to the most general description 
of client-FSP interaction and may include a wide range of different services, 
ranging from retail products (such as payment and account facilities, 
mortgages etc.) and investment-related services (e.g., brokering and 
maintaining exchange-traded products like stocks and mutual funds) to 
individualized wealth management services (e.g., fiscal advice). In private 
banking – i.e., an FSP’s division reserved to wealthy clients (such as, 
increasingly, “affluent” clients) – such services are often combined 
[Molyneux and Omarini 2005:2], e.g., by providing basic retail services of 
accounting with investment advisory services. In the literature, especially the 
latter have received much attention because of their exposition to the 
complexity and volatility of financial markets. In contrast to retail-only 
services, these services are typically conducted on a one-to-one basis via a 
financial advisor or relationship manager, creating a link between the client 
and the FSP [Driga et al. 2009:232]. This role constitutes the main client 
interface to the FSP, offering “its professional financial expertise to 
individuals who seek assistance or want to completely delegate their 
investment decisions” [Fischer and Gerhardt 2007:9]. In this essay, we will 
mainly refer to investment advisory services that focus on supporting the 
client’s decision-making regarding her financial investments, regardless 
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whether they are performed “stand alone” or embedded in comprehensive 
“holistic” advice (i.e., combined with retail products and services). 
In general, sales-oriented advisory services like investment advice may be 
delimited from other professional counseling and advice, e.g., in socio-
psychology; these strive to provide decision guidance for a client and her 
specific problems by means of brokering information and practice of 
capabilities [Schwarzer and Posse 1986], with the ultimate goal of helping 
the client in helping herself. Financial advice may also be delimited from 
“everyday advice”, i.e., the information exchange between co-workers, 
friends and family, which constitutes seventy percent of all “advisory 
encounters” [Warschburger 2009:4].  
Today, the notion of advice is exceedingly used in contexts of service 
provision, such as management consultancy, travel counseling or financial 
advisory services [Schmidt-Rauch and Nussbaumer 2011]. Indeed, in such 
settings clients seek to be enabled and supported to solve a problem (e.g., 
make-or-buy decisions, planning holiday trips or optimizing personal 
financial investments) – however, the advisory and consulting services are 
sales-oriented and potentially strained by the providers’ self-interest to 
provide recommendations that are geared towards revenues rather than the 
clients’ needs. For financial (investment) advisory services, a considerable 
amount of research has pointed to such inherent problems of information and 
interest asymmetry and their implications on quality and regulations [Buhl 
and Kaiser 2008; Evers et al. 2000; Jungermann 1999; Oehler and Kohlert 
2009]. 
Much literature has investigated advisory services from the perspective of 
their underlying processes of client-provider interaction, e.g., especially in 
the domains of management consultation [Elfgen and Klaie 1987; König and 
Volmer 1996; Lippitt and Lippitt 1984] and financial service and insurance 
provision [Bechmann 2002; Haller and Ackermann 1995; Howald 2007; 
Mutter 2003]. Such processes have also found their pendants in marketing 
practice, where FSPs increasingly promote their advisory approaches as a 
means of differentiation (e.g., UBS
3
, CS
4
), mostly targeting wealthier, at 
least “affluent” clients. Though they differ in their number of advisory 
phases and activities as well as their naming, virtually all advisory processes 
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from literature and practice share four generic phases (see also exemplary 
illustration in Figure 6-1). In the contact or initiation phase, the client 
approaches the advisor (or vice versa) because of an investment problem 
(e.g., investing savings in stocks or mutual funds). Advice will then be 
provided and discussed in the succeeding phase (advice), usually in 
(multiple) face-to-face encounters of client and advisor. In these encounters, 
the advisor will try to identify the client’s situation and needs, structure her 
problems and define the investment goals [Elfgen and Klaie 1987]. In 
investment advisory services, the solution generated in the advice phase is 
typically composed of a generic investment strategy based on the client’s 
risk profile as well as its specific mapping to a product portfolio. This 
portfolio is implemented in the next phase of the advisory process 
(implementation) and continuously monitored and adapted by the advisor 
and the client in the support phase; in this phase, further initiations of the 
advisory process may occur, activated for example by changes in the client’s 
financial situation or needs. 
 
Figure 6-1: Generic advisory process, compared to processes from practice and 
literature 
Advisory processes can be seen as the generic representation of the client-
FSP interface, allowing each interaction to be subsumed into a respective 
advisory phase, independent from service channels (e.g., online, over the 
telephone, face-to-face). As such, advisory processes may also be 
conceptualized as the main interface between clients and their FSPs. As 
discussed above, this interface is increasingly important for FSPs as a means 
of differentiation against competitors [Buhl and Kaiser 2008]. However, they 
are also increasingly challenged by demanding clients as well as regulatory 
frameworks, both intensifying cost pressure [Birchler et al. 2011; Crosby et 
al. 2011].  
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Also from a client’s perspective, improving advisory processes and their 
quality seems important. Clients seek financial advice for many reasons, e.g., 
because of their lack of knowledge regarding financial markets or their lack 
of interest or time [Financial Services Authority 2002:15–17]. Consequently, 
they find the greatest advantage of advisory services in advisors explaining 
relevant information, giving feedback on the client’s own investment ideas 
and giving “assurance of doing the right thing” [Cocca et al. 2009:33]. 
Similarly, Bluethgen et al. [2008] argue for the need of financial advice 
because of complexity (individuals making mistakes in complex situations 
which an advisor may be able to prevent) and the related high costs of 
information collection. The important function of advisors to reduce 
complexity of investment decisions is also mirrored in the low financial 
literacy of typical investors. Birchler et al. [2010:29], for example, found 
that only 32% percent of Swiss affluent investors (investments from 0.1 Mio 
to 0.5 Mio CHF) evaluate their investment-relevant knowledge as being 
“good” or “very good”, whereas the majority (61%) states to have only basic 
knowledge.  
While clients obviously seek help of investment advisors in order to achieve 
superior decision quality, research on the quality of advice brokered by FSPs 
is quite ambiguous. Hackethal et al. [2012] find that using professional 
investment advice lowers portfolio returns and has negative effects on risk-
return profiles; advised clients exhibit increased account turnover and 
investment in mutual funds, which the authors find to be “consistent with 
incentives built into the commission structure” [p. 510] of financial advisors. 
Likewise, Bergstresser et al. [2009] found few measurable advantages of 
customers that make use of brokers rather than buying mutual funds 
themselves; actually, brokered funds underperformed their counterparts 
purchased via direct channels (even without subtracting charges). The 
authors argue that their results may also reflect that brokers act in self-
interest, given that fund flows were positively related to related fees. In the 
prevailing advisory business model of FSPs (in Switzerland and, 
incidentally, also in Germany and other European countries [Oehler and 
Kohlert 2009]), such fees – e.g., product distribution and transaction fees – 
are used to cross-subsidize the “free-of-charge” advisory services [Roth 
2007]. Such cost considerations are problematic in terms of moral hazard as 
the advisor may be incentivized to optimize his or the FSPs benefits by 
recommending products that are more costly [Oehler and Kohlert 2009:105]. 
As such, lay investors relying on professional advice are potentially exposed 
to misselling, where – essentially enabled by information asymmetries 
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[Eisenhardt 1989] regarding the actual costs – advisors may sell products 
that do not match the client’s needs but his own interests [Inderst and 
Ottaviani 2011].  
Even if not emphasizing on such detrimental effects of financial advice, 
similar research finds no evidence that advised investors significantly 
outperform or underperform their unadvised counterparts [Gerhardt and 
Hackethal 2009; Kramer 2009; Marsden et al. 2011]. Thus, regarding the 
potential advantages of professional investment advice, Marsden et al. 
[2011] picture financial advisors as “clinical psychologists whose services 
are of value per se” [p. 641, emphasis in the original], in that they encourage 
clients to concern themselves with important investment-related tasks (like 
examining their needs and goals) and make them feel confident about their 
financial future. 
Based on the above-mentioned issues, research on advisory quality [Evers et 
al. 2000; Oehler and Kohlert 2009] and consumer reports [e.g., Stiftung 
Warentest 2007; Stiftung Warentest 2008; Stiftung Warentest 2009; Stiftung 
Warentest 2010] alike tend to heavily criticize professional investment 
advice. The main critiques include the advisors’ insufficient incorporation of 
the client’s financial situation, risk profile and financial goals, lack of 
individualization and poor quality of information exchange, especially 
regarding the explanation of investment types and disclosure of their 
associated risks.  
Legal frameworks have been developed to address such issues and to 
establish uniform regulations for consumer protection. For European 
markets, the most prominent example is the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive [MiFID; European Commission 2004]. Basic duties of 
allegiance, due diligence and information disclosure have also been defined 
for Swiss FSPs [FINMA, Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht 2008; Roth 
2009]. Such legal duties require FSPs to establish basic transparency, e.g., 
that the advisor collects all relevant client information and in turn provides 
her with all relevant information for the potential investment decision 
[Oehler and Kohlert 2009:98]. However, research has frequently pointed to 
weaknesses and failures of the legal frameworks [Jungermann and Belting 
2004; Kohlert 2009], arguing that they show little effect on advisory practice 
because of their generic nature, being neither comprehensive nor specific 
enough [Oehler and Kohlert 2009:98–99]. 
Despite these vast criticisms and despite their dissatisfaction [White and 
Yanamandram 2004], however, the majority of clients keeps turning to 
advisory services for their investment decisions – as reported by Cocca et al. 
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[2009], 69% of Swiss private banking clients use financial advice provided 
by their FSPs. 
6.2.2 Investment Advisory Services and IT 
Besides their basic capital and human resources, IT has long been a strategic 
production factor for FSPs [Marty 1996] and, thus, been a significant driver 
of FSP business [Lamberti and Büger 2008]. While today IT forms the 
backbone of an FSPs daily business, its maintenance and advancement 
regarding infrastructure and software applications is associated with high 
costs – already in 2003, IT systems in retail banking accounted for 15% to 
30% of total operating costs (10-15% in private banking) [Holliger-
Hagmann 2003] and in 2011 IT cost efficiency is still difficult to achieve 
especially for smaller FSPs [Geyran and Ackermann 2011]. 
In respect of investment advisory services, available IT systems are mostly 
related to customer relationship management (CRM) [Moormann and 
Schmidt 2007:20; Peppard 2000]. In practice, these systems support advisors 
in their advisory-related, primarily administrative tasks. To further increase 
the efficiency and effectivity of the advisory process, FSPs increasingly 
strive to support advisor activities with IT systems in terms of, e.g., mapping 
customer requirements to appropriate investment strategies and products. 
While requirements and utility of such systems have been demonstrated in 
scientific discourse [e.g., Dziarstek et al. 2004; Eberhardt and Zimmermann 
2007; Meier et al. 2007; Winkler 2006], few such systems have been 
reported to have also been applied in practice [Alt et al. 2010; Borchers and 
Dlugosch 2006; Heutschi et al. 2006; Voss 2005]. Even more strikingly, 
such IT systems are often designed to be used solely by the advisor in the 
back office – IT support of client-advisor encounters has only recently been 
brought into focus through the availability of appropriate hardware, namely 
multi-touch enabled tabletop and tablet PCs. Software vendors increasingly 
promote solutions to support advisors also in the client encounter (e.g., 
Figlo
5
, Avanade
6
, Barclays
7
, Finantix
8
). At the time of this writing, however, 
FSPs by and large are hesitant at incorporating such technology. In 
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Switzerland, PostFinance
9
 was the first and – as hitherto sole – FSP to 
officially equip their advisors with a dedicated iPad solution. So far, 
however, this solution is limited to advising small businesses. 
Time will tell to what degree and for what purpose such technology will be 
used in FSP practice, and with what effects. Recent research, however, has 
already pointed to great potential of information technology in advisory 
contexts. Research on advisory systems for decision making [Beemer and 
Gregg 2008] highlights the possibilities of IT to support problem 
identification and decision making in complex and rather unstructured 
domains. Research on collaborative use of information technology in 
consultancy [Halloran 2002; Novak and Schmidt 2009; Rodden et al. 2003; 
Schenk and Schwabe 2010; Schmidt-Rauch and Schwabe 2011], on the other 
hand, demonstrate great potential of supportive IT systems to enhance 
advisor-client interaction. In presence of information and interest 
asymmetry, a collaborative advisory support system could mediate the 
advisor-client interaction by providing relevant information regarding 
advisory content, process activities and costs. 
On a conceptual level, such collaborative interaction between customers and 
firms has been discussed as value co-creation [Vargo et al. 2008] and 
interactive creation of value [Reichwald and Piller 2006]. From this 
perspective, the company and the customer collaboratively design the 
product or service, implying a reduction of information asymmetry as the 
company has to reveal the company-specific design and production 
knowledge (solution space) and the customer has to reveal his problem 
knowledge, interests and preferences (problem space) [Novak 2009]. In such 
scenarios, the focus of interaction needs to shift to a reduction of the problem 
as well as the solution space, as complex situations of decision making with 
a variety of options may lead to an overwhelming effect. Thus, in such 
situations, collaborative IT systems pose requirements that are different from 
traditional group support systems [Fjermestad and Hiltz 2000; Mittleman et 
al. 2008; Nunamaker et al. 1996], as they have to mediate the transparent and 
traceable assignment of customer needs and preferences to product or service 
characteristics [Rodden et al. 2003]. A first conceptual framework for 
expert-mediated interactive value creation incorporating such requirements 
has been proposed by Novak [2009]. Characteristics of this concept can be 
found in systems for interactive, cooperative travel advisory by Schmidt-
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Rauch and Schwabe [2011] as well as for advisory in public administration 
[Schenk and Schwabe 2010]. However, though these approaches account for 
the information asymmetry between advisors and clients, the applicability in 
presence of inherent conflicts of interests as in investment advisory services 
has not yet been demonstrated.  
6.2.3 Investment Advisory Services and Investor Information Search10 
Literature on individuals’ information searches when making investment 
decisions is scarce [Loibl and Hira 2009:26], particularly that related to 
research investigating the specific impacts and implications of investors’ 
information search on financial advisory services. Relevant literature can be 
found in general research on information seeking as well as the more specific 
research on consumer information search and decision making. 
Theories of information seeking behavior have emerged from multiple 
perspectives and focused on different aspects of an individual’s behavior in 
dealing with information (see Case [2006] and Fisher et al. [2005] for 
comprehensive overviews). A closely related field is the one of decision 
making – while information seeking is generally concerned with how 
individuals acquire information to satisfy some information need, decision 
making focuses on individuals making choices among alternatives. While 
organizational research is interested in the fundamental mechanics of 
information seeking behavior regarding advice giving and taking [Jonas and 
Frey 2003; Jonas et al. 2005; Sniezek and Buckley 1995], the specific use of 
information sources by investors has found attention in both finance research 
[Birchler et al. 2010; Cocca et al. 2009; Ernst et al. 2009] and consumer 
research [Lee and Hogarth 2000a; Lee and Hogarth 2000b; Lin and Lee 
2004; Loibl and Hira 2009].  
In general, investors seem to be accustomed to rather extensive search 
processes to fulfill their information needs, using a wide variety of 
information sources other than advisory services (such as media, Internet, 
personal environment etc.). Indeed, in a recent survey, Cocca et al. [2009] 
found Swiss private banking clients to make more use of the press (74.7% of 
respondents) than of investment advisors (69.1%), followed by the Internet 
(54.9%), annual reports (44.3%), friends and acquaintances (38.3%) and 
television (29.9%). While these figures show that advisory services are not 
the most important investor information source (even though they are used 
by the majority of investors, for reasons discussed above), they do not 
                                           
10
  This section is partly based on the literature review from Nussbaumer et al. [2011:3–
4]. 
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specifically explain the role of different information sources in respect of the 
client’s information search. For these aspects, Information Science research 
provides two helpful perspectives of investigation, namely the specific 
characteristics of information sources as well as their use in an individual’s 
information search process. We will briefly discuss both perspectives in the 
remainder of this section.  
Information source characteristics. Different information sources exhibit 
peculiar characteristics that affect their applicability for specific information 
gathering. In his seminal model of information behavior, Wilson [1997] 
suggests that different intervening variables such as personal characteristics 
and source characteristics may constitute barriers to information seeking and 
processing. Personal characteristics, e.g., refer to the information seeker’s 
socioeconomic background and her knowledge base. Source characteristics 
are accessibility, credibility and channel of communication (e.g., whether the 
information source is a person or not).  
In order to be used for information seeking, a source has to be accessible – if 
an individual is simply not aware of a specific information source or the 
costs are higher than she is prepared to pay, the use of an information source 
is easily inhibited. Regarding the accessibility of particular information 
sources, the principle of least effort [Case 2005] plays an important role. It 
describes the tendency of individuals to try to invest as little effort into 
information seeking as they possibly can, “even to the point that they will 
accept information they know to be of lower quality (less reliable), if it is 
more readily available or easier to use.” [Bates 2002:6]. In general, this 
behavior should lead to an increased use of more accessible as well as more 
efficient and effective sources [Krikelas 1983; Wilson 1997].  
Credibility, or more generally trust, refers to the perceived reliability and 
accuracy of a source’s information [Wilson 1997:562]. Thereby, not trusting 
or believing the information provider potentially constitutes a strong barrier 
of usage.  
Finally, Wilson [1997:562] suggests that the channel of communication may 
also influence the perception and use of information. Interpersonal 
information can be more effective for reducing uncertainty, making other 
individuals one of the most common sources of information; this is 
consistent with Krikelas’ [1983] observation that individuals will prefer 
personal over impersonal sources. The channel of communication also 
influences the individual’s search methods and modes. Choo [2005] 
distinguishes formal and informal searches, where the former includes only a 
few sources and is aimed simply at learning, while the latter typically 
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involves more sources and effort and is usually performed to find 
information for an impending decision or action. 
Information search process. The search process, i.e., the acts of searching 
for information, is an important aspect of an individual’s information 
behavior. The information need, i.e., the recognition that one’s knowledge is 
inadequate to satisfy a specific goal [Case 2006:5], can be seen as the basic 
premise for individuals to initiate the search process. Belkin [2005] 
conceptualizes this need as an anomalous state of knowledge (ASK), i.e., an 
individual’s state of knowledge that is in some way inadequate regarding a 
topic with respect to some goal. This notion is compatible with Kuhlthau’s 
[2004] concept of uncertainty; the individual progresses in her search 
process to reduce uncertainty and finally fulfill her need or find a solution to 
her problem.  
Wilson [1999] proposes a problem-solving model of four stages for an 
individual’s search process: problem identification (identifying the type of 
problem), problem definition (defining the exact nature of the problem), 
problem resolution (searching for an answer to the problem) and solution 
statement (stating the answer to the problem). Wilson further suggests that 
each stage sees the successive resolution of uncertainty or results in a 
feedback loop to the previous stage if uncertainty fails to be resolved. 
Proposing a similar process model, Kuhlthau [2005] finds that information 
does not necessarily reduce, but may rather increase uncertainty – especially 
when information is inconsistent or conflicting.  
Research on successive search suggests a refinement of the individual’s 
problem and solution space while performing information seeking activities 
[Spink et al. 2002]. Individuals tend to engage in multiple, repeated searches 
on the same problem and thus experience shifts in the particular information 
seeking or problem solving stages [Spink 1996]. Thus, through successive 
searches the seeker may develop a better understanding of the problem and 
make further progress in the search process. Belkin’s ASK can be 
conceptualized as the starting point of such a search process, implying a 
rather incomplete understanding of the problem at the beginning that inhibits 
directed, targeted searches. So, if the individual does not completely 
understand her search problem, she cannot specify questions. In these 
situations, Ellis et al. [2002] show that human intermediaries are superior to 
other information systems. They can use their empathy and understanding of 
another person’s situation to help uncover hidden information needs by 
supplying background information or asking appropriate questions. 
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6.2.4 Research Questions 
Against the presented background of the previous sections, we may refine 
our initially posed general research questions. 
1. What are the clients’ expectations and why do FSPs fail to meet them? 
As discussed in Section 6.2.1, the quality and utility of investment advisory 
services have dubious reputation in both research and the media [e.g., 
Bernau 2011; Evers et al. 2000; Kohlert and Oehler 2009; Spiegel Online 
2010; Stiftung Warentest 2010]. While these aspects have been frequently 
investigated for German FSPs [e.g., Evers et al. 2000; Habschick and Evers 
2008; Oehler and Kohlert 2009], advisory quality of Swiss FSPs has not 
received much attention. Thus, we aim to investigate the status quo of Swiss 
investment advisory practice quality and the expectations and perceptions of 
the services’ main stakeholders, i.e., the clients, advisors, sales managers and 
IT managers:  
RQ1.1 What do advisory stakeholders perceive and expect from 
investment advisory services? 
In Section 6.2.2 above, we have found IT systems to be a backbone of FSP 
business execution and also a significant cost factor [Geyran and Ackermann 
2011; Holliger-Hagmann 2003]. In investment advisory service, and 
especially in client-advisor encounters, however, few IT seems to be used, 
even though research has proposed significant benefits for similar advisory 
domains [Beemer and Gregg 2008; Eberhardt and Zimmermann 2007; 
Novak 2009]. Thus, we are also interested in the status quo of IT in Swiss 
investment advisory services:  
RQ1.2 What is the role of IT in advisory services? 
2. What is the role of investment advisory services and what alternatives do 
clients employ? 
Despite their dissatisfaction with investment advisory services, the majority 
of clients indicate to frequently use investment advice provided by their FSP 
[Cocca et al. 2009; Ernst et al. 2009]. In this essay, we aim to investigate this 
situation from the rather novel perspective of the clients’ information search 
behavior (see Section 6.2.3). We are interested in the clients’ appraisal of 
investment advisory services in their information search processes [Kuhlthau 
2005; Wilson 1999] as compared to other information sources. We 
commence by exploring what information sources clients are using:  
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RQ2.1 What information sources do clients use and what is the role of 
investment advisory services? 
We are then interested in the specific usage of these sources in their 
information search process:  
RQ2.2 What are the clients’ information search processes and what is 
the role of investment advisory services? 
As discussed above, the goal of this essay is to provide an in-depth 
investigation of investment advisory services. We implemented our research 
in Switzerland as one of the leading markets for wealth management and, 
thus, we provide answers to the posed research questions primarily from a 
Swiss perspective. However, our observations and conclusions regarding the 
general problems of investment advisory services, especially regarding 
advisory quality, may be generalizable and applicable to other countries as 
well, with research pointing to similar issues for European financial markets 
(e.g., Germany [Hackethal et al. 2012; Oehler and Kohlert 2009], United 
Kingdom [Atkinson et al. 2007], Austria [Hanke et al. 2006]) as well as the 
United States [Krishnan et al. 1999; Mullainathan et al. 2011]. 
6.3 Methods 
Since our research perspective on financial investment advisory services is 
rather novel, we chose an exploratory research approach. Explorative 
research has the goal to discover and describe unexplained phenomena, their 
correlates and contexts [Briggs and Schwabe 2011; Stebbins 2001]. A 
precept of such explorative endeavors is their broad and altering scope: “To 
understand well any phenomenon, it is necessary to start by looking at it in 
broad, nonspecialized terms.” [Stebbins 2001:viii]. An important facet of 
explorative research is its concatenation of findings, i.e., linking together 
results of field studies in a chain, leading to cumulative grounded theory 
[Stebbins 2006]. Later studies in the chain are significantly guided by earlier 
ones, based on their findings, methods, and samples. Briggs and Schwabe 
[2011] argue that the products of exploratory research provide the foundation 
for all other modes of inquiry in Information Systems research, providing 
unexplained observations to theoretical research and experimental research 
or contribute its discoveries to applied research/engineering, e.g., through 
implicit design guidelines. 
To gain broad and deep insights into our research questions, we applied 
several complementing quantitative and qualitative empirical methods. Such 
combination of approaches also allows for triangulation of methods in order 
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to mutually compensate their weaknesses [Flick 2000]. Combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods allowed both developing and finding 
support for existing working hypotheses and seeking for a deeper 
understanding in areas less well understood.  
Essentially, our exploration followed three general phases that were 
concatenated in that each phase’s results informed the successive phase. 
Below we will detail the phases along with their goals, methods and samples. 
6.3.1 Phase 1: Orientation in the Field 
To gain ground in the field of investment advisory services, we started with 
comprehensive literature research on advisory processes in general as well as 
investment services in Swiss FSPs in particular. Since for the latter 
investigations were scant, we decided to also acquire first hand experiences 
of the status quo of advisory services by conducting mystery shopping 
episodes. Mystery shopping is a form of participant observation, where 
researchers “deceive customer-service personnel into believing that they are 
serving real customers or potential customers” [Wilson 2001:721]. It is used 
in a broad range of organizations to measure service performance relative to 
some established standard [Wilson 2001:732]. For our research endeavor, 
this method allowed us to gain valuable insights into the main questions of 
exploration, “who is doing (thinking, feeling) what to (with, for, about) 
whom, and when and where” [Stebbins 2006:490, emphasis in the original], 
as well as how and why it is being done. It also allowed us to investigate 
provider-specific differences of service provision.  
The overall 21 mystery shopping episodes were conducted by four 
researchers from Dec 2007 to Feb 2008 in Switzerland (16) and – for 
comparison – Austria (3) and Germany (2). The consultations were 
conducted in 12 retail banks, 5 private banks and one provider of 
bancassurance
11
. The researchers were seeking advice for investing a 
minimum of 50’000 to 500’000 Swiss francs, thus representing affluent 
clients; each session had a typical duration of 60 to 90min.  
As a basic means of structuring our observations, reports of mystery 
shopping episodes were compiled along categories generally based on the 
Needs Driven Approach [Schwabe and Krcmar 1996]. The researchers were 
asked to report the implemented work processes in the advisory encounter 
(activities and phases, timeline), their interactions with the FSP and the 
advisor (before and during the encounter), the provided work equipment and 
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workspace (materials, IT tools) as well as the provided information and how 
it was exchanged (e.g., information sources). 
6.3.2 Phase 2: Building and First Validation of General Research Model 
Based on the initial phase of field exploration with literature research and 
mystery shopping, we assembled the prominent phenomena of interest into a 
general research model. As our observations mirrored the prevailing general 
critique of their quality found in the literature, we were interested to find out 
whether they would be assessed equally by investment advisory 
stakeholders. Would FSP advisors and managers be aware of existing issues 
and their clients’ perceptions and expectations?  
A model incorporating such conceptions can be found in Zeithaml et al.’s 
[1990] gaps model of service quality (SERVQUAL), which provides the 
structural base of our research model depicted in Figure 6-2. The gaps relate 
to discrepancies in the clients’ expectations and perceptions of service 
quality (Gap 1), sales managers incorrectly estimating the clients’ 
expectations (Gap 2) as well as further gaps between the sales managements’ 
specification of quality standards, their communication to the customer and 
their actual implementation. According to our main phenomena of interest, 
we decided to focus on the first two gaps and extend the model with further 
stakeholders to assess their estimation of client expectation; thus, in addition 
to sales managers, we decided to interview advisors (actually providing the 
service to the client) and IT managers (being responsible for providing 
supportive IT tools in service provision). 
The gaps model features a multi-item scale for measuring consumer 
perception of service quality [Parasuraman et al. 1988]. Perceived quality is 
conceptualized as the individual’s judgment about a service’s overall 
excellence and results from comparing expectations with perceptions of 
performance [Parasuraman et al. 1988:15]. The SERVQUAL scale measures 
quality expectations and perceptions along five dimensions [Parasuraman et 
al. 1988:23; Zeithaml et al. 1990:26]: 
 Reliability: correct and dependable performance of the service 
 Assurance: knowledge, courtesy and trustworthiness of employees 
 Responsiveness: willingness of immediate and attentive service 
provision 
 Empathy: individual attention in respect of the customer’s specific 
needs 
 Tangibles: the service firm’s exteriors, e.g., physical facilities, 
appearance of personnel 
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As depicted in Figure 6-2, we conceptualize the advisory process as the main 
interface between client and FSP and use it as a common frame of reference 
to investigate the gaps of expectations and perceptions. In addition to the 
general service quality, we were also interested in further aspects, such as the 
actual implementation of advisory processes and their IT support. 
 
Figure 6-2: General research model, partly based on Zeithaml et al. [1990:46] 
Zeithaml et al. [1990] find word-of-mouth communications, personal needs, 
past experience, and external communications of the service provider to be 
key determinants of the client’s service expectation. For our purpose, we 
decided to put an emphasis on the role of the client’s information (seeking) 
behavior in order to investigate the role of advisory services in her decision 
making process and gain insights on her rationales of using investment 
advice.  
While the SERVQUAL model offers one of the most complete 
conceptualizations of service quality [Nyeck et al. 2002], it has been often 
criticized in respect of its underlying dimensions and their stability [Buttle 
1996; Nyeck et al. 2002]. As presented above, we thus based our research on 
an adapted SERVQUAL model (Figure 6-2). Our main investigations of 
advisory quality were based on self-defined dimensions we found to be most 
relevant in the first research phases (e.g., personalization and assurance). 
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Furthermore, we constructed own metrics for these dimensions, which 
showed high reliability (see also Section 6.3.4). We only used the original 
SERVQUAL dimensions and metrics to measure the respondents’ perceived 
relative importance of different service aspects (see above).  
In a next step, we conducted focus group discussions in order to deepen our 
understanding of our framework’s main topics as well as validating the 
usefulness of their conceptualizations. Focus group discussions are 
frequently used for marketing research on consumer attitudes and 
motivations [Flick 2007:259–263; Lunt and Livingstone 1996]. Focus 
groups explicitly use the dynamics of group interactions to generate insights 
on the topics of interest. As such, it may be used for discovery and as a 
source of ideas for quantitative testing [Lunt and Livingstone 1996:80], 
where salient dimensions emerging from group discussions may be used as a 
precursor for quantitative research.  
Typically, but depending on the context and research goals, multiple focus 
groups are applied on the same topic to achieve “saturation” regarding 
potential contributions – as a rule of thumb, Lunt and Livingstone [1996:83] 
state that “one should continue to run new groups until the last group has 
nothing new to add, but merely repeats previous contributions”. While the 
number of participants per focus group is a compromise between 
manageability and idea diversity of the groups [Morgan 1997], group sizes 
mostly vary from 6 to 10 participants [Lunt and Livingstone 1996:82]. 
For our research, we conducted two major focus groups to discuss our 
phenomena of interests from a client’s perspective. The first focus group was 
conducted in May 2008 with 17 employees of a medium size Swiss 
consultancy company, the second in Sep 2008 with 11 alumni of information 
systems studies at University of Zurich. Managing these rather large groups 
was enabled by supporting discussions with an electronic meeting system
12
. 
The system was used to conduct electronic brainstorming episodes, 
quantitative questionnaires as well as written discussions and supported 
moderation as well as documentation of participant contributions. The focus 
groups lasted 150 minutes each. The majority of participants (22 of 28) 
categorized themselves as at least “affluent”, and only 3 clients indicated 
their wealth being below 50’000 CHF; details on the demographics of the 
participants can be found in Table 6-10 in Appendix A1. 
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  Group Systems: http://www.groupsystems.com 
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6.3.3 Phase 3: Validate Understanding through Investigations on a Larger 
Scale 
We initiated the third phase of exploration with two main goals; (1) to 
validate the cumulative findings from the client’s perspective of the 
preceding phases on a larger scale and (2) to contextualize them with the 
perspectives of FSP stakeholders. 
To address the first goal, we conducted a purely quantitative client survey; 
we addressed the second goal with interviews of the main FSP stakeholders 
(advisors, managers, IT managers) to get in-depth insights on their 
perspective regarding advisory quality. Below, we will provide details on 
these investigations. Both interviews and online surveys were based on items 
and measurements that were compiled and already used in Phase 2. These 
will be separately discussed in section “Items and Measurements” below. 
Online survey. Surveys are well-defined sets of questions to which an 
individual is asked to respond, typically with no researcher present [Lazar et 
al. 2010:100]. Surveys seek to collect data from a larger number of people – 
due to their mostly quantitative items and their self-administration, they are 
especially appropriate to get an overview of a specific population; however, 
they are not particularly suited to get in-depth, detailed data [Lazar et al. 
2010:101]. With the diffusion of the Internet, surveys are increasingly 
conducted online, i.e., using the World Wide Web [Atteslander 2006:155]. 
In information systems research, such surveys have been quite popular 
[Newstad et al. 1998; Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1993]. 
Our client online surveys were conducted in two waves from Sep to Oct 
2008. The first wave was sampled based on self-selection and conducted in 
collaboration with a popular Swiss investment journal, which promoted a 
link to the online questionnaire on their web page. Due to length restrictions, 
the survey was split in two parts; one was covering questions on advisory 
quality (including process and IT support), the other contained questions on 
the clients’ information behavior. The two survey parts were promoted one 
after the other (one week apart). The respondents of the second wave were 
sampled with targeted e-mailing, i.e., invitations to participate were sent to 
affluent clients from the researchers’ environment, including the request to 
forward them to other interested parties. The respondents were presented the 
same two questionnaires from the first wave; however, the parts were 
combined into a single questionnaire, offering the possibility to end the 
survey after the first part (information behavior) or to additionally complete 
the second part (advisory quality).  
6. Essay I: Investment Advice and its Role for Investors 
51 
Table 6-1 provides an overview of the profile of respondents of the different 
waves (investment journal, targeted e-mailing) per questionnaire (advisory 
quality, information behavior). The respondents show some diversity 
regarding age and reported wealth. With the majority belonging to the 
targeted affluent customer segment and above, this allowed the investigation 
of a broad client base.  
Table 6-1: Profiles of sample for survey parts 
 Advisory quality Information behavior 
 
Investment 
journal 
Targeted  
e-mailing 
Investment 
journal 
Targeted  
e-mailing 
number of respondents 72 64 66 76 
age 
20-88 years 
M = 52.74  
SD = 14.29 
24-69 years 
M = 40.11  
SD = 9.88 
17-75 years 
M = 50.17  
SD = 14.33 
24-69 years 
M = 39.33 
SD = 9.71 
gender 
female 11.11% 14.06%  9.09% 15.79% 
male  88.89% 85.94% 90.91% 84.21% 
wealth 
< 50.000 CHF 2.78% 7.81% 7.58% 6.58% 
50.000 -  
500.000 CHF 
47.22% 7.81% 50.00% 75.00% 
> 500.000 CHF 40.28% 73.44% 24.24% 10.53% 
not specified 9.72% 10.94% 18.18% 7.90% 
We tested for a potential sample bias regarding the different sampling 
methods by individually evaluating each sample for both questionnaires. 
Evaluations of the different samples regarding the advisory quality 
questionnaire revealed similar answer patterns and showed equal effects in 
respect of their differences to the FSP stakeholders’ assessments; thereby, 
both samples lead to the same conclusions of existing perceptive gaps 
between clients and FSPs. Thus, we decided to merge the samples into a 
single data set and evaluate the pooled sample (see Table 6-2). Analogously, 
answer patterns of the samples were similar also for the information 
behavior questionnaire, revealing equal effects and conclusions for both 
samples. Therefore, we also merged these samples into a single data set 
(Table 6-2). Table 6-11 and Table 6-12 in Appendix A1 provide the detailed 
respondent demographics of the merged data sets. 
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Table 6-2: Merged online survey responses 
Promotion / 
Survey part  
Investment journal Targeted e-mailing  
Total 
completed 
Respondents Completed Respondents Completed 
Advisory quality 180 72 (40.0%) 76 64 (84.2%) 136 
Information 
behavior 
107 66 (61.7%) 126 76 (60.3%) 142 
Interviews. In contrast to surveys, which are appropriate for broad 
investigations of the topic of interest, interviews are a common method of in-
depth, qualitative investigations [Lazar et al. 2010:178]. In this respect, 
interviews are similar to focus group discussions, whereas they are typically 
conducted in one-to-one encounters of interviewer and interviewee. 
Interviews may be conducted to investigate subjective perspectives of 
different social groups, and their results be used either as an input for further 
quantitative investigations or to deepen insights from previous findings 
[Flick 2007:201]. 
In order to investigate the provider perspective on our topics of interest, we 
conducted a total of 62 guided interviews with stakeholders of 37 major 
Swiss FSPs from Jun 2008 to Oct 2008. To gain insights in advisory services 
from a FSP perspective, we interviewed advisors, sales managers as well as 
IT managers concerned with advisory processes and their IT support. Table 
6-3 gives an overview of the number of interviews conducted per 
perspective. 
Table 6-3: Overview of FSP stakeholder interviews 
FSP Stakeholder Role 
Average 
Duration 
# Interviews 
Advisor 
Direct contact with the client, providing 
her with investment advice. 
60-90min 22 
Manager 
Sales manager responsible for advisory 
processes and their implementation 
(typically senior executives). 
60min 28 
IT managers 
Managers responsible for providing 
advisory-relevant IT support. 
60min 12 
The interviews were semi-structured [Atteslander 2006:125], i.e., while the 
interviewers followed a standardized written guideline providing questions 
and their order, they were encouraged to ask additional questions for 
clarification or to follow interviewee comments. For all stakeholders, 
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specific interview guidelines were developed, containing open-ended 
questions regarding the SERVQUAL dimensions, advisory processes as well 
as their IT support; the guidelines shared a specific set of identical questions 
that were asked all stakeholders in order to allow for comparison. 
Furthermore, each guideline contained a set of quantitative items that was 
also used for the client survey. Thereby, we asked the interviewees to 
provide their estimation of client expectations in respect of the different 
advisory dimensions; this allowed statistical comparison of the stakeholders’ 
opinions with those gathered from the client survey. Interviews were audio-
taped and evaluated based on the recordings; for interviews that could not be 
recorded (7 advisor interviews; 5 management interviews; 1 IT manager 
interviews), interviewer notes of the answers were used as the basis of 
evaluation. In two of five non-recorded management interviews, the 
interview partner could not be interviewed face-to-face and electronically 
answered the questionnaire.  
6.3.4 Items and Measurements 
As discussed above, our exploratory research endeavor was conducted in 
three consecutive phases. While the first phase was highly qualitative in 
nature, it furthered our understanding of the domain and its most important 
phenomena. In the second phase, we conceptualized the phenomena of 
interest, compiling and constructing basic items for their measurement. As 
we will detail in this section, we drew these items from three sources, i.e., 
(1) the literature, (2) discussions with advisory professionals of our partner 
organization that we conducted our study with, (3) experiences and insights 
from our early research phases. 
We used these items for the focus groups in the second phase to investigate 
client opinions on advisory quality, advisory processes and IT support as 
well as their information behavior. In the focus groups, quantitative scales 
were mainly used as a starting point and initiator of broad qualitative 
discussions. Thereby, we could gain first experience with the items’ 
comprehensibility and validity.  
For the third phase, which had the goal of gaining a more extensive sample 
of respondents in interviews and online surveys, we extended and adapted 
the quantitative scales. 
In any method of data collection (focus groups, interviews, survey) 
additional control variables were included, such as items to measure age, 
gender, education, assets, and subjective knowledge of asset classes. These 
were operationalized as continuous (e.g., age), categorical (e.g., education, 
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assets) or binary variables (e.g., gender). The variables along with their 
analyses are presented in Appendix A1.  
Advisory quality. To investigate our first research question (RQ1.1), we 
were interested in the client’s perception and expectation of investment 
advisory services. The quantitative scales measuring the clients’ experienced 
and expected service quality as well as the FSP stakeholders’ assessment 
thereof were generally based on the SERVQUAL questionnaire [Zeithaml et 
al. 1990]. This questionnaire provides a multiple-item scale to measure 
different service quality dimensions (reliability, assurance, responsiveness, 
empathy, tangibles) as well as the client’s overall satisfaction. While we 
asked respondents to assess the relative importance of the five dimensions 
(see below), from our focus group discussions and interviews the topics of 
satisfaction, assurance and personalization emerged to be most relevant and 
interesting for our research goals. Thus, we based our online surveys on 
scales to measure these dimensions. The final scales regarding advisory 
quality are presented in Table 6-4. Items were presented as seven-point 
Likert items, where 1 was “I strongly disagree”, and 7 was “I strongly 
agree”. In the online survey, client respondents were offered an additional 
answer category of “I don’t know”. Items attributed to this category were 
excluded from analysis for the respective respondent. To test their reliability, 
we computed Cronbach’s alpha for all Likert scales – with all scores greater 
than the suggested cut-off value of 0.7 [Nunnally and Bernstein 1994], the 
scales showed satisfying reliability. 
As indicated in Table 6-4, Likert scales of personalization and assurance 
were measured twice to assess the respondent’s agreement regarding her 
expectation as well as experience (perception). For example, to assess their 
perceived and expected assurance, the client respondents would respond to 
the items “I expect the behavior of very good advisors to be instilling 
confidence in clients” and “The behavior of advisors is instilling confidence 
in clients”, respectively. Note that, as suggested by Zeithaml et al. [1990], 
expectation was measured in respect to excellent service and “very good” 
advisors. 
In the interviews, FSP stakeholders responded to the same scales, however, 
with two notable differences. First, for all scales other than satisfaction and 
advisory process quality (where all respondents assessed experience), 
advisors and managers were only provided with items on expectations. 
Second, they were asked to respond to both experience and expectation items 
according to how they thought their clients would assess them. IT managers 
were only asked to assess the client’s expectation on IT (see below). 
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Table 6-4: Advisory quality scales with items and reliabilities 
Likert Scale Items 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
(expectation) 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
(experience) 
Satisfaction 
 “I was very satisfied with the investment 
advisory service.” 
 “I would highly recommend the investment 
advisory service.” 
- .958 
Personal-
ization 
 “I expect very good advisors to adapt their 
advice to the specific situation and 
requirements of the client.” 
 “I expect very good advisors to pay attention 
that relevant client information is up-to-
date.” 
 “I expect very good advisors to consult 
experts if uncertainties appear.” 
 “I expect very good advisors to always 
respond to the client’s requests.” 
 “I expect very good advisors to incorporate 
the client’s situation and requests into their 
advice.” 
.733 .877 
Assurance 
 “I expect the behavior of very good advisors 
to be instilling confidence in clients.” 
 “I expect very good advisors to have 
sufficient knowledge of developments 
regarding financial market.” 
 “I expect very good advisors to have 
sufficient knowledge of the products they 
are supplying.” 
 “I expect very good advisors to recommend 
adequate solutions for the client’s 
problems.” 
.811 .916 
We also measured the client, advisor and manager respondents’ assessment 
of the relative importance according to the original SERVQUAL 
dimensions, based on the items presented in [Zeithaml et al. 1990:184]. They 
were asked to allocate a total of 100 points among the following features. 
 Reliability: “The bank’s ability to perform the promised service 
dependably and accurately.” 
 Assurance: “The knowledge and courtesy of the bank’s employees and 
their ability to convey trust and confidence.”  
 Responsiveness: “The bank’s willingness to help customers and 
provide prompt service.” 
 Empathy: “The caring, individualized attention the bank provides its 
customers.” 
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 Tangibles: “The appearance of the bank’s physical facilities, 
equipment, personnel, and communication materials.” 
Advisory process quality. We were not only interested in the respondents’ 
assessment of general dimensions of service quality but also in their 
particular perception of the service procedure, i.e., the advisory process. 
Thus, analogous to advisory quality scales, we provided clients and FSP 
stakeholders a scale to assess their perception of the process quality. In 
discussions with advisory experts of our partner organization, we defined 
five relevant aspects of advisory process quality, related to its costs, 
duration, perceived efficiency and effectiveness. The respective items were 
used in focus groups, online surveys and interviews. Again, FSP 
stakeholders were asked to assess how their clients’ would respond to the 
items. 
Table 6-5: Scale for measuring experience of advisory process quality, with items and 
reliability 
Likert Scale Items (experience) 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
(experience) 
Advisory 
process 
quality 
 Costs: “Monetarily, the advisory process is too expensive 
(i.e., it is not worth the advisor’s fees and commissions).” 
 Duration: “Proceeding from information need to the 
investment decision takes very long.” 
 Efficiency. “Coming to a decision is too time-consuming.” 
 Effectiveness: “The advisory process reliably leads to a 
very good decision.” 
.801 
Table 6-5 gives an overview of the Likert scale, along with its items and 
computed reliability
13
. Item measurements ranged from 1 (“I strongly 
disagree”) to 7 (“I strongly agree”), whereas survey respondents were 
offered an additional answer category of “I don’t know”. Items attributed to 
this category were excluded from analysis for the respective respondent. 
IT support. To quantitatively measure the client’s perception and all 
respondents’ expectation regarding specific advisory IT support (related to 
RQ1.2), we used the seven point Likert items presented in Table 6-6. In 
defining the different categories of advisory process IT support, we could 
again draw on the experience of our partner organizations’ domain experts. 
In accord with their practical insights regarding IT tools that were used in 
investment advisory practice, we defined four classes of IT systems related 
                                           
13
  Negatively coded items (1-3) were recoded for calculating reliability. 
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to communication support, information access, decision support and self-
advice. We used this classification for focus groups, interviews and online 
surveys. Due to their specific semantics of investigating different 
information systems, we could not summarize the items to a single scale and 
compute its reliability. Thus, results of items on IT support were evaluated 
individually.  
Analogous to the advisory quality scale, each item regarding IT support was 
phrased to assess the client’s perception (e.g., “Banks provide software 
programs that allow for self-advice.”) as well as her expectation (e.g., “I 
expect very good banks to provide software programs that allow for self-
advice.”). FSP stakeholders (advisors, managers, IT managers) were only 
asked to assess their clients’ expectations. 
Table 6-6: Items to investigate expectation regarding different information systems 
 Items (expectation) 
IT support 
 Communication support: “I expect banks to provide a wide range of possibilities 
to communicate with advisors (e.g., e-mail, instant messaging, video 
conferencing, SMS).” 
 Information access: “I expect in advisory encounters IT systems to be available 
that allow incorporating up-to-date information (e.g., rates, ratings, tests…) into 
decision making.” 
 Decision support: “I expect in advisory encounters IT systems to be available 
that allow simulation and visualization of investment scenarios by incorporating 
life stages and important events.” 
 Self-advice: “I expect banks to provide according software programs (e.g., 
checks of financial situation) to allow for self-advice.” 
Information seeking behavior. In contrast to other phenomena of interest, 
items on information seeking behavior were only responded by clients in 
focus groups and online surveys. Related to RQ2.1, the participants were 
prompted to evaluate properties of several information sources, which were 
classified into seven categories. Similar categories were used in the surveys 
of Ernst et al. [2009] amongst German shareholders and Cocca et al. [2009; 
2008; 2006] amongst Swiss private banking clients, whereas we further 
divided the categories of investment advice (provided by banks, provided by 
independent FSPs) and Internet (professional and informal sources) to 
evaluate their potential differences:  
 personal environment (family, friends, co-workers, etc.)  
 advisory services provided by banks 
 advisory services provided by independent FSPs 
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 professional Internet sources (stock exchange web sites, finance news, 
sites of FSPs) 
 informal Internet sources (online communities, blogs, etc.) 
 media (newspapers, magazines, TV broadcast, print and online-access)  
 guidebooks (books, stock market letter).  
We asked the respondents to rate these information sources for investment 
decisions to several criteria. Based on RQ2.1, we were interested in FSP 
clients’ usage of different information sources, which we conceptualized as 
their frequency of usage. Further criteria were derived from the literature 
(see also Section 6.2.3): based on the source characteristics of Wilson 
[1997], we were interested in the clients’ perception of accessibility and their 
trust in the information sources. Regarding the personal characteristics that 
may interfere with a client’s information search, we were also interested in 
the clients’ perceived comprehensibility of different information sources. 
Based on the principle of least effort [Case 2005], which suggests that clients 
might make greater use of more effective and efficient sources, we were also 
interested in the influence of such criteria on information source usage. The 
individual criteria were measured using the following items: 
 frequency of usage: “How often do you use the following information 
sources for investment decisions?” 
 accessibility: “This information source is easily accessible for me.” 
 trust: “I trust in this information source.” 
 comprehensibility: “The information provided by this source is 
comprehensible for me.”  
 inefficiency: “Using this information source takes much time.” 
 effectivity: “The information provided by this source helps me to 
make a very good investment decision.” 
Responses to the opening question, frequency of usage, were measured as 
seven point Likert items that ranged from “very little” (1) to “very often” (7) 
and featured an additional answer category of “never” to automatically filter 
out unused sources for subsequent questions. To further investigate the 
information search processes of the respondents (RQ2.2), we were also 
interested in their chronological order of information source usage. We 
asked the respondents to provide a temporal rank order of the sources they 
had indicated using (i.e., only those sources could be ranked to which the 
respondent had not attributed a response of “never”, whereas not all sources 
had to be ranked).  
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6.3.5 Analyses 
While the three phases represent our actual research process, they do not 
feature one-to-one relations to our research questions. Indeed, we 
investigated our phenomena of interests by concatenating findings of all 
phases and contextualizing the different perspectives. Answers to the 
individual research questions, however, put emphases on particular data 
collections. Below, we will present our general analyses of qualitative data 
(interviews and focus groups). We will then briefly discuss the combination 
of qualitative data and quantitative statistical analyses according to our 
research questions.  
In general, the analysis of the semi-structured interviews with advisors, 
managers and IT managers followed the structure of qualitative content 
analysis [White and Marsh 2006; Mayring 2000]. We based our approach on 
thematic coding [Flick 2007:402], which is especially suitable to investigate 
predefined questions for predefined groups and compare them.  
We proceeded as follows. All interviews were transcribed along the 
questions of the respective interview guide. For each interview, summaries 
of the respondents’ answers were then consolidated in spreadsheets (one per 
stakeholder group), where columns related to questions and rows related to 
the single interviewee’s answers. 
Development of themes (categories) followed three basic steps, (1) analysis 
of single interviews, (2) analysis/comparison of all interviewees’ answers per 
stakeholder group, (3) analysis/comparison of categories between 
stakeholder groups. In the first step, the single interviews were analyzed to 
identify central topics along the predefined themes with their corresponding 
questions. These topics were coded “openly”, i.e., answer categories were 
not defined a priori but developed from the analysis; in doing so, each topic 
could be used as a “heuristic” for analyzing other interviews.  
After the single interviews (i.e., rows in the spreadsheet) had been analyzed, 
in the second step categories of interest were compared for each question 
(columns) and related to each other, such that a general tendency or “theory” 
could be formulated. For the predefined theme of “advisory process”, for 
example, identified topics in answers of questions like “What do you think 
of the advisory process?” could include “too restrictive”, “does not match 
my work practice”, “too generic to be of use” and, thus, may lead to the 
general thematic structure of advisors being skeptical towards advisory 
processes.  
While analyzing and comparing the identified categories between interviews, 
the thematic structures evolved and were adapted, e.g., as individual 
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interviewees provided contradicting categories for particular questions (e.g., 
finding advisors that are “satisfied with the process and appreciate to have 
guidelines”). 
In the third step, we compared the categories between stakeholder groups, 
analyzing similarities and differences between advisors, managers and IT 
managers for our topics of interest. On this level, we also compared the 
categories with those found in our client focus groups to gain a 
comprehensive picture of the different perspectives.  
Our analysis of the client focus groups was based on written discussions 
(documented by the electronic meeting system) as well as video-taped oral 
discussions. Similar to our interview analysis strategy, the interpretation of 
focus group discussions was related to thematic coding and categorizing, as 
also suggested by other researchers [see, e.g., review in Lunt and 
Livingstone 1996:94]. In doing so, we investigated the discussions per topic 
(e.g., satisfaction with advisory, quality of advisory process, information 
search behavior) and identified the general themes being focused in the 
different discussions. Since the written discussions were anonymized, we 
could not match oral and written statements of the participants. Instead, we 
compared and matched oral and written statements regarding their prevalent 
topics and themes. 
RQ1.1 Our account on the stakeholder’s perceptions and expectations of 
advisory services builds upon both quantitative and qualitative items 
regarding several dimensions of advisory quality, including the quality of the 
underlying advisory processes.  
All stakeholder groups (clients, advisors, managers) responded a common 
set of quantitative items in interviews and online surveys, allowing us to 
evaluate differences of their responses regarding potential statistical 
significance. We conducted Kruskal-Wallis tests
14
 to investigate differences 
of the stakeholder groups’ assessments because responses to the scales were 
not normally distributed (according to Shapiro-Wilk tests; p < .05 for all 
variables). For every significant difference we conducted post-hoc analysis 
with Mann-Whitney U test
15 
(two-tailed). To explore the differences between 
client expectation and experience along the employed scales, we conducted 
                                           
14
  The Kruskal-Wallis test is the non-parametric equivalent of the one-way between-
subjects ANOVA. It does not assume normal distribution of the dependent variable for 
each category of the independent variable. 
15
  Mann-Whitney U tests are the non-parametric equivalent of independent t-tests and do 
not assume normal distribution of the compared data. 
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Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests
16
 (two-tailed), since Shapiro-Wilk 
tests had shown that the differences were not normally distributed (p < .05 
for all variables). 
All p-values were corrected for multiple hypotheses testing using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure [Benjamini and Hochberg 1995]. The 
correction also accounted for the tests with non-significant results. For all 
variables revealing significant differences according to Mann-Whitney and 
Wilcoxon tests, we also calculated the effect size
17
 to provide an objective 
measure of their importance.  
The quantitative results of surveys are qualified and triangulated with our 
qualitative analyzes from focus groups and stakeholder interviews (see 
above), as well as observations from mystery shopping episodes. 
RQ1.2 Our treatise on the role of IT in advisory processes and client-advisor 
encounters is mainly based on our observations from mystery shopping 
episodes as well as the IT-related questions in interviews and surveys. These 
qualitative data is complemented with quantitative measures on expectation 
and perception of IT usage – with the variables (and their differences, 
respectively) being significantly non-normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk, p < 
.05 for all variables), the stakeholders’ assessments again were compared 
using Kruskal-Wallis tests with post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests (two-tailed), 
and differences of client expectation and perception were evaluated using 
Wilcoxon tests (two-tailed). As for the other tests, we corrected the p-values 
for multiple comparisons (also accounting for non-significant results) and 
calculated the effect size r for significant differences. 
RQ2.1 and RQ2.2 To investigate the information sources that FSP clients 
are accustomed to use to support their investment decisions, we performed a 
descriptive analysis of the measures introduced above. The frequency of 
usage and patterns of non-usage were analyzed using the mean of the 
respondents’ rating of their source usage, filtering out information sources 
that the respondents indicated not using at all (“never”). As the performed 
Shapiro-Wilk tests showed them to be not normally distributed, we 
conducted Friedman tests to compare the respondents’ ratings of information 
sources (in respect of accessibility, efficiency, effectivity, trust and 
                                           
16
  The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test is the non-parametric equivalent of the 
paired t-test without the assumption of normal distribution. 
17
    
 
√ 
 , where r = .1 is considered a small effect, r = .3 a medium effect and r ≥ 5 is 
considered a large effect [Field 2009]. 
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comprehensibility). Post-hoc analysis was conducted using Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-rank tests with a Benjamini-Hochberg correction 
applied. The correction also accounted for the tests with non-significant 
results. For significant differences, we also calculated the effect size r. 
We deduced the search process of the respondents from their indicated order 
of usage, which we evaluated for each source according to the rank it was 
assigned in the majority of cases. The number of information sources used 
by the respondents for making a decision on financial investments was 
calculated by counting the sources given for the order of usage. 
As for the other research questions, we qualified and triangulated the results 
of our quantitative analyses with qualitative findings (here: discussion of 
information source characteristics in client focus groups).  
6.4 Results 
The results will be presented along the research questions discussed in 
Section 6.2.4. We commence with RQ1, which is concerned with the clients’ 
expectations and experiences regarding investment advisory services and the 
quality of their processes (RQ1.1), their IT support (RQ1.2) as well as the 
FSP stakeholders’ assessment thereof. We will then proceed with providing 
answers to RQ2 regarding the clients’ preferred information sources (RQ2.1) 
and their information search processes (RQ2.2). 
6.4.1 RQ1.1 What do Advisory Stakeholders Perceive and Expect from 
Investment Advisory Services?18 
We will present the results on the quality of Swiss investment advisory 
processes along the constructs and metrics introduced in Section 6.3.4. First, 
we will discuss our findings regarding the perceived quality of advisory 
service processes and the clients’ satisfaction with overall service provision. 
We will then turn to our results regarding the importance of particular 
dimensions of service quality, especially in respect of service personalization 
and assurance. 
Quality of investment advisory processes. The majority of the 37 surveyed 
FSPs reported to have introduced standardized advisory processes (26 FSPs) 
in the past three years or that such processes were under development (2 
FSPs). These processes mirror the generic advisory processes discussed in 
                                           
18
  Data underlying this section has in parts been previously published in Mogicato et al. 
[2009] and Nussbaumer et al. [2009], whereas the results reported in this essay have 
been entirely reanalyzed. 
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the literature (see Section 6.2.1); their implementation, however, showed to 
be quite diverse. While some FSPs provide their advisors with checklists and 
non-binding guidelines, others have engineered process phases with strict 
standards of information gathering and processing.  
According to our mystery shopping episodes, compliance with either of 
these processes seems to be rather low. Client needs and expectations were 
gathered and analyzed only in 9 of 21 episodes; only in 6 cases the advisor’s 
analysis of the client’s personal financial situation and risk profiling 
followed a structured process. Most of the mystery shoppers’ negative 
remarks were related to this lack of incorporating and analyzing the client’s 
situation and needs. Consequently, only in seven episodes the advisors 
evaluated whether the client’s advisory goal had been reached.  
These findings were confirmed in interviews with advisors and managers, 
who found various reasons for the lack of process acceptance. Advisors, for 
example, found the processes to be too rigid and restraining advisory 
practice – for some of them, the processes were impractical because their 
conception lacked inclusion of advisor input. Also, some advisors found the 
established processes to be insufficiently supported by IT (see also findings 
on RQ2.2 below). Managers, however, found that the main issue of current 
advisory processes was their lack of monitoring and enforcement. 
In our mystery shopping episodes, we could also confirm the critique of 
potential interest conflicts discussed in the literature. Only in seven advisor 
encounters, the test clients found the advisor to perform a comprehensive 
check of their financial situation, whereas in seven episodes the emphasis 
was on product sale – in seven cases, the mystery shoppers were even 
indecisive of the advisor’s strategy. Advisor competence, however, was 
found to be “very good” in the majority of cases (11 episodes), “good” in 
two episodes, “moderate” in four and “poor” in only two episodes (answers 
for two episodes missing). 
In general, the mystery shoppers found that advisors put much emphasis on 
small talk, making up to 40% of the encounter’s total duration, whereas less 
time was dedicated to needs gathering and analysis or solution 
recommendation. Also, all advisors provided their advice based on pen and 
paper, supported by brochures and fact sheets. IT was used by the advisor in 
only 6 cases – to look up exchange rates and print out further fact sheets. 
Dedicated advisory software was not used in any of the encounters. 
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Figure 6-3: Client experience of advisory process quality  
(with estimations of advisors and sales managers) 
Based on the observations regarding the established advisory processes, we 
were interested in how clients and FSP stakeholders would rate the status 
quo of advisory processes regarding their quality. Aggregated responses of 
clients, advisors and managers are presented in Figure 6-3. Note that 
advisors and managers assessed how they thought that their clients would 
respond to the specific scales. 
The groups’ assessments of advisory process quality showed significant 
differences (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ
2
(2) = 37.800, p < .001) and post-hoc 
Mann-Whitney tests found differences to be highly significant with medium 
to large effect sizes between clients and advisors (U = 477.000, p < .001, r = 
-.49) as well as clients and sales managers (U = 747.500, p < .001, r = -.38). 
Assessments of sales managers and advisors, however, revealed no 
significant differences. 
Client satisfaction. Besides their assessment of the advisory process quality, 
we were also interested in the clients’ overall satisfaction with investment 
advisory services as well as the FSP stakeholders’ assessment thereof. As 
depicted in Figure 6-4, the clients showed low satisfaction with the FSPs’ 
services. Quite to the contrary, FSP stakeholders believed that their clients 
were very satisfied – we found significant differences between the clients’ 
and FSP stakeholders’ assessments (Kruskal-Wallis test, χ2(2) = 52.532, p < 
.001). Post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests revealed that both the differences 
between clients and advisors (U = 344.500, p < .001, r = -.44) as well as 
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clients and sales managers (U = 566.000, p < .001, r = -.45) were significant 
with large effect sizes. The assessments of sales managers and advisors 
revealed no significant differences. 
Regarding their satisfaction with advisory services, also the participants of 
our focus groups expressed mixed feelings – few positive aspects were 
raised, with one participant highlighting his advisor’s kindness and concern 
with his own financial requirements, and another being impressed by his 
advisor’s initiative, providing regular updates via e-mail. Yet other 
participants appreciated the advisor’s feedback on the client’s own 
investment ideas. 
 
Figure 6-4: Overall client satisfaction with advisory services  
(with estimations of advisors and sales managers) 
However, the majority of participants criticized their advisors as being very 
passive, inexperienced and lacking an in-depth understanding of the FSP’s 
products. One participant even doubted that advisory services are meaningful 
at all, stating that “if the advisor knew how to make money, he would not be 
working as an advisor”. 
Some discussions also circled around the advisors’ tendency to take 
advantage of uninformed clients, i.e., focusing on their own or the FSP’s 
interests. While the focus group participants generally acknowledged that 
FSPs cross-subsidize advisory services with different fees and voiced their 
willingness to pay these in return for good advice, they criticized that the 
services lacked transparency regarding the exact costs; thus, they found it 
difficult to assess the cost-benefit ratios of advisory services. 
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The open discussion results were mirrored in the quantitative focus group 
surveys, in which only 35% of the focus group participants indicated that 
they would “highly recommend” their latest consultation.  
In interviews with FSP stakeholders, we found that their systematic 
overestimation of client satisfaction was largely based on personal 
impressions of their own advisory practice or anecdotal evidence from others 
– almost two-thirds of the surveyed FSPs indicated that they did not measure 
client satisfaction; other FSPs declared to measure client satisfaction only 
irregularly and using informal modalities, e.g., by advisors inquiring the 
client’s satisfaction at the end of the service encounter. 
Dimensions of advisory quality. We asked clients, advisors and sales 
managers to weight the relative importance of the different SERVQUAL 
dimensions (reliability, assurance, responsiveness, empathy, tangibles; a 
total of 100 points could be allocated). The different groups’ assessments are 
presented in Figure 6-5. Advisors and sales managers assessed the 
dimensions from their clients’ perspective.  
Clients found reliability to be the most important dimension, followed by 
trust and responsiveness. FSP stakeholders, however, expected significantly 
different client preferences for all but one dimension – responsiveness was 
evaluated similarly by all stakeholders. For all dimensions, FSP stakeholders 
showed very similar estimations of the clients’ evaluation with no 
statistically significant differences.  
Differences in the weighting of reliability (Kruskal-Wallis, χ
2
(2) = 32.096, p 
< .001), however, were significant with medium effect sizes between clients 
and managers (U = 805.00, p < .001, r = -.38) as well as clients and advisors 
(U = 789.000, p < .001, r = -.29). Weighting of assurance also showed 
significant differences between the groups (χ
2
(2) = 13.294, p = .001); both 
advisors (U = 996.500, p = .014, r = -.20) and managers (U = 1240.500, p = 
.006, r = -.23) evaluated the relative importance higher than the client 
respondents; effect sizes, however, were small.  
The stakeholders’ weighting of empathy (individual attention of the FSPs 
employees towards the clients) shows similar differences (χ
2
(2) = 13.858, p = 
.001), with advisors (U = 944.000, p = .008, r = -.23) and managers (U = 
1275.000, p = .008, r = -.22) overemphasizing the importance of empathy as 
compared to their clients (small effect sizes). Finally, also the tangibles of 
advisory services are differently valued by the stakeholders (χ
2
(2) = 10.393, 
p = .006). Clients attach significantly less importance to this dimension than 
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advisors (U = 1004.000, p = .015, r = -.20) and managers (U = 1390.000, p = 
.025, r = -.18) – the effect sizes of these differences, however, were small.  
 
Figure 6-5: Weighting of relative importance of quality dimensions  
(with estimations of advisors and sales managers) 
Personalization. In addition to the general weighting of service quality 
dimensions, many discussions in focus groups and interviews circled around 
the personalization and assurance of advisory services. As depicted in Figure 
6-6, the client’s expectation regarding personalized and client-oriented 
services is very high, approximately matching the FSP stakeholders’ 
estimation. While the differences between the groups were statistically 
significant (Kruskal-Wallis, χ
2
(2) = 12.654, p = .002) with advisors (U = 
810.000, p = .008, r = -.23) and managers (U = 1295.000, p = .015, r = -.20) 
estimating the client’s responses lower, the effect sizes were small. Again, 
Mann-Whitney tests found no significant differences between the advisors’ 
and managers’ assessments. Concerning the significant differences between 
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client expectation and experience (Figure 6-7), effects were very large (Z = 
8.539, p < .001, r = -.81). 
In the focus groups, we discussed whether clients deemed advisory services 
to be personalized, i.e., tailorable to incorporate information of their 
individual requirements and preferences. Though some participants 
expressed strong interest in having such information incorporated, the 
majority of participants did not find that existing advisory services were 
individualized or personalized to their preferences or learning progress. 
Some participants even felt that advisors tended to shelve their clients and 
advise them according to some particular “category”. Thus, they did not find 
that the advisor responded to their specific financial situation and needs but 
rather advised standard recommendations, leading to a perception of low 
influence on the process and its results.  
As noted above, this perception was mirrored in the mystery shopping 
episodes: in only 9 of 21 episodes did the advisor attempt to obtain specific 
information on the client’s needs, preferences and expectations. The 
obtained personal information, however, was focused on individualizing the 
outcome, i.e., investment strategies or products fitting the client’s personal 
situation, and not on individualizing the information mediation according to 
the client’s information need. 
 
Figure 6-6: Expected personalization of clients (with estimations of advisors and sales 
managers) 
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Figure 6-7: Client expectation and experience of advisory service personalization 
Assurance. As already indicated in the general weighting of quality 
dimensions, the clients’ expectation of assurance is high. Advisors and 
managers show very similar estimations (Figure 6-8).  
 
Figure 6-8: Expected assurance of clients 
Even though we found statistically significant differences between the 
respondent groups (Kruskal-Wallis, χ
2
(2) = 9.633, p = .008), post-hoc Mann-
Whitney tests revealed that only the ratings of clients and advisors were 
significantly different (U = 864.500, p = .009, r = -.22) with a small effect 
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size. To the contrary, the clients’ expectation did not match their experience 
(Figure 6-9) – the Wilcoxon test revealed a significant difference (Z = 8.523, 
p < .001, r = -.77) with a large effect size. 
 
Figure 6-9: Client expectation and experience of advisory service assurance 
Focus group participants found assurance and trustworthiness of advisory 
services low for several reasons; first, they criticized that clients could not 
discern their counterpart’s real interests, i.e., whether the advisor acts on the 
client’s behalf or pursue his own or the FSPs’ interest. Indeed, in the 
interviews almost all FSPs indicated to provide their advisors with lists of 
recommended products. Being offered such recommended products, the 
client has to trust both the FSP (i.e., that recommended products do not only 
serve FSP self-interests) and the advisor (i.e., that he is actually 
recommending adequate products). 
The client participants found the issue of trustworthiness to be aggravated by 
the advisory services’ lack of transparency regarding the advisor’s actions 
and activities. Clients tend to perceive the advisor as a “black box”, not 
being able to comprehend how or on what basis advisors derive their 
recommendations. 
In line with their high expectation of advisors recommending “adequate 
solutions”, client participants also expected advisor to warn them against 
high-risk or imprudent investments, i.e., to sufficiently analyze the client’s 
situation and risk profile prior to conducting transactions. Furthermore, they 
were disappointed with most advisors’ inadequate information policy 
regarding negative developments of their portfolio. 
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6.4.2 RQ1.2 What is the Role of IT in Advisory Services?19 
As observed in our mystery shopping episodes, the role of IT for supporting 
advisory service encounters is rather insignificant – if at all, available 
computers are primarily used to look up online information (e.g., exchange 
rates) or to print out further information material. This impression was 
supported by the interviews with FSP stakeholders. Advisors and sales 
managers indicated that FSPs provide several supportive IT systems in the 
back office – e.g., CRM systems to collect information on the interaction 
with clients or other systems to enforce compliance (e.g., in respect of 
money laundering laws). Indeed, those advisors of our mystery shopping 
episodes, who had prepared for the meeting, obviously had gathered their 
information from back office IT systems and brought a printout to the 
meeting.  
Focus group participants voiced their disappointment regarding the lack of 
IT support and expressed a strong consensus that implementation of 
supportive IT would be useful, especially regarding decision support, e.g., 
providing visualization and simulation functionality as well as self-advice, 
e.g., applications supporting the client with her investment decisions over the 
Internet.  
This general indication was supported by the online survey respondents 
(Figure 6-10).  
                                           
19
  Qualitative results presented in this section were previously published in Schwabe and 
Nussbaumer [2009] and Mogicato et al. [2009]. Quantitative data were published in 
Mogicato et al. [2009] and have been reanalyzed for the essay at hand.  
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Figure 6-10: Client expectation of IT support in advisory services  
(with estimations of advisors, sales managers and IT managers) 
Clients show rather high expectation of all surveyed IT support systems – 
while FSP stakeholders (advisors, sales managers and IT managers) mostly 
provided correct assessments of the client’s expectations, gaps between 
client expectation and experience proved to be large (Figure 6-11).  
Regarding communication support, i.e., FSPs supporting diverse 
communication channels for clients to contact their advisors, we found no 
statistically significant differences between stakeholder groups. Client 
expectation of such support, however, did not match their experience (Z = -
4.650, p < .001, r = -.43) with medium effect size. Also, client expectation of 
information access (availability of up-to-date information in advisory 
encounters) was rated equally high by all stakeholder groups.  
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Figure 6-11: Client expectation and experience of IT support 
Nevertheless, advisory practice causes a noticeable gap between client 
expectation and experience (Z = -6.454, p < .001, r = -.60) with large effect 
size. 
Clients expect advisory encounters to be provided with decision support 
tools. Estimations of FSP stakeholders do not quite mirror such expectation 
(Kruskal-Wallis, χ
2
(2) = 26.853, p < .001), with significant differences 
between clients and advisors (U = 708.000, p < .001, r = -.32) as well as 
between clients and managers (U = 1040.500, p < .001, r = -.30). Differences 
between client expectation and experience again were significant with large 
effect sizes (Z = -6.919, p < .001, r = -.64).  
Finally, clients also expect FSPs to support their information search and 
decision making outside advisory encounters with tools for self-advice. 
Again, FSP stakeholders do not show high awareness of such expectation 
(χ
2
(2) = 44.716, p < .001) and showing moderate differences between client 
and manager responses (U = 657.000, p < .001, r = -.43), clients and 
advisors (U = 656.000, p < .001, r = -.34) and clients and IT managers (U = 
414.500, p = .005, r = -.23). Differences between client expectation and 
experience were large (Z = -6.898, p < .001, r = -.64). 
While FSP stakeholders and especially IT managers seem to acknowledge 
the clients’ expectation of IT support, our observations of advisory practice 
as well as the clients’ experiences shows little evidence of FSPs trying to 
fulfill this demand. What are the reasons? In discussing IT support of 
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advisory services (especially in advisory encounters) with FSP stakeholders, 
we found a complex network of reasoning. Figure 6-12 provides an overview 
of the main arguments of different stakeholders [Schwabe and Nussbaumer 
2009]; characterizations of the stakeholder’s attitudes towards IT support are 
placed above and below the respective boxes, whereas the labeled arrows 
between boxes indicate stakeholders shifting responsibility to other 
stakeholders. 
Clients. From our observations above, we can conclude that clients are 
generally open to IT support, also in advisory encounters. The focus group 
participants identified the visualization of information as a key feature to 
advisory encounters and particularly wished to be provided with enhanced 
means of comparison and scenario simulation. Furthermore, some 
participants found that the advisory process should become more transparent 
as for the client to be enabled to assess its quality. However, there were also 
critical voices of participants who found that the advisor should take care in 
not letting IT use replace personal conversation.  
Advisors. In the interviews with advisors and other FSP stakeholders (sales 
managers, IT managers), we found that advisors are generally critical in 
respect of IT support. While older advisors tend to lack IT-affinity, younger 
advisors are not convinced of the provided systems’ functionality and, in 
particular, their usability. Indeed, talking to the responsible managers, we 
found that IT tools are sometimes poorly integrated and therefore require 
advisors to use multiple tools, causing inconsistencies and redundancies. 
Only in few FSPs, which have established structured and stringent advisory 
processes with successful IT tool integration, do advisors conceive IT 
systems as supportive. However, advisors generally are critical regarding the 
controlling function of IT, allowing their supervisors to monitor their 
activities.  
Most advisors do not feel confident to use IT in advisory encounters, i.e., in 
front or in cooperation with the client. They fear the loss of competence if 
problems appear – a fear fuelled by their experience of tools lacking stability 
and usability. Another major reason not to use IT in advisory encounters was 
the advisors’ claim that clients do not want IT. They perceive investment 
advisory as “people’s business”, being personal and trust-oriented. In their 
opinion, using IT would endanger the client-advisor encounter and – as one 
advisor phrased it – “destroy the magic”. 
Sales managers. Sales managers are responsible for implementing and 
monitoring advisory services for advisors, and thus are part of the business 
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departments. In the interviews, we found that sales managers show a rather 
pragmatic attitude towards IT – given that powerful transaction systems are 
at the core of every FSP’s infrastructure, they acknowledge IT’s importance 
for the daily business – they do not think, however, of IT as being an 
appropriate means of differentiation, i.e., that they would add to competitive 
advantage and see IT as an “hygiene” factor. 
 
Figure 6-12: Overview of stakeholder arguments regarding IT support  
[from Schwabe and Nussbaumer 2009] 
Sales managers confirmed our observations that advisors tend to only 
hesitantly use IT. They criticized that most advisors only use mandatory 
system functionality that ensures compliance with legal requirements. They 
also pointed out that there may be strong incentives for advisors to not 
overly use IT. In Switzerland, it is common practice (especially in private 
banks) that advisors take their clients along when joining another FSP. 
Hence, some sales managers suggested that it was in the advisor’s interest to 
tie the client to himself rather than the FSP and its information system. 
IT managers. IT managers were best at estimating the clients’ expectation 
of IT support and shared the client’s views regarding potential benefits. They 
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voiced their disappointment with the advisor’s little and hesitant use of the 
laborious and expensive IT systems. Potential causes for this were found in 
the lack of alignment between IT and business departments, particularly 
regarding the IT managers’ late involvement in decision processes for the 
design and support of advisory processes. 
6.4.3 RQ2.1 What Information Sources do Clients Use and What is the 
Role of Investment Advisory Services? 
We will present our findings in respect of this research question according to 
our main metrics of interest, i.e., the respondents’ indicated usage of 
information sources as well as their assessment of the different sources’ 
accessibility, trust, effectivity, inefficiency and comprehensibility. 
Usage of information sources. The most popular information sources used 
by the survey participants are media (used by 99.3% of the respondents), 
professional Internet sources (96.5%) and personal environment (92.3%), 
whereas the usage of other sources is comparably lower, specifically for 
advisory services (see Table 6-7).  
Looking at the frequency of usage (Figure 6-13), we find significant 
differences between the information sources (Friedman test, χ
2
(6) = 80.926, 
p < .001). Professional Internet sources are used most and significantly more 
often than any other information source – its frequency of usage is 
significantly different from media (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test, 
Z = -3.0349, p = .002, r = -.26) with a medium effect size and also 
significantly different from advisory services in banks (Z = -7.1146, p < 
.001, r = -.68) and independent FSPs (Z = -6.0009, p < .001, r = -.74) with 
large effect sizes. 
Table 6-7: Usage of information sources as indicated by respondents 
Information source % of users 
media 99.3 
professional Internet 96.5 
personal environment 92.3 
bank advice 79.6 
guidebooks 77.5 
informal Internet  76.1 
independent FSP advice 48.6 
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Figure 6-13: Frequency of information source usage 
Media, which is used by the majority of respondents, was used very 
frequently by our respondents, followed by personal environment (used by 
most respondents), informal Internet sources and guidebooks. The frequency 
of using informal Internet resources was very diverse, with some 
respondents indicating a very high and others a very low frequency of use; 
there is, however, a notable difference to professional Internet sources (Z = -
7.1893, p < .001, r = -.70) with a large effect size. Both advice provided by 
banks and independent FSPs are not used very frequently, whereby 
independent FSP advice was used by less than 50% of the respondents and 
shows the lowest frequency of usage. Consequently, the differences between 
advisory services of banks and independent FSPs were significant (Z = -
3.2195, p = .001, r = -.39) with a medium effect size. A comprehensive list 
of all information source pairs and their differences regarding frequency of 
usage is provided in Table 6-13 in Appendix A2.  
The participants of our focus groups showed a very similar pattern of most 
frequently using media, professional Internet and personal environment and 
using advisory services only rarely. While some participants used advisory 
services to get already “filtered” and therefore most relevant information, 
others stated to not use such services because their lack of credibility (see 
also results discussed above, RQ1.1). Furthermore, some found them 
inefficient regarding their overall duration. 
Despite their high usage frequency, media like newspapers were not 
appreciated by all participants; some found them to be too facts-oriented or 
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lacking timeliness. Professional Internet sources were commonly used by 
focus group participants to get up-to-date information like exchange rates but 
also for comparison of FSP services and products; some participants 
mentioned that they use informal Internet sources (e.g., message boards and 
blogs) to investigate other investors’ experiences.  
According to the number of ranked information sources (from RQ2.2 
below), the average respondent consults 5.7 information sources before 
making investment decisions, whereby more than 85% of the respondents 
use more than four information sources (Table 6-8) – this mirrors our focus 
group participants’ conclusion that it was important to not rely on a single 
source and to not purchase the “first available offer”. The survey respondent 
using only one information source relied on guidebooks. The usage profile of 
the respondents using three or more sources was very similar, with 
professional Internet sources, media and personal environment assigned to 
the top three positions, followed by informal Internet sources and advisory 
services in banks. However, as the number of information sources utilized 
increases, the assigned ranking of advisory services increases as well. 
Therefore, in terms of the corresponding order of use, both advisory 
provided by banks and independent FSPs consistently ranked amongst the 
last used information sources.  
Table 6-8: Number of used information sources for decision making 
No. of used sources No. of respondents % of all respondents Cumulative % 
1 1 0.7 0.7 
3 8 5.6 6.3 
4 12 8.5 14.8 
5 36 25.4 40.1 
6 39 27.5 67.6 
7 46 32.4 100.0 
Total 142 100.0  
Accessibility. The perceived accessibility shows a pattern similar to the 
frequency of usage, with professional Internet sources, media and personal 
environment having the highest average agreement on being accessible 
(Figure 6-14).The differences between the sources are highly significant 
(Friedman test, χ
2
(6) = 266.634, p < .001). Professional Internet sources were 
rated as being significantly more accessible than all other sources, with a 
small effect difference to the media (Z = -2.3317, p = .03, r = -.20), which 
are perceived the second most accessible source. Bank advice is also 
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considered significantly less accessible than personal environment (Z = -
5.0163, p < .001, r = -.43) and informal Internet (Z = -2.7830, p = .008, r = -
.25). 
Advice provided by banks exhibits similar accessibility as guidebooks (no 
significant difference), which is also true for the frequency of usage. At the 
far end of the scale, we find independent FSP advice, which is also most 
infrequently used. It is perceived as significantly less accessible than any 
other information source, with large effect differences as compared to 
guidebooks (Z = -6.0509, p < .001, r = -.54), which rank the second least 
accessible source, as well as bank advice (Z = - 6.7980, p < .001, r = -.60). 
Similar to their frequency of usage, the two different kinds of Internet 
sources show a significant difference regarding their perceived accessibility 
with a large effect size (Z = -6.4210, p < .001, r = - .57). Table 6-13 in 
Appendix A2 provides a comprehensive list of all significant differences of 
accessibility ratings. Focus group participants showed a very similar rating 
of information source accessibility, with professional Internet, media and 
personal environment found to be most accessible because of their 
“availability” and approachability. 
 
Figure 6-14: Perceived accessibility of information sources 
Trust. Similar to other characteristics discussed thus far, the information 
sources with the highest perceived trust are professional Internet sources, 
media and personal environment (Figure 6-15). Again, the respondents 
provided significantly different ratings for the information sources (χ
2
(6) = 
117.634, p < .001). Respondents trust significantly more in professional 
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Internet sources than in media (Z = -3.6404, p < .001, r = -.31), whereas 
ratings of media and personal environment show no significant differences.  
At the other end of the spectrum, bank advice attracts the lowest degree of 
trust. It is significantly less trusted than other information sources, except for 
informal Internet and independent FSP advice. Independent FSP advice 
shows a similar picture, being significantly less trusted than the most trusted 
sources of professional Internet, media, personal environment and 
guidebooks (see Table 6-14 in Appendix A2). Informal Internet sources are 
trusted significantly less than professional Internet sources with a large effect 
size (Z = -7.9458, p < .001, r = -.68). 
 
Figure 6-15: Trust in information sources 
Again, the focus group participants similarly rated the different information 
sources, putting highest trust in professional Internet, media and personal 
environment. However, not all participants found these sources reliable – 
some participants especially questioned the utility and trustworthiness of 
personal environment (the third most frequently used information source), 
with one investor posing the following rhetorical question: “Why would 
family members and friends be more knowledgeable regarding 
investments?”. Another investor, however, heavily relied on his retired 
father’s recommendations – stating that his father had more time to gather 
relevant information than himself. 
Effectivity. The respondents ratings of information sources in respect of 
effectivity were significantly different (χ
2
(6) = 85.262, p < .001). The highest 
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perceived effectivity is attributed to professional Internet sources (see Figure 
6-16), which are rated significantly higher than the second-ranked media (Z 
= -3.1351, p = .003, r = -.26) with small to medium effect size. Effectivity of 
bank advice and independent FSP advice were rated equally low with no 
significant differences. Both were considered significantly less effective than 
the best rated professional Internet sources with large effect sizes (bank 
advice: Z = -5.8728, p < .001, r = -.51, independent FSP advice: Z = -5.9420, 
p < .001, r = -.55). Again, the perception of professional and informal 
Internet sources shows large effect differences (Z = -7.8796, p < .001, r = -
.68). Similar ratings were provided by our focus group participants. 
Advisory services as well as informal Internet sources were not considered 
to support investors in making good investment decisions mainly because 
their lack of credibility and trust (see similar results for RQ1.1). 
 
Figure 6-16: Perceived effectivity of information sources 
Inefficiency. Regarding the perceived inefficiency of the information 
sources used (Figure 6-17), ratings again are significantly different (χ
2
(6) = 
186.975, p < .001). The three best-rated (i.e., with lowest agreement) sources 
again were personal environment, professional Internet sources and media, 
which so far have shown the highest frequency of use and accessibility (see 
above).  
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Figure 6-17: Perceived inefficiency of information sources 
Differences between personal environment and professional Internet were 
highly significant with medium effect size (Z = -3.6090, p < .001, r = -.31). 
Independent FSP advice as well as bank advice show the highest average 
rating of inefficiency with a small but significant difference (Z = -2.7728, p 
= .008, r = -.25). The inefficiency of informal Internet sources is rated 
significantly lower than for guidebooks (Z = -3.1308, p = .003, r = -.29) as 
well as the subsequent sources (see Table 6-15 in Appendix A2).  
Responses of focus group participants largely conform to those of the online 
survey. While they also generally found professional Internet sources to be 
very efficient, however, some found them tedious for finding useful 
information because of missing functionality to filter relevant information. 
Comprehensibility. The different information sources are perceived as 
significantly different regarding their comprehensibility (χ
2
(6) = 40.685, p < 
.001). Highest rated information sources are professional Internet, personal 
environment and media with no significant different ratings between them. 
Media is considered significantly more comprehensible than guidebooks (Z 
= -3.5072, p < .001, r = -.32) and all following information sources (see 
Table 6-14 in Appendix A2), including bank advice and independent FSP 
advice, which are not rated significantly different. Ratings of informal and 
professional Internet, however, show significant differences with large effect 
size (Z = -5.2688, p < .001, r = -.47).  
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Figure 6-18: Perceived comprehensibility of information sources 
In our focus group discussions, many participants found advisory services to 
be particularly lacking comprehensibility in respect of the advisor’s not 
sufficiently explaining their activities and actions and overly using technical 
terms. 
6.4.4 RQ2.2 What are the Clients’ Information Search Processes and What 
is the Role of Investment Advisory Services?20 
To investigate the clients information search processes, we asked the 
respondents to rank the sources according to their temporal usage order. We 
deduced the order of usage for each source according to the rank it was 
assigned in the majority of cases. Results show that the respondents start 
their information search using impersonal sources (professional Internet 
sources, media), and turn to personal sources (like their personal 
environment or advisory services) only later in the process.  
This usage pattern can be found equally for customers frequently, 
infrequently or never using advisory services provided by banks. Table 6-9 
presents the detailed results, where the temporal rank orders are shown for 
respondents “not using bank advice” (usage frequency: “never”), 
“infrequently using bank advice” (mean usage frequency lower than 4 on the 
seven-point Likert scale) and respondents who report a high usage of these 
services (mean usage frequency greater than 4). To analyze the obtained data 
we evaluated the ranking of each source given by the majority of 
                                           
20
  Results presented in this section are based on Nussbaumer et al. [2011]. 
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respondents. Two information sources may therefore share the same rank – 
e.g., for respondents not using bank advice, the third rank was chosen by the 
majority of respondents for both personal environment and guidebooks. In 
this case, another rank is missing, because only respondents who had 
indicated to using bank advice are represented.  
Table 6-9: Usage order of information sources in respect of bank advice usage 
 
Rank order of source usage... 
... if not using bank advice 
... if infrequently using bank 
advice 
... if frequently using bank 
advice 
1 prof. Internet prof. Internet prof. Internet 
2 media media media 
3 personal env. & guidebooks personal env. personal env. 
4 informal Internet informal Internet bank advice 
5 - guidebooks - 
6 independent FSP advice bank & independent FSP advice ind. FSP advice & inf. Internet 
7 - - guidebooks 
While our focus group participants provided similar usage orders in the 
quantitative surveys, their results were not discussed with the participants 
and therefore leave no further qualitative explanations other than the findings 
regarding other information source characteristics reported above. 
6.5 Discussion21 
Even though FSP stakeholders correctly estimate their clients’ expectations, 
they do not succeed in satisfying them. Hence, clients find investment 
advisory services unsatisfying – with FSP stakeholders seemingly being 
unaware of their services’ poor reputation. 
Expectation and experience of advisory service quality. Client 
expectation of service quality is very high, with the all mean quality 
expectation ratings being greater than 6.4 on a seven-point scale. In none of 
the dimensions, however, did the clients’ experience match with their 
expectation – while FSP stakeholders estimated the clients’ expectations 
rather accurately, advisory practice does not seem to sufficiently address 
them. Furthermore, regarding the relative importance of the basic quality 
dimensions (reliability, assurance, responsiveness, empathy, and tangibles), 
FSP stakeholders do not seem to understand the client’s value systems. In 
general, clients of investment advisory services seem to put more emphasis 
                                           
21
  Interpretation of information behavior results is based on Nussbaumer et al. [2011]. 
6. Essay I: Investment Advice and its Role for Investors 
85 
on “hard” factors rather than “soft” factors: for them, the most important 
dimension is reliability, i.e., correct and dependable service performance; 
this dimension has been repeatedly found to be the most critical dimension, 
regardless of the service domain [Zeithaml et al. 1990:27].  
Advisors and managers, on the other hand, aim at improving “soft” 
dimensions like empathy and assurance – or even the advisory services’ 
tangibles (appearance of facilities and personnel) that was considered least 
important by investor clients, similar to investigations in other domains 
[Zeithaml et al. 1990:28].  
From our observations in mystery shopping episodes, we were not surprised 
that clients found service quality being rather low. The contrary beliefs of 
FSP stakeholders, however, are striking and point to severe and also 
collective – given the stakeholders’ mostly concordant estimation of client 
expectation and experience – gaps in their perception. This may provide 
some explanation to our introductory question of why FSPs are not 
addressing the clients’ concerns – they do not seem to be quite aware of 
them. Given that two-thirds of the surveyed FSPs have not established 
structured and regular means of measuring client satisfaction, this lack of 
awareness seems not too surprising. 
Looking at the clients’ critiques, we find that investment advisory services of 
Swiss FSPs – despite their reputation – face the same issues previously 
discussed for investment advice of German and other European FSPs [e.g., 
Hackethal et al. 2012; Jungermann and Belting 2004; Oehler and Kohlert 
2009] (see also Section 6.2.1). Our surveyed clients’ dissatisfaction is related 
to the following aspects: 
(1) Lack of personalization and customer orientation: Clients may use 
advisory services for several reasons, like superior advisor knowledge 
and experience, aggregated information provision or increased efficiency 
– in general, they seem to expect advisory results that are superior to 
making investment decisions on their own. In our investigations, we 
found that investors also expect advice to be reflecting their specific 
situation and needs. FSP advisory practice, however, does not match 
these expectations. Few FSPs have implemented structured processes 
and guidelines to establish such customer orientation. Consequently, 
though clients voiced their need for adapting advisory services to their 
requirements and preferences, few found that advisory practice fulfilled 
their needs. Thus, clients found that advisors often shelved them into 
categories and provided “standard” advice, on which the client had little 
control. This was also matched by our observations in mystery shopping 
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episodes, where only in 9 of 21 encounters the advisor even tried to 
obtain information on the client’s situation, needs and preferences. 
(2) Low assurance: Overall, professional investment advice is not deemed 
very assuring and trustworthy, even more so in comparison to other 
client information sources (see below). Clients find that their advisors 
are not particularly knowledgeable about the products they provide or 
the financial markets in general. Furthermore, they are aware of potential 
conflicts of interests stemming from the prevalent business models of 
cross-subsidizing free-of-charge advisory services with product costs – 
some clients explained that they generally do not trust the advisor to 
really act on the client’s behalf. Consequently, clients are not convinced 
that their FSPs advisory process leads to a very good decision. This is 
surprising all the more given the FSP stakeholders’ exceedingly high 
estimation of their clients’ expectation on assurance.  
(3) Lack of transparency: Problems of low assurance based on immanent 
conflicts of interests are further aggravated by the client’s perception of 
information asymmetries. Clients tend to perceive their advisor as a 
“black box” – neither the underlying process (advisor activities and 
actions) nor the information provided are deemed very comprehensible. 
The issues of lacking personalization and client control as well as low 
assurance may also be related to this lack of transparency – even in 
actually individualized service encounters it would be difficult for the 
client to acknowledge such individualization if she cannot comprehend 
what the advisor is trying to accomplish. Given the potential conflicts of 
interest, such a lack of comprehensibility may also affect the client’s 
perception of assurance and trustworthiness. In this regard, transparency 
of costs has been discussed quite controversially, with clients criticizing 
that FSPs were reluctant to disclose exact costs of the advisory services 
and their products, respectively. 
Advisory services and IT. Our investigation of the status quo of IT usage in 
Swiss investment advisory services soon gave way to an investigation of IT 
non-usage. Indeed, in none of our surveyed FSPs did IT play a significant 
role for investment advice. While major FSPs provide their advisors with 
CRM-oriented software solutions to prepare and document client 
consultation, they are – if ever – mostly used outside the actual advisory 
encounter; except for sporadic use of IT to print fact-sheets or retrieve 
exchange rates. Collaborative support systems developed and recommended 
by CSCW research for similar advisory domains [e.g., Novak and Schmidt 
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2009; Rodden et al. 2003] have not been established in any of the surveyed 
Swiss FSPs. 
In respect of little IT support and usage in advisory processes and IT’s 
virtual non-existence in advisory encounters, the stakeholders provided us 
with manifold, however sometimes contradictory arguments. Clients 
expressed high expectation of IT support – also for advisory encounters, in 
order to increase comprehensibility and transparency, e.g., through enhanced 
means of comparison and simulation. Their expectation does not seem to 
correspond with their experience. Advisors and sales managers, however, 
expect clients to be very critical towards IT usage in advisory encounters, 
stating that their clients “don’t want IT” – while some client participants of 
our focus groups actually warned that exceeding IT usage might interfere 
with personal advisory atmosphere, both the discussions and online surveys 
point to very positive client attitudes towards IT. So far, only IT managers 
seem to acknowledge the client’s expectation and valuation of IT support.  
What could be the cause of these perceptive gaps between the FSP 
stakeholders? In our investigations, we found the stakeholders’ perceptions 
being influenced by their particular roles and interests. For sales managers, 
IT tools are not considered a means of differentiation but a means of 
enforcing compliance and monitoring advisory processes. Thus, business 
representatives tend to put little attention to improvements of IT support and 
insufficiently involve IT managers in their decisions. In our interviews, sales 
managers were not convinced of benefits of IT in advisory encounters. As 
advisor voice no specific demand, sales managers do not push the 
development of further advisory support systems.  
This seems to support the advisor’s ambiguous attitudes towards IT. In our 
interviews with advisors, we found several IT-related issues other than their 
clients’ alleged objection against IT support. Advisor acceptance of IT seems 
to be strongly related to software quality. Some advisors pointed to the lack 
of tool integration, while many respondents emphasized on the lack of 
usability. This lack of trust in IT functionality also seems to pose a great 
barrier to IT use in advisory encounters – advisors do not feel confident in 
using software with clients and fear a loss of control in case of system 
malfunctions. A more general barrier to IT usage can be found in the 
information and interest asymmetries between advisors and their FSP. Using 
only the little mandatory functionality of IT systems allows advisors to 
constrain supervisors in monitoring their activities as well as keeping back 
client information in order to bind them to themselves rather than the FSP 
and its information systems. 
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Information behavior and the role of FSP advice. Besides FSP advice, 
investors are accustomed to using a wide variety of information sources to 
gather investment-related information. The majority of respondents used 
media (99.3%), professional Internet sources (96.5%) and personal 
environment (92.3%). Advice from banks indeed is also being used by most 
respondents (79.6%), however, much less frequently. Analyzing the 
perceived characteristics of the different information sources, we find the 
recurring pattern of professional Internet sources, media and personal 
environment being top-rated. For advisory services – provided by banks and 
or independent FSPs – the respondents show a contrary perception of the 
surveyed characteristics. Compared to other information sources, advisory 
services are perceived to be rather inaccessible (with services provided by 
independent FSPs showing the significant lowest accessibility), inefficient 
and ineffective. Furthermore, advisory services also rank amongst the least 
trusted information sources. These ratings are compatible with our 
investigation of advisory quality issues discussed above.  
For the order of usage of information sources, we find that the respondents 
of our survey exhibit very similar search patterns. Our survey findings point 
to a high amount of successive searches, with more than 85% of the 
respondents indicating to successively use more than four information 
sources for investment decision making. In respect of their arrangement, 
clients seem to adopt the principle of least effort [Case 2005], proceeding 
from the most accessible to the least accessible information sources. Also, 
the first sources to be used (personal environment, professional Internet 
sources, media) are also perceived as being the most efficient, effective and 
comprehensible information sources. In respect of trust, we find a similar 
pattern – in their search process, investors start with the most trusted and 
progress with less trusted sources. Possibly reflecting the agency conflicts 
between advisor and client, advisory services provided by banks are the least 
trusted source and used only later or even as the last sources in information 
search. As observed by Julien [1999] in the domain of career decision 
making, such low trust may also negatively affect the perception of 
advisory’s helpfulness or effectivity.  
In terms of the search process, our respondents generally progress from 
rather untargeted, informal searches (using professional Internet sources, 
media, personal environment) to more targeted, formal searches (using more 
specific sources like advisory services or guidebooks). The first sources used 
in the process support search modes that are more suitable for the initiation 
of information search, as well as the selection and exploration of information 
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sources. In terms of problem resolution, however, it seems that investors turn 
to advisory services, whereas the definitive investment decision solution may 
be preceded by some validation of the information search results (using 
informal Internet sources or guidebooks). Such a behavior is illustrated by 
Kuhlthau’s [2004] concept of uncertainty, in which the use of information 
sources (such as advisory services) may not necessarily reduce but rather 
increase uncertainty. 
Thus, the late usage of advisory services may be connected to the 
individual’s problem-resolution process [Wilson 1999]; in the problem 
identification and definition phase, the individual opportunistically uses 
multiple sources in order to enhance her understanding of the problem. Only 
when she has reduced her uncertainty to a degree that allows for an 
articulation of the search problem or even possible solutions, the investor 
turns to advisory services. Individuals never or only infrequently using 
advisory services in banks (indicated by their frequency of use) seem to 
employ any available information source before electing to turn to 
(independent) advisory services, maybe to validate their knowledge and 
possibly implement their investment solutions – as a matter of fact, such an 
integration of advice and solution implementation is common for Swiss 
FSPs. Frequent users of bank advice use these services directly after having 
employed the top three sources (professional Internet sources, media, 
personal environment) and turn to other sources only later (informal Internet 
sources, guidebooks). This might also imply an attempt at validation of the 
outcomes of the advisory experience. Thus, advisory services are not 
necessarily used infrequently and late in the search process only because of 
the perceived low quality – in fact, frequency and order of information 
source usage may be attributed to the investors’ search process which 
converges from informal searches to formal, targeted searches. As such, 
advisory services seem to be attributed a closure role in information search, 
marking the exit rather than the entry point to information search. This 
equilibrium seems to be suboptimal as human advisors in the role of a 
personal source are superior to other information systems in that they have a 
unique ability to uncover hidden information needs [Ellis et al. 2002] – an 
activity most needed in the early phases of the information search. Thus, 
applying their services early in the information search process could greatly 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of any subsequent information 
search activities. To commend themselves as “early” information sources, 
however, advisory services clearly would have to be improved, especially 
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regarding their accessibility, comprehensibility and trustworthiness. We will 
discuss potential approaches to such improvements in Section 6.6. 
Figure 6-19 summarizes the discussion by showing the association of the 
order of source usage and the ratings of their characteristics; additionally, it 
contrasts the succession of information sources with their suggested search 
process phase. 
 
Figure 6-19: Usage order of information sources in context with their characteristics 
and the search process [adapted and extended from Nussbaumer et al. 2011] 
We will conclude the discussion of investor information seeking behavior 
with some general considerations in respect of the different usage of 
professional and informal Internet sources as well as a brief comparison of 
our findings with those of other related surveys. 
Looking at the seeming importance of professional Internet sources, we find 
that the “Internet revolution” might indeed have considerably influenced or 
even changed the information behavior of individuals. Interestingly, this 
does not apply for informal Internet, i.e., the information sources of the Web 
2.0 (online communities, blogs, etc.). Compared to professional Internet 
sources they fall short regarding frequency of usage as well as in their 
perception of accessibility, trust and effectivity. As we can therefore see, the 
Internet is still not the panacea to information search.  
For the use of press and other media, our findings are consistent with the 
usage of information sources reported in Cocca et al. [2009], where 74.7% of 
the respondents cited the press as the principal source of information on 
investment issues, and Ernst et al. [2009], where 75% indicated a high 
reliance upon newspapers, magazines and TV. Compared to our results, the 
study of Cocca et al. suggests a similar usage of advisory (69.1%), but a 
considerably less frequent usage of Internet sources (54.9%) and personal 
environment (38.3%). In the study of Ernst et al., only 40% of the 
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respondents considered advisory as (very) important, whereas the Internet 
(26%) and the personal environment (16%) are considered important by 
many fewer respondents. These differences are possibly based on the diverse 
samples of respondents. While our study addressed affluent clients of Swiss 
FSPs, Cocca et al. targeted the information source use of Swiss private 
banking clients, and Ernst et al. considered information source usage of 
German shareholders. As such, the latter survey also included retail 
investors, for which Cocca et al. [2009] found different information source 
usage as compared to affluent or “private” investors.  
6.6 Implications and Conclusions 
In the introduction, we posed two initial research questions; (1) What are the 
clients’ expectations and why do FSPs fail to meet them? and (2) What is the 
role of investment advisory services and what alternatives do clients 
employ? 
In respect of the first question, we found that client expectations are high in 
any surveyed dimension (personalization, assurance, IT support). While FSP 
stakeholders provided approximately correct estimations of these 
expectations, they did not seem to be aware of the actual client experience 
and overestimated their satisfaction. This lack of awareness – furthered by 
missing instruments of measuring advisory quality – might be one reason of 
FSPs to fail to meet the clients’ expectations, e.g., in respect of requested 
personalization and client orientation. Other sources of dissatisfaction, 
however, can be found in the inherent issues of advisor-client interactions, 
namely the information and interest asymmetries between the parties. 
Information asymmetries are a general feature of encounters between 
laypersons and experts, where the former requests help from the latter. In 
investment advisory services, however, these are aggravated by poor 
information exchange, where clients find it difficult to follow the advisor’s 
actions or even comprehend the provided information. Interest asymmetries 
relate to the potential conflicts of interests between the actors (which are 
furthered by the FSPs prevailing business models), where the advisor might 
be incentivized to take advantage of the less informed client. Such 
asymmetries affect assurance and trustworthiness of investment advisory 
services. 
If investment advisory services provide are dissatisfying, what is their actual 
role in client information search and what alternatives do they employ? Our 
investigation of this second research question revealed that clients actually 
do not make exceeding usage of FSP advice. We found that they are 
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accustomed to use a multitude of alternative information sources to support 
their investment decisions, with professional Internet sources, media and 
personal environment being the most frequently used and top-rated sources. 
FSP advice, on the contrary, is perceived as rather inaccessible, inefficient, 
and ineffective as well as lacking trust and comprehensibility. Looking at 
their information search processes, most clients use FSP advice at some 
point of time; mostly, however, they use them very late in the search process, 
making them an exit rather than an entry point of information search. One 
reason for this can be found in the fact that, in Switzerland, implementation 
of investments and according transactions typically require interaction with a 
FSP and an investment advisor, respectively. Thus, clients possibly employ 
other information sources prior to advisory services as a compensation for 
their lack of comprehensibility and assurance.  
Overall, these premises lead to an unsatisfying equilibrium. Firstly, FSPs fail 
to satisfy their clients, which in turn might affect client retention – clearly, 
they therefore miss the opportunity of differentiating themselves from 
competitors by providing unique, personalized advisory services that are 
difficult to imitate [Buhl and Kaiser 2008]. On the other hand, possibly due 
to the negative aspects of FSP advice, clients use advisory services only 
infrequently and late in their information search process; they therefore fail 
to reap the beneficial effects of personal information sources in the early 
phases of problem identification, including the reduction of uncertainty and 
personalized information aggregation. 
To achieve an equilibrium that is more satisfying for FSPs and investment 
advisory clients, we suggest the following steps in improving advisory 
services and their encounters.  
Firstly, FSPs should not only reconsider their conceptions and 
implementation of advisory processes but also the assessment of their 
quality. Our findings point to large perceptive gaps of advisors and sales 
managers regarding the advisory quality and client satisfaction. One major 
reason for this situation was found in many FSPs’ practice of only irregularly 
and informally surveying their clients’ satisfaction. Thus, in order to better 
estimate their clients’ expectation-experience gaps, FSPs should introduce 
regular, structured measurements of satisfaction and advisory quality. 
Secondly, in order to provide the most benefit for the client as well as 
differentiate against competitors, FSPs should strive to position their 
advisory services as entry points of an investor’s information search. For 
this, however, prevailing issues of low accessibility as well as the lack of 
personalization, assurance and transparency have to be adequately addressed.  
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To increase accessibility, FSPs should encourage their customers to seek 
their advice also in early phases of their investment decision making, helping 
them to define their problems and reduce their uncertainty. Considering the 
successive searches of their clients and their particular combination of 
information sources, FSPs could address and positively influence their media 
choice, e.g., by providing appropriate information in different channels. We 
also suggest that FSPs put more emphasis on their Internet presence, which 
should better support their customers’ identification and definition of 
financial problems during informal, unstructured searches. This could greatly 
improve the accessibility of FSPs services, with interactive tools offered at 
web sites helping clients to identify their needs, which could then be further 
discussed in noncommittal advisory conversations. 
Furthermore, the current issue of low assurance and trust based on immanent 
interest asymmetries has to be addressed. This might indicate the need to 
separate advisory services from the investment solution’s implementation – 
this could alleviate agency conflicts and lead to increased trust in advisory 
services. Furthermore, this separation would relieve clients from advisors’ 
potential incentives to base his recommendations on considerations of 
earnings and provisions. At the same time, such an approach could also 
alleviate the related issues of cost transparency.  
Finally, information asymmetries and the client’s perceived lack of 
comprehensibility and transparency should be addressed. As discussed 
above, CSCW research has already pointed to great potential of information 
technology in mediating collaborative solution-finding processes. For 
asymmetric advisory settings, the provision of shared, collaborative 
information spaces could greatly improve client-advisor interaction 
[Nussbaumer and Schwabe 2010]. Such shared information spaces could 
mediate advisor-client interaction by providing relevant information 
regarding advisory content, activities and costs. This could improve 
comprehensibility and transparency of advisory encounters, while possibly 
restricting the advisor to engage in hidden information and hidden action and 
thus alleviating issues arising from conflicts of interest. 
Such IT support could also allow for cooperative exploration and modeling 
of the client’s problem space and enhance her understanding through 
appropriate visualizations and simulations. Thereby, IT could support the 
client’s information search and decision-making process and allow for 
improved consideration and incorporation of the specific client situation and 
requirements.  
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Regarding the client’s information source preferences, IT-enabled shared 
information spaces could allow for the inclusion of popular and trusted 
information sources. For example, IT could be used to supplement advisory 
encounters with information sources that clients find effective, 
comprehensible and credible. This could allow for transparent information 
aggregation in the advisory encounter already in very early search phases of 
the client, thus also increasing the efficiency and effectivity of her overall 
search process.  
However, as we may deduce from our investigation on current issues of IT 
usage in investment advisory services, such IT systems also pose several 
requirements from the advisor’s and organization’s perspective. To further 
their acceptance, IT tools must be tightly integrated in advisory processes 
and existing IT infrastructure. They should avoid necessity of using multiple 
applications in order to reduce inconsistencies and redundancies, also 
improving the advisor’s efficiency. Especially in respect of using shared 
information spaces with the client, usability and user experience seems to be 
of utmost importance and highly related to non-usage. If adequately 
implemented, such systems could also improve the effectivity of the 
advisor’s recommendations in that they may increase comprehensibility for 
the client and positively influence trustworthiness and client satisfaction. 
Only if they are convinced that the proposed advantages of IT exceed the 
potential disadvantages (reduction of information asymmetries towards both 
the clients and the FSPs), will advisors be willing to use them.  
Limitations. As with any exploratory research, our results and their 
interpretation may be generalized only with caution. While we were able to 
talk to sales managers, advisors and IT managers of all major Swiss FSPs, 
the surveyed institutions showed great diversity. Thus, the arguments given 
by a particular interview partner may be specific to the respective FSP and 
may not hold true for any other FSP. However, we were surprised about the 
coherency of their arguments across different FSPs.  
Also, the number of client respondents of our online surveys was rather 
small and informative only for customers of the affluent segment (or above) 
of the Swiss banking region. However, our observations and conclusions 
regarding the general problems of investment advisory services show high 
consistency with similar research in other financial markets. 
The representativeness of our sample may be limited by their acquisition – 
the respondents were acquired through an online finance newspaper and 
through targeted e-mailing in the researchers’ environments. Thus, the 
respondents may show higher financial literacy and/or experience than 
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average clients. Also, using online surveys implies a sample bias in the 
participants’ evaluation of Internet information sources usage – the indicated 
high average use of these sources could therefore also be attributed to the 
online survey’s implicit exclusion of individuals infrequently or not using 
the Internet at all.  
Regarding our results on client information behavior, another important 
limitation is that we measured the participants’ perceptions of their 
information search activities rather than their actual use of different 
information sources. Thus, higher scores may also reflect the perceived 
intensity of the specific information-gathering task [Laroche et al. 2004]. 
Finally, another potential limitation stems from the time period in which the 
data collection took place. As the focus groups, interviews and online 
surveys were conducted from May to Oct 2008, we cannot isolate potential 
effects of the financial crisis that was emerging at the time. This crisis may 
have biased especially the clients’ assessment of service quality. However, 
consistent with prior (pre-crisis) investigations of the field, we found that the 
clients’ attitudes towards investment advisory services point to substantial 
problems in client-advisor relationships that are seemingly independent from 
short- or middle-term developments of financial markets. 
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6.7 Appendix 
A1. Client Sample Profiles 
Table 6-10: Profile of sample of client focus groups  
  
Focus Group 1 
(N = 17) 
Focus Group 2 
(N = 11) 
age  
31-45 years  
(M = 35.82 , SD = 3.76) 
25-53 years 
(M = 37.36 , SD = 8.77) 
gender 
female 5.9% 18.2% 
male 94.1% 81.8% 
education university degree 100% 100% 
wealth 
less than 50.000 CHF 5.9% 9.1% 
between 50.000 and 
500.000 CHF 
64.7% 63.6% 
more than 500.000 CHF 11.8% 18.2% 
not specified 17.6% 9.1% 
frequency of 
investment 
decision 
every few years 11.8% 9.1% 
multiple times a year 82.4% 54.5% 
multiple times a month 5.9% 36.4% 
multiple times a week 0% 0% 
decision 
making 
solitary 82.4% 81.8% 
with partner 17.6% 18.2% 
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Table 6-11: Profile of sample of client survey on quality of advisory services 
 N = 136 respondents Count N % 
age 
< 18 2 1.5% 
18-24 4 2.9% 
25-34 23 16.9% 
35-44 40 29.4% 
45-54 24 17.6% 
55-64 28 20.6% 
65 or older 15 11.0% 
gender 
female 17 12.5% 
male 119 87.5% 
education 
compulsory education 0 0.0% 
apprenticeship 28 20.6% 
high school 14 10.3% 
university degree 90 66.2% 
not specified 4 2.9% 
wealth 
not specified 7 5.1% 
less than 50.000 CHF 39 28.7% 
between 50.000 and 500.000 CHF 76 55.9% 
more than 500.000 CHF 14 10.3% 
working for FSP 
yes 28 20.6% 
no 103 75.7% 
not specified 5 3.7% 
investment  
experience 
yes 125 91.9% 
no 8 5.9% 
not specified 3 2.2% 
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Table 6-12: Profile of sample client survey on information seeking behavior 
N = 142 respondents 
% of all 
respondents 
using bank 
advice 
(% of N per 
row) 
using ind. FSP 
advice 
(% of N per row) 
N per row 
age 
< 18 2.1% 66.7% 66.7% 3 
18-24 2.8% 50.0% .0% 4 
25-34 21.8% 80.6% 58.1% 31 
35-44 28.9% 85.4% 51.2% 41 
45-54 19.0% 70.4% 29.6% 27 
55-64 16.2% 87.0% 60.9% 23 
65 or older 9.2% 76.9% 46.2% 13 
gender 
female 12.7% 83.3% 61.1% 18 
male 87.3% 79.0% 46.8% 124 
education 
compulsory 
education 
.0% .0% .0% 0 
apprenticeship 16.9% 79.2% 50.0% 24 
high school 7.7% 45.5% 18.2% 11 
university degree 72.5% 82.5% 49.5% 103 
not specified 2.8% 100.0% 100.0% 4 
wealth 
not specified 12.7% 83.3% 44.4% 18 
less than 50.000 
CHF 
7.0% 70.0% 50.0% 10 
between 50.000 
and 500.000 CHF 
63.4% 82.2% 48.9% 90 
more than 500.000 
CHF 
16.9% 70.8% 50.0% 24 
frequency 
of 
investment 
decisions 
less than twice a 
year 
15.5% 81.8% 63.6% 22 
more than once a 
year 
59.9% 85.9% 52.9% 85 
more than once a 
month 
18.3% 69.2% 34.6% 26 
more than once a 
week 
6.3% 44.4% 11.1% 9 
decision 
making 
solitary 62.0% 77.3% 46.6% 88 
with partner 38.0% 83.3% 51.9% 54 
working for 
FSP 
yes 24.6% 77.1% 31.4% 35 
no 71.8% 79.4% 53.9% 102 
not specified 3.5% 100.0% 60.0% 5 
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A2. Further Results 
Table 6-13: Wilcoxon test results for frequency of usage and accessibility, p-values 
adjusted for multiple comparisons [Benjamini and Hochberg 1995] 
 
Information sources Z p-value r 
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
u
s
a
g
e
 
personal environment professional Internet -6.3327 0.000 -0.56 
personal environment media -5.0776 0.000 -0.44 
independent FSP advice professional Internet -6.0009 0.000 -0.74 
independent FSP advice media -5.5031 0.000 -0.66 
bank advice professional Internet -7.1146 0.000 -0.68 
bank advice media -6.8109 0.000 -0.64 
professional Internet informal Internet -7.1893 0.000 -0.70 
professional Internet guidebooks -7.1308 0.000 -0.69 
informal Internet media -5.4384 0.000 -0.52 
media guidebooks -6.7513 0.000 -0.65 
personal environment independent FSP advice -3.9536 0.000 -0.49 
independent FSP advice informal Internet -3.2634 0.002 -0.42 
independent FSP advice guidebooks -3.2604 0.002 -0.44 
independent FSP advice bank advice -3.2195 0.002 -0.39 
personal environment bank advice -3.1397 0.003 -0.30 
professional Internet media -3.0349 0.004 -0.26 
A
c
c
e
s
s
ib
ili
ty
 
personal environment independent FSP advice -8.4345 0.000 -0.74 
personal environment guidebooks -5.7272 0.000 -0.49 
independent FSP advice bank advice -6.7980 0.000 -0.60 
independent FSP advice professional Internet -8.9086 0.000 -0.79 
independent FSP advice informal Internet -7.1800 0.000 -0.65 
independent FSP advice media -8.4904 0.000 -0.76 
independent FSP advice guidebooks -6.0509 0.000 -0.54 
bank advice professional Internet -7.1298 0.000 -0.62 
bank advice media -6.8151 0.000 -0.59 
professional Internet informal Internet -6.4210 0.000 -0.57 
professional Internet guidebooks -7.9574 0.000 -0.69 
media guidebooks -7.7954 0.000 -0.68 
personal environment bank advice -5.0163 0.000 -0.43 
informal Internet media -4.7860 0.000 -0.42 
informal Internet guidebooks -3.9395 0.000 -0.35 
personal environment professional Internet -3.5569 0.001 -0.31 
bank advice informal Internet -2.7830 0.008 -0.25 
professional Internet media -2.3317 0.026 -0.20 
personal environment informal Internet -2.1798 0.038 -0.19 
personal environment media -2.0813 0.048 -0.18 
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Table 6-14: Wilcoxon test results for trust and comprehensibility, p-values adjusted for 
multiple comparisons [Benjamini and Hochberg 1995] 
 
Information sources Z p-value r 
T
ru
s
t 
independent FSP advice professional Internet -7.1928 0.000 -0.64 
independent FSP advice media -5.3801 0.000 -0.48 
bank advice professional Internet -7.3612 0.000 -0.63 
bank advice media -5.4628 0.000 -0.47 
professional Internet informal Internet -7.9458 0.000 -0.68 
informal Internet media -6.4128 0.000 -0.55 
professional Internet guidebooks -4.6657 0.000 -0.42 
personal environment bank advice -4.3988 0.000 -0.37 
personal environment informal Internet -4.1740 0.000 -0.36 
informal Internet guidebooks -4.0920 0.000 -0.37 
bank advice guidebooks -3.9515 0.000 -0.35 
personal environment independent FSP advice -3.7283 0.000 -0.33 
professional Internet media -3.6400 0.001 -0.31 
independent FSP advice guidebooks -3.5130 0.001 -0.32 
personal environment professional Internet -3.3410 0.001 -0.28 
media guidebooks -2.6560 0.011 -0.24 
C
o
m
p
re
h
e
n
s
ib
ili
ty
 
professional Internet informal Internet -5.2688 0.000 -0.47 
informal Internet media -5.3367 0.000 -0.47 
personal environment informal Internet -3.9471 0.000 -0.35 
independent FSP advice professional Internet -3.6974 0.000 -0.35 
personal environment independent FSP advice -3.5123 0.001 -0.33 
independent FSP advice media -3.5114 0.001 -0.33 
media guidebooks -3.5072 0.001 -0.32 
professional Internet guidebooks -2.8878 0.006 -0.26 
bank advice media -2.8793 0.006 -0.25 
bank advice professional Internet -2.6830 0.010 -0.23 
personal environment bank advice -2.6829 0.010 -0.23 
personal environment guidebooks -2.2603 0.031 -0.21 
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Table 6-15: Wilcoxon test results for effectivity and inefficiency, p-values adjusted for 
multiple comparisons [Benjamini and Hochberg 1995] 
 
Information sources Z p-value r 
E
ff
e
c
ti
v
it
y
 
independent FSP advice professional Internet -5.9420 0.000 -0.55 
bank advice professional Internet -5.8728 0.000 -0.51 
professional Internet informal Internet -7.8796 0.000 -0.68 
informal Internet media -6.4262 0.000 -0.56 
professional Internet guidebooks -4.6114 0.000 -0.42 
personal environment professional Internet -4.2417 0.000 -0.36 
independent FSP advice media -4.0104 0.000 -0.37 
informal Internet guidebooks -3.9558 0.000 -0.36 
bank advice media -3.7562 0.000 -0.32 
professional Internet media -3.1351 0.003 -0.26 
personal environment informal Internet -2.7920 0.008 -0.24 
independent FSP advice guidebooks -2.7053 0.010 -0.26 
media guidebooks -2.6823 0.010 -0.24 
bank advice guidebooks -2.5737 0.014 -0.23 
personal environment media -2.4176 0.021 -0.21 
In
e
ff
ic
ie
n
c
y
 
personal environment independent FSP advice -8.8048 0.000 -0.79 
personal environment bank advice -8.8489 0.000 -0.79 
personal environment informal Internet -5.2904 0.000 -0.48 
personal environment guidebooks -7.6858 0.000 -0.69 
independent FSP advice professional Internet -7.1602 0.000 -0.64 
independent FSP advice informal Internet -5.5924 0.000 -0.52 
independent FSP advice media -7.0283 0.000 -0.62 
bank advice professional Internet -6.4535 0.000 -0.55 
bank advice media -6.3684 0.000 -0.54 
media guidebooks -5.5016 0.000 -0.49 
professional Internet guidebooks -5.0229 0.000 -0.45 
personal environment media -4.6442 0.000 -0.40 
bank advice informal Internet -4.4836 0.000 -0.41 
personal environment professional Internet -3.6090 0.001 -0.31 
professional Internet informal Internet -3.4271 0.001 -0.31 
independent FSP advice guidebooks -3.1367 0.003 -0.29 
informal Internet guidebooks -3.1308 0.003 -0.29 
independent FSP advice bank advice -2.7728 0.008 -0.25 
informal Internet media -2.6639 0.011 -0.24 
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7 Essay II: Designing for Transparency in Client-
Advisor Encounters – The Case of Investment 
Advice 
Abstract 
This essay argues that shared collaborative IT artifacts are a feasible and 
useful means to improve transparency of asymmetric client-advisor 
encounters and to increase client satisfaction. We suggest that information, 
knowledge and interest asymmetries in client-advisor encounters can be 
addressed by increasing transparency with shared IT artifacts, concerning (1) 
the disclosure of what activities are performed and why (process 
transparency) and (2) the revelation of the advisor’s information base as well 
as showing what information is used for what purpose and with what effect 
(information transparency). Based on three consecutive build-and-evaluate 
iterations in the domain of financial investment advice, we will devise an 
initial design theory of implementing shared IT artifacts supporting such 
notions of transparency in asymmetric client-advisor encounters.  
While the individual iterations informed our understanding of the underlying 
transparency mechanisms of client-advisor interaction, the concatenation of 
their findings proved to be the sine qua non to specify the final successful 
design and to devise design principles of transparency. Exploratory 
evaluations of the built shared IT artifacts for investment advisory 
encounters suggest the usefulness of the design principles to increase process 
and information transparency; furthermore, our results provide insights of 
how such increased transparency relates to other determinants of the service 
encounter as perceived by the client, including controllability of the situation 
and overall satisfaction. 
7.1 Introduction 
Many important decisions are not made by the decision-maker alone but 
often after consulting with others [Bonaccio and Dalal 2006:128], seeking to 
make better decisions and avoid mistakes [Heath and Gonzalez 1995]. This 
demand is increasingly accommodated by advisory services also in sales-
oriented domains, where individuals are offered decision support or advice 
regarding, e.g., their next vacation (travel consultancy), securing their life 
and property (insurance advice) or their financial investments (investment 
advice) [Schmidt-Rauch and Nussbaumer 2011]. Such services, however, are 
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strained by several asymmetries regarding information, knowledge and 
interests of the lay client and the expert advisor, and therefore further agency 
conflicts [Eisenhardt 1989; Mishra 2004].  
In this essay, we argue that these asymmetries and conflicts are detrimental 
to advisory quality and client satisfaction. Indeed, in different domains, 
quality and client satisfaction of advisory services is deemed rather low (e.g., 
travel counseling [Novak and Schwabe 2009; Novak 2009] or investment 
advice [Jungermann and Belting 2004; Mogicato et al. 2009; Oehler and 
Kohlert 2009]). We find one prime cause in the services’ basic rationale of 
combining advice with product sales (e.g., travel bookings, investment 
products). Information and knowledge asymmetries [Sharma 1997] may 
favor advisor opportunism – advisors, for example, may take advantage of 
the client’s informational deficiencies by optimizing advice and 
recommendations to their self-interest and either over-provide their services 
(e.g., provide products the client does not need) or under-provide them (e.g., 
limiting their effort of finding appropriate products) [Mills 1990; Mishra 
2004]. Being a layperson regarding the domain information and advisory 
processes, the client may not be able to uncover such over- and under-
provision and correctly evaluate the quality of the recommendation 
[Jungermann 1999; Oehler and Kohlert 2009]. Lack of means to control for 
advisor opportunism and verify the provided recommendation may affect 
advisor-client interaction and further low satisfaction [Inbar and Tractinsky 
2011]. 
Against this background, in this essay we suggest that the problems of client-
advisor asymmetries and related low client satisfaction may be addressed by 
increasing transparency of the advisory encounter. We argue that shared 
collaborative IT artifacts are a feasible and useful means to improve such 
transparency in client-advisor interaction, such that shared informational 
resources increase the client’s comprehension of the advisor’s information 
(information transparency) and his actions (process transparency). We will 
investigate the feasibility and usefulness of this solution approach in the 
domain of financial investment advisory services, building and evaluating 
shared artifacts in three design science research iterations. Based on our 
observations and findings from these iterations, the essay will devise an 
initial design theory of how to improve transparency for client-advisor 
encounters in general.  
The research reported in this essay is based on findings of a research project 
at University of Zurich in cooperation with UBS and Zurich University of 
the Arts, which was co-financed by the Swiss commission for technology 
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and innovation. The project’s concepts and findings were previously 
published in Nussbaumer et al. [2010; 2011; 2012b; 2012c] as well as 
Schmidt-Rauch and Nussbaumer [2011].
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This essay is organized as follows. Section 7.1.1 and Section 7.1.2 of the 
introduction will summarize the research problem and provide details on our 
research approach. The remaining sections of the essay follow the structure 
of our research process, which was based on Peffers’ et al. [2007] design 
science research methodology. Section 7.2 is dedicated to the identification 
of problems in client-advisory encounters; to address these problems, 
Section 7.3 motivates the general solution approach of transparency. In 
Section 7.4, we introduce investment advisory services as an exemplary 
domain of asymmetric client-encounters, which we will then use to 
investigate the feasibility and utility of shared IT artifacts to enable 
transparency. Sections 7.5 to 7.7 present three build-and-evaluate iterations 
of such IT artifacts for investment advisory encounters, each providing 
details on the solution objectives, design and development and evaluation. 
From our findings and experiences in these design research iterations, we 
will devise an initial design theory of transparency in Section 7.8. We will 
conclude our design science endeavor in Section 7.9. 
7.1.1 Research Problem 
We argue that some general issues of advisory encounters are inherently 
related to information, knowledge and interest asymmetries between the 
client and the advisor. In this essay, we suggest that these asymmetries may 
be effectively addressed by introducing different facets of transparency to 
increase the client’s comprehensibility of the advisory encounter. Making 
transparent the advisor’s actions and their rationale (process transparency) as 
well as the underlying information (information transparency) should 
improve the client’s ability of assessing and validating the advisory course, 
its underlying information and its results. Also, increasing the client’s 
comprehensibility should enable her to better contribute to the process and 
allow for actual co-creation of its results. While increased comprehensibility 
of their advisor’s recommendation in respect of important decisions hence is 
an end in itself, transparency may also be a means to address correlates of 
the current asymmetries, e.g., low perceived advisory quality and client 
satisfaction [Inbar and Tractinsky 2011; Oehler and Kohlert 2009]. 
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In our research, we address the question of how such transparency may be 
enabled with the introduction of collaborative IT artifacts. Therefore, this 
essay has two main aims; (1) we will show how we built and evaluated 
shared IT artifacts in the domain of financial investment advice along three 
concatenated design science research cycles [Peffers et al. 2007]; (2) from 
our findings, we will derive general design principles and put forward an 
initial design theory of improving transparency in client-advisor encounters. 
Solutions to agency problems in such service contexts have been 
predominantly sought in two areas; (1) pre-contract strategies (e.g., 
signaling, screening [Bergen et al. 1992; Mishra 2004]), which only provide 
conditions to cope with ambiguity rather than to actually reduce asymmetries 
[Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000:153]; (2) top-down laws and regulations in 
respect of increased execution transparency and consumer protection (e.g., 
MiFID for European financial markets [European Commission 2004]), 
which are found to fail because of their lack of comprehensiveness and 
specificity [Oehler and Kohlert 2009].  
This essay introduces a novel approach of actually addressing prevalent 
asymmetries in client-advisor encounters. Our research contextualizes 
findings of diverse fields that traditionally have been investigated in 
isolation; we combine research on judge-advisor systems and advice-giving 
and taking [Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Jungermann 1999] as well as agency 
research and agency relationships in service encounters [Bergen et al. 1992; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Mishra 2004; Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000] with diverse 
literature on transparency [e.g., Andersson and Holm 1998; Carter and Curry 
2010; Eggert and Helm 2003].  
Against this background, we propose a first account on the role of different 
facets of transparency for client-advisor encounters as well as their support 
with shared IT artifacts. Introduction of supportive IT artifacts into such 
encounters constitutes a rather novel approach, with little research providing 
insights into their requirements, implementation and effects [e.g., Halloran 
2002; Novak and Schwabe 2009; Schmidt-Rauch and Schwabe 2011]. As 
such, the essay takes a perspective that focuses on asymmetry and 
transparency issues in client-advisor interaction and their potential solution 
with shared IT artifacts; it explicitly excludes other relevant aspects of 
advisory encounters, e.g., user experience [Novak and Schmidt 2009], 
advisor training [Schmidt-Rauch and Geiger 2010] or financial literacy 
[Mitchell and Lusardi 2011].  
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7.1.2 Research Approach 
In our research, we aim to improve transparency of asymmetric advisory 
encounters with a shared IT artifact that mediates client-advisor interaction. 
Exemplarily investigating the domain of investment advisory services, we 
suggest that such artifacts contribute to solve the business problems of 
perceived low advisory quality and low client satisfaction. 
In seeking to develop a technological solution for a practical problem, our 
research qualifies as a design science research endeavor [Hevner et al. 2004]. 
The two main processes of design science research are to build artifacts 
(constructs, models, methods, or instantiations) to demonstrate their 
feasibility in addressing practical problems, and evaluate them to determine 
their utility in solving these problems [March and Smith 1995]. 
An important issue of such design science research is to capture and 
communicate the design knowledge incorporated into the artifact. Gregor 
and Jones [2007] suggest codifying such knowledge into design theories. 
Rather than only explaining why an artifact’s design solves the problem, 
such theories focus on giving explicit prescriptions on how to design and 
develop a solution artifact [Gregor and Jones 2007:313]. Such prescriptions 
or technological rules may take the form of heuristics: “if you want to 
achieve Y in situation Z, then something like action X will help” [van Aken 
2004:227].  
To guide our research process, we followed the Design Science Research 
Methodology (DSRM) suggested by Peffers et al. [2007], which segments 
the proceedings of design research into six consecutive activities. Along 
these activities, in this essay we report three build-and-evaluate design 
science iterations; these iterations aim to demonstrate the feasibility and 
utility of shared IT artifacts to address transparency issues in investment 
advisory service encounters. From our experiences and observations in 
implementing and evaluating these artifacts for investment advice, we will 
infer an initial design theory of transparent artifacts for general asymmetric 
client-advisor encounters. Representing the important principles of our 
solution as a design theory should make them applicable to similar systems 
yet to be constructed, also in other domains. 
According to Gregor and Jones [2007], a design theory consists of eight 
components (Table 7-1). Given the practical stance of design science 
research, the components of a theory may be “extracted from observation 
and inference from already instantiated artifacts” [Gregor and Jones 
2007:321]. In doing so, some components of a design theory may be 
specified in earlier phases of a design science research endeavor (e.g., 
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purpose and scope), others seem to require at least one build-and-evaluate 
iteration to be conducted (e.g., principles of implementation and expository 
instantiation of the design theory). However, the definition of each 
component of a design theory is correlated to particular activities of the 
DSRM process of Peffers et al. [2007]. Thus, in describing our research 
along the DSRM process below, we will also point to the relevant design 
theory components as parts and potential outputs of the single activities. We 
will start our considerations with a brief overview and will provide details on 
the activities thereafter. 
Figure 7-1 provides an overview of the mentioned activities’ most important 
concepts and outputs and contextualizes them along the research process of 
problem exploration and solution exploration (i.e., design and evaluation). 
Table 7-1: Components of an Information Systems Design Theory [Gregor and Jones 
2007] 
Component Description 
1) Purpose and Scope Set of goals that specifies the type of artifact to which the 
theory applies (scope, boundaries) 
2) Constructs Entities of interest in the theory 
3) Principle of form and function Principles that define the structure, organization, and 
functioning of the design artifact 
4) Artifact mutability Changes in the artifact anticipated by the theory (evolution 
or adaptation) 
5) Testable propositions Propositions or hypotheses about the constructed artifact 
against which it can be tested 
6) Justificatory knowledge Knowledge that gives base or explanation for the artifact 
design 
7) Principles of Implementation Process of implementing the theory (artifact) in specific 
contexts 
8) Expository instantiation Physical implementation of the artifact for the purpose of 
theory representation or testing 
As suggested by the DSRM, we dedicated the first activity of our research 
process to problem exploration, i.e., to (1) identify an organizational 
problem, atomize the problem into its underlying causes and show the 
importance of a solution. Based on the problem definitions, we initiated 
several iteration loops of a solution-finding process, where each loop (2) 
defined the respective solution’s objectives, (3) designed and built the 
artifact according to design requirements of what the artifact has to afford to 
accomplish the solution objectives, and (4) demonstrated how the artifact 
may be used to solve the problems. Finally, for each loop we conducted (5) 
evaluations using experimental techniques to investigate the artifact’s utility 
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against the solution objectives. If the artifact had failed to fulfill the 
objectives, a consecutive iteration was initiated. This essay’s goal is to report 
on three such iterations and devise an initial design theory of how to 
introduce transparency into client-advisor encounters, thus (6) 
communicating the research results. 
 
Figure 7-1: Meta concepts of the design research process 
(1) Identify Problem and Motivate. As design science “creates and 
evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve identified organizational problems” 
[Hevner et al. 2004:77], the first activity of the design science research 
process is to specify the research problem and justify the value of a solution 
[Peffers et al. 2007:52].  
In this essay, we address the organizational problems arising from inherent 
issues in advisory service provision (see Section 7.2). We show how these 
issues occur in financial investment advisory services (Section 7.3), leading 
to low advisory quality and, thus, low client satisfaction.  
Because the problem definition provides the basis of developing a solution 
artifact, Peffers et al. [2007] suggest that “it may be useful to atomize the 
problem conceptually so that the solution can capture its complexity” (p. 52). 
We atomize our organizational problem into four inherent causes of client 
dissatisfaction in asymmetric advisory services, which guide the further 
build-and-evaluate activities: the problems of concealment, diverging goals, 
undissolved complexity, and low controllability (see Section 7.2).  
In respect of the design theory, the activity of problem identification and 
motivation provides a first basis of its purpose and scope, i.e., for which 
contexts the theory may be applicable and in which contexts the respective 
artifacts are intended to operate. While we conduct our build-and-evaluate 
iterations in the domain of investment advisory services, we aim to broaden 
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the purpose and scope of our initial design theory to include general 
asymmetric client-advisor encounters. 
(2) Define Objectives of the Solution. The goal of this activity is to infer 
the solution objectives from the preceding activity’s problem definition as 
well as knowledge of “what is possible and feasible” [Peffers et al. 2007:55], 
i.e., the state of problems and current solutions. Objectives answer the 
question of how an artifact is expected to support a solution to the identified 
problems. 
Based on existing CSCW and HCI research, we find that collaborative IT 
artifacts may constitute an appropriate solution approach; we suggest that a 
shared transparent IT artifact contributes to address existing problems of 
advisory service provision, and to address the organizational problem of low 
advisory quality and client satisfaction.  
To provide a solution to the identified problems, with such IT artifacts we 
aim to accomplish four objectives; (1) increase the service encounter’s 
process transparency (comprehensibility of the advisor’s actions) as well as 
(2) increase information transparency (comprehensibility of advisory 
information), while also enabling (3) increased client controllability of the 
service encounter. Attaining these solution objectives should give way to (4) 
increased overall client satisfaction. 
The concepts of transparency and controllability (and, overall, client 
satisfaction) are related to the constructs required by a design theory, i.e., the 
representations of the entities of interest in the theory (Section 7.3). In design 
theories for information technologies, single constructs may represent semi-
independent sub-systems or components, for which the designs may be 
carried out with some degree of independence [Gregor and Jones 2007:325]. 
In respect of their possible design, process and information transparency are 
such semi-independent components in that they address different solution 
objectives. As we assume increased controllability to be partly a 
consequence of increased transparency, however, designing for 
controllability shows some dependencies to the chosen transparency designs. 
Within these limits, we also address controllability as a single component 
and, consequently, as a separate solution objective. In our research, we 
assume that client satisfaction depends on the degree of transparency and 
controllability perceived by the client, making increased client satisfaction a 
direct consequence of successful transparency and controllability design. As 
such, we seek to attain our objective of increased satisfaction based on the 
fulfillment of the other solution objectives.  
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(3) Design and Develop. Design research must produce an “artifact created 
to address a problem” [Hevner et al. 2004:82], which should be relevant to 
the solution of a “heretofore unsolved and important business problem” 
[Hevner et al. 2004:84]. The design-and-develop activity includes 
determining the artifact’s required functionality to accomplish the solution 
objectives; upon these design requirements the actual artifact is then created, 
e.g., implemented in a software prototype.  
While the design and develop activities for our first iteration were based on 
inputs from expert interviews and focus groups, we contextualized the 
second iteration of our research process with methods of scenario-based 
development [Rosson and Carroll 2002] to enable artifact designs and 
instantiations that better conform to the actual users’ needs and preferences. 
This approach is based on close collaboration with actual users and 
dedicated to acknowledge their understanding of problems, requirements and 
possible solutions. In an iterative manner, scenario-based development starts 
with the creation of problem scenarios in the form of short stories that mirror 
the researchers’ understanding of the situation and may be easily understood 
and validated by users. In a similar manner, the users’ feedback may be 
gained for solution objectives (activity scenarios, i.e., stories about using the 
new artifact), and, as a next step, paper-based low-fidelity prototypes, 
presenting different aspects of the artifact. Prior to implementing high-
fidelity, functional prototypes, such an approach allows to iteratively and 
rapidly improve the artifact’s design. To implement this process for our 
second and third iteration, six key users (three advisors and three clients) 
were involved in iterative problem specification and solution validation.  
Many of the components required by a design theory are informed by design 
and develop activities. First, they may specify principles of form and 
function, which define the “structure, organization, and functioning of the 
design product” [Gregor and Jones 2007:325]. While design requirements 
define what functionality the artifact has to afford, such principles 
correspond to how the requirements may be instantiated to accomplish the 
solution objectives. Our instantiations of the design requirements, which 
evolved along the design iterations, provided the basis for the design 
theory’s final design principles. Second, in our research we implement the 
solution artifacts as software prototypes. These prototypes relate to 
expository instantiations required by a design theory, contributing to the 
“identification of potential problems in a theorized design and in 
demonstrating that the design is worth considering” [Gregor and Jones 
2007:329]. Third, describing the development process may also inform the 
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design theory’s principles of implementation, i.e., how the designs are 
brought into being. 
Fourth, the justificatory knowledge of the design theory, i.e., the knowledge 
that gives a basis and explanation for the design, plays a pivotal role in 
designing and developing artifacts. The knowledge base is used to find and 
choose amongst design alternatives or alternative ways of instantiating them. 
We base our considerations on several bodies of knowledge (see Section 7.2 
and Section 7.3), including agency research, judge-advisor systems and 
advice-giving and taking, as well as literature on transparency and 
collaborative IT support. Our artifact designs and their instantiations evolved 
along the research process, where each iteration was built on the experiences 
of the previous one. With the designs, their justificatory knowledge evolved 
as well, providing a rich background for the resulting design theory.  
Finally, the choices among design alternatives and instantiations may also 
inform artifact mutability of a design theory, pointing to potential changes 
and improvements to evolve or adapt the artifact, e.g., for other application 
domains.  
(4) Demonstrate and (5) Evaluate. The use of the designed artifact has to 
be demonstrated for at least one instance of the problem, involving “its use 
in experimentation, case study, proof, or other appropriate activity” [Peffers 
et al. 2007:55]. Thus, the artifact’s use may be demonstrated while 
evaluating its utility. Such evaluation has the goal of observing and 
measuring whether the artifacts succeeds in fulfilling the solution objectives 
defined in Activity 2. If the artifact supports a solution to the defined 
problems, research may proceed with communicating the results (Activity 
6); if not, consecutive design iterations may be initiated in Activity 3, trying 
to improve the effectiveness of the artifact. 
In the literature, several methods have been proposed for the evaluation of 
design science research artifacts, including observational studies, action 
research, surveys, analytical analyses, functional or structural test, 
descriptive argumentation and controlled experiments or simulations [see 
overviews, e.g., in Cleven et al. 2009:4; Hevner et al. 2004:18]. 
Experimental techniques are widely used in human-computer interaction 
research, particularly to evaluate design solutions [Lazar et al. 2010:42]. As 
such, they are deemed very effective to determine causality while controlling 
for extraneous variables [Siau and Rossi 2011:258].  
In our research, we conducted exploratory evaluations using such 
experimental techniques to evaluate our designed artifacts and measure their 
influence and effects on client-advisor encounters. We assigned test subjects 
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(here: clients and advisors) to treatment and control conditions, manipulated 
the independent variable (here: artifact support, such that the treatment 
condition involves the using the artifact, whereas the control condition refers 
to the unsupported, traditional encounter) and measured the effects on the 
dependent variables (e.g., process transparency) [Siau and Rossi 2011:257]. 
The evaluations followed a within-subject design, where each client 
participant was exposed to both the treatment and the control condition and 
was then asked to evaluate the differences along several metrics. We used 
metrics of process transparency, information transparency, controllability 
and satisfaction to operationalize our main hypotheses regarding the 
artifacts’ utility and to assess whether the artifacts accomplished their 
solution objectives. 
The predictions or hypotheses about the outcomes of the artifact that are 
tested in evaluations relate to the design theory’s testable propositions. In a 
general form these propositions may read as: “If a system or method that 
follows certain principles is instantiated then it will work, or it will be better 
in some way than other systems or methods” [Gregor and Jones 2007:327]. 
Such propositions may vary in their degree of generality, from general 
claims that a design works universally in many context to propositions that 
are only approximations of what will work in different contexts [Gregor and 
Jones 2007:327]. 
(6) Communication. The resulting knowledge of the conducted research 
needs to be communicated, including “the problem and its importance, the 
artifact, its utility and novelty, the rigor of its design, and its effectiveness” 
[Peffers et al. 2007:56]. We meet this requirement in the current essay. 
As indicated above, iterating the build-and-evaluate activities of the DSRM 
process allowed building subsequent solution designs on the experiences and 
findings of the respective previous iterations. This concatenation of our 
research allowed us to iteratively progress towards successful transparency 
designs, which we will devise as an initial design theory in this essay. We 
will briefly summarize the three iterations below.   
First iteration: Our first iteration started with a identifying and motivating 
our research endeavor. Having identified investment advisory services as a 
prime example of asymmetric client-advisor encounters, the problem 
identification phase included an in-depth study of such advisory services in 
Swiss FSPs [Mogicato et al. 2009; Nussbaumer et al. 2011]. Surveying 
different stakeholders (clients, advisors, and managers) allowed us to define 
an initial set of problems to address and also informed the design of our first 
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design solution. We implemented the design solution in a software prototype 
for a multi-touch tabletop system (Microsoft Surface) and evaluated its 
utility. 
Second iteration: Evaluation of the first software prototype showed that the 
solution objectives of transparency could not be attained. Thus, we initiated 
a second process iteration, where we revised the design requirements and re-
implemented their instantiation in a new software prototype. For the design 
to better conform to the actual users’ needs and preferences, we 
contextualized the second iteration of our research process with methods of 
scenario-based development [Rosson and Carroll 2002]. Again, we 
implemented the software prototype for the multi-touch tabletop system and 
conducted evaluations. 
Third iteration: Since the results of our second evaluation were promising 
but constrained by obvious interaction design issues, we entered a third 
build-and-evaluate iteration. We again followed the scenario-based 
development process to design and develop the solution artifact. We built on 
our initial problem statements and solution objectives but revised our design 
requirements and their implementation in the tabletop software artifact. Our 
evaluation showed that this final artifact could successfully accomplish all 
solution objectives.  
7.2 Problem Identification 
Counseling and advice provide decision guidance for particular problems 
(e.g., career, marriage, substance abuse) [Warschburger 2009:4]. In such 
psychosocial contexts, counseling aims to broker relevant information and 
build or practice the client’s capabilities in order to enable her in helping 
herself [Warschburger 2009:25; Brown et al. 2006:7]. Disregarding such 
origins, the notion of professional counseling and advice has also been used 
exceedingly in service provision, e.g., management consultancy, travel 
counseling or financial investment advice [Schmidt-Rauch and Nussbaumer 
2011]. While in such service settings the client also seeks to be enabled and 
empowered to solve a problem (e.g., make-or-buy decisions, planning a 
holiday trip, investing in mutual funds) and implement an appropriate 
solution, their basic character is sales-oriented – there is no explicit intention 
to develop expertise in the advised person. Thus, should a similar problem 
arise in the future, the client may have to return to the source of advice 
[Brown et al. 2006:8].  
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This orientation towards sales rather than counseling may lead to potential 
issues regarding the provider’s self-interest, such as to provide 
recommendations that are optimized towards his own revenues rather than 
the client’s needs. As encounters between advisors and clients are also 
characterized by information and knowledge asymmetry, such advisor 
opportunism may be additionally aided. 
In the literature, such facets of advice and advisory encounters have been 
discussed from different perspectives, but seldom in an integrative manner. 
For the purpose of this essay, we will summarize literature of the relevant 
areas of judge-advisor systems and advice-giving and taking [Bonaccio and 
Dalal 2006; Sniezek and Buckley 1995] and integrate it with relevant 
concepts from agency research [Sharma 1997; Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000; 
Eisenhardt 1989]. In a novel effort, we will then contextualize the findings of 
these bodies of knowledge with literature on transparency, providing a new 
perspective on potential solutions to agency problems in advisory 
encounters. 
7.2.1 Advisory Encounters and Decision Making 
Individuals may seek advice for different problems and reasons; they may 
seek decision guidance from psychological counselors (e.g., requesting 
advice on career, marriage, substance abuse) [Warschburger 2009], medical 
advisors (e.g., seeking advice on medical treatments) [Jungermann 1999] or, 
with the constant growth of service industry, increasingly “practical” 
advisors (e.g., insurance advice, investment advice, travel counseling).  
Advisors, however, may fulfill different functions. In psychological 
counseling, for example, the advisor’s role lies in practicing the client’s 
capabilities in order to enable her in helping herself [Schwarzer and Posse 
1986; Warschburger 2009:25]; in medical advice, advisors may be consulted 
because of their expertise in providing relevant information that the clients 
may not gather or process; yet another function lies in information brokering 
[Valley et al. 1992], where advisors collect and sell information to clients 
that are not willing to invest time and effort themselves, such as in travel 
consulting [Jonas and Frey 2003:154]. Other advisors may as well fulfill 
both of the latter functions, i.e., providing expert domain knowledge and 
brokering relevant information, e.g., in insurance or investment advice, 
where the client either lacks knowledge to gather all relevant information or 
lacks access to important information. 
For quite some time, research on judge-advisor systems has investigated 
advice utilization and judgment accuracy in respect of different 
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characteristics of both the advisor and the decision maker [Bonaccio and 
Dalal 2006; Harvey and Fischer 1997; Sniezek and Buckley 1995; Yaniv 
2004]. Especially for complex problems, individuals use input from others to 
make better decisions (and with greater accuracy) and avoid mistakes, to be 
provided with new information and perspectives, to gain more confidence 
for their decision at hand [Heath and Gonzalez 1995] and to share 
responsibility of the decision outcome [Harvey and Fischer 1997]. Indeed, 
using advice has been found to increase decision accuracy [Bonaccio and 
Dalal 2006:133] and advisors have been found to engage in a less biased and 
more balanced information search and to exhibit greater concern regarding 
the accuracy of their recommendation [Jonas and Frey 2003], thus 
employing more task-related effort [Kray 2000].  
However, most research on judge-advisor systems neglects two features of 
dyadic consulting interaction; firstly, experimental setups mostly allow no 
direct interaction between advisor and client [Bonaccio and Dalal 2006:138]. 
Secondly, they do not acknowledge that in such dyadic decision situations 
expertise and experience are asymmetrically distributed between advisor and 
client.  
Jungermann and Fischer [2005] ascribe this informational asymmetry to 
differences in knowledge and solution-finding strategies between clients and 
advisors. Advisors are more experienced with client problems and their 
potential solutions, have extensive knowledge regarding the relevant facts 
and “statistical knowledge” (or technical database) of client goals and 
values, their coping behaviors, biases, etc. Furthermore, the advisor has 
explicit procedural knowledge of how to arrive at a solution [Jungermann 
and Fischer 2005:158–159]. Clients, on the other hand, are usually 
laypersons lacking the relevant factual knowledge and systematic solution-
finding strategies, and even might have only limited awareness of their own 
goals, values and preferences; finally, clients are not familiar with the 
advisors’ decision making and thus will have difficulties in understanding 
the recommendation, its rationale and possible alternatives [Jungermann and 
Fischer 2005:159–160].  
There are some consequences of these asymmetries; without the client being 
able to notice, advisors may categorize clients and their problems and select 
the best option associated with the category rather than evaluating the 
complete set of options [Jungermann and Fischer 2005:160; Jungermann 
1999:5]. They will provide only the output of their solution search, 
explaining and justifying their recommendation, but will provide no 
reasoning how they arrived at the solution [Jungermann 1999:6].  
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Nevertheless, the relationship between advisors and customers is still 
functional because they are accustomed to acting “as if”. While advisors act 
as if they had gathered and provided all relevant information and as if the 
client understood them, the latter will behave analogously, acting as if they 
understood the provided information and solutions [Jungermann and Belting 
2004].  
This equilibrium shows some severe drawbacks – not only does under this 
assumption the client not sufficiently understand the procured information 
and solution; the client will also be vulnerable to potential self-interests of 
the advisor. While the discussed research on judge-advisor systems and 
advice giving and taking indeed finds information asymmetry an inherent 
characteristic of advisor-client encounters, one immediate consequence has 
found less consideration, i.e., the potential moral hazard of the advisor to 
take advantage on the less knowledgeable client. Such issues have been 
investigated by agency research, which will be discussed in the following 
section. 
7.2.2 Agency Characteristics of Advisory Encounters 
As implied above, advisor-client interactions feature characteristics of 
principal-agent relationships, which have been prominently investigated by 
agency research [Eisenhardt 1989; Mishra 2004; Singh and Sirdeshmukh 
2000]. Traditionally, agency theory is concerned with “relationships that 
mirror the basic agency structure of a principal and an agent who are 
engaged in cooperative behavior, but have differing goals and differing 
attitudes to risk” [Eisenhardt 1989:59].  
Such relationships are characterized by one party (the agent, i.e., the advisor) 
undertaking actions on behalf of another (the principal, i.e., the client). In 
general, agency theory investigates such relationships in terms of 
information and interest asymmetries.  
Information asymmetry relates to agents being more knowledgeable about 
their own actions than the principal, making it difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is actually doing and evaluate the quality 
of his actions. Interest asymmetry (and its potential consequence of 
opportunism) is based on the assumption that partners in exchange are 
motivated by self-interest and are likely to exploit information asymmetry to 
further their self-interest. Such interest asymmetries may be ameliorated by 
adequate compensation systems which do not only focus on output quantity 
but also its quality [Mishra 2004]. 
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If principals seek out agents for their specialized knowledge, as it may be the 
case for advisory encounters, client and advisor partake in a principal-
professional relationship [Shapiro 2005:276; Sharma 1997]. In such 
situations, the principal may not only lack information of what the advisor 
does (information asymmetry), but also how he is doing it, introducing the 
problem of knowledge asymmetry. Thus, the lay principal may not possess 
the knowledge to evaluate or verify the professional’s effort or outcome.  
Much research has investigated specific principal-agent relationships [Golec 
1992:81], e.g., those of shareholder-manager [Jensen and Meckling 1976], 
issuer-investment banker [Baron 1982], or intra-organizational relationships 
of employer-employee (see, for example, overviews in Eisenhardt [1989:66–
67] and Bergen [1992:10–11]). Also, the relationship between employees of 
service organizations and their customers has been considered, e.g., 
regarding prescriptive governance mechanisms to improve effectiveness of 
service firms (cf. Sharma [1997:759]).  
In the following, we will integrate important characteristics of advisory 
encounters from an advice giving and taking perspective with issues caused 
by the inherent principal-agent relationship of advisor and client. Advisory 
encounters (e.g., travel counseling, insurance and investment advisory 
services) share the following characteristics (adapted and extended from 
Schmidt-Rauch and Nussbaumer [2011:4]). 
Encounter of experts and laypersons. At the intersection of advice giving 
and taking research and agency research, advisory services can be 
conceptualized as encounters of experts and laypersons partaking in 
principal-professional relationships [Sharma 1997], where the principal is 
requesting help from the professional within a specific problem domain.  
While clients may know that there are high and low quality providers, the 
distinguishing characteristics are not transparent to them (hidden 
characteristics) [Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000:141]. Furthermore, the 
advisor is typically more knowledgeable about his own actions than the 
client, i.e., the client may observe and evaluate the advisor’s output but does 
not know what the advisor is doing and may therefore not observe the 
quality of the output (hidden action, e.g., Bergen et al. [1992:3ff]). Even if 
the client is able to observe the advisor’s actions, the latter has power over 
the lay client by virtue of his expertise – the client may neither possess the 
factual nor procedural knowledge to evaluate the advisor’s effort or 
accomplished outcome, i.e., the client cannot understand how the agent 
arrives at a specific recommendation (hidden information, e.g., Bergen et al. 
[1992:6ff]). 
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The expert-layperson asymmetry also impacts the comprehensibility of the 
encounter as perceived by the client. The client’s information processing 
capabilities are limited (bounded rationality, Simon [1991]); thus it may be 
unrealistic that disclosure of all relevant factual and procedural information 
could actually be processed by clients [Jungermann 1999:9] due to potential 
information overload [Eppler and Mengis 2004; Maes 1994], especially for 
complex decisions like they occur in investment advisory [Harrison 2002:8f; 
Oehler and Kohlert 2009:102]. Not only do bounded rationality and 
information overload lead to decision heuristics and systematic failures in 
client judgment [Stracca 2004] but also do they make the client especially 
vulnerable towards advisors taking advantage on the information and 
knowledge asymmetries. 
Diverging goals and opportunism. As discussed above, information and 
knowledge asymmetries between advisors and clients are problematic 
because they impair the client’s understanding of the advisory encounter 
(i.e., the underlying information and advisor actions) and may thus affect her 
decision making. These problems are aggravated in situations where advisor 
and client have diverging goals and, thus, conflicts of interest appear 
(interest asymmetry). Such conflicts arise in most advisory service 
encounters, since advisors take on the agent’s role in two principal-agent 
relationships [Mishra 2004]: an investment advisor is the agent of a client 
principal, for whom he undertakes actions, e.g., to find an optimal 
investment portfolio for his client. At the same time, he is agent of a profit-
seeking firm that demands selling particular products. Therefore, the advisor 
may engage in hidden action and hidden information both towards the client 
principal and the corporate principal: Will he sell particular products even if 
they are not suitable for the clients to follow the goals of the firm principal? 
Or will he under-provide (e.g., by only superficially preparing 
recommendations to increase efficiency) or over-provide the client (e.g., to 
sell more expensive products because of provisions and commissions) to 
follow his own personal goals?  
Advisory services often propagate compensation schemes that further 
deteriorate such agency problems; in the prevailing business model of 
investment advisory services, for example, service of advice is offered free 
of charge but cross-subsidized by provisions and fees of product sales, 
pressuring advisors to efficiently sell their products or incentivizing them to 
increase their earnings by selling specific products [Financial Services 
Authority 2009; Inderst and Ottaviani 2011; Mullainathan et al. 2011; Oehler 
and Kohlert 2009]. 
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Such conflicts are not exclusive to sales-oriented advisory encounters and 
their compensation schemes; they may also appear in situations where no 
specific products or services are exchanged. Physicians as medical advisors, 
for example, may have incentives to recommend particular treatments to 
promote their own research. Patients, however, are unable to determine the 
treatments’ appropriateness [Mills 1990:35]. Thus, at presence of conflicts of 
interests and given the information and knowledge deficiencies of the client, 
the advisor may act opportunistically in self-interest and organizational 
interest with little risk of being caught [Jungermann 1999:8; Oehler and 
Kohlert 2009:94f; Shapiro 2005:267]. 
Co-created solutions. Typically, the goal of an advisory encounter is the 
advisor providing the client with a problem-specific and individual 
recommendation (solution). In most advisory domains, the recommendation 
is thus highly dependent from the client’s specific situation, needs and goals. 
Therefore, prior to the actual encounter, the solution and/or its specific 
configuration is unknown to both the advisor and client – in fact, the solution 
is jointly co-created on the basis of their interaction [Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004; Vargo and Lusch 2004]. Such co-creation requires inputs 
from either party; while the advisor relies on the client for input information 
on her specific situation and needs (problem space), the client relies on the 
advisor’s explanations and recommendations (solution space).  
The client-advisor dialogue enabling co-creation, however, is hampered by 
information and knowledge asymmetries. These asymmetries complicate the 
client’s comprehension of her own role and tasks as well as the advisor’s 
actions and recommendations. Thus, the client may be hindered to 
contribute. In fact, she may not even have enough control of the process and 
its results to and take the role of the primary decision maker; as the advisor 
is providing the majority of inputs and recommendations, he might represent 
the real locus of decision [Jungermann 1999:4]. 
Complex problem-solving process. Even though an individualized solution 
for the client should be inherently co-created by both actors, information and 
knowledge asymmetry hinder effective collaboration. The general, idealized 
process of problem solving involves potentially complex mappings of the 
client’s problem space (needs, situation, and preferences) to the advisor’s 
solution space (options, configurations). In practice these idealized process is 
hampered by several asymmetries. While information regarding the solution 
space of the advisor may be concealed from the client, also the elicitation of 
the client’s problem space may prove difficult: typically, clients lack 
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knowledge of and experience with the advisory situation and may not have 
thought about their particular goals and needs in advance [Dorn-Seifert 
2004] or may not be aware of them because of their early state in the 
problem-solving process [Belkin 2005; Kuhlthau 1999]. Thus, problems and 
needs may be fuzzy and “sticky” [von Hippel 1994]. 
Likewise, client preferences may be unstable and stochastic [Kahneman 
1994] and may be developed not until the process of elicitation [Hibbard et 
al. 1997; Slovic 1995]. Hence, preferences may also be dependent from the 
elicitation method used [Starmer 2000]. As their elicitation is primarily 
guided by the advisor, the client is subject to potential opportunistic 
manipulation. For example, advisors may exploit framing effects [Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981] and present choice problems in ways that influence the 
client’s decision (e.g., suggestive questioning such as “you are certainly 
familiar with stocks?”) [Oehler and Kohlert 2009:100].  
Also, when mapping the client’s needs and preferences to the solution space, 
advisors may act opportunistically, e.g., by engaging only in superficial 
solution search, i.e., simply categorizing clients and select the best option 
associated with the respective category [Jungermann 1999:4]. Such “default” 
options are “one-size-fits-all” and thus may provide inadequate solutions to 
the client – also, the client is inhibited to carefully consider other, more 
adequate solutions [Agnew and Szykman 2005:58]. As advisors will 
typically explain and justify their recommendation but not show how they 
came to the solution [Jungermann 1999:6], the client will not even notice the 
advisor’s short cuts in providing his recommendation. The problem-solution 
gap makes it difficult for the client to comprehend the advisor’s solutions or 
potential alternatives, let alone evaluate their quality. Also, whether or not 
the advisor invests further effort in adapting the solution to the client’s 
individual needs lies at the discretion of the advisor. 
7.2.3 Problem Summary 
From the discussed characteristics we may synthesize the following main 
problems (P) as they occur in client-advisor encounters. 
P1. The problem of concealment: Clients may (partly) observe the advisor’s 
actions but may not – due to concealed information regarding in respect 
of the advisor’s solution space and knowledge asymmetry – evaluate 
their quality (hidden information); e.g., for needs elicitation, the client 
may (partly) observe the agent’s actions (e.g., regarding his information 
gathering strategy) but may not be able to infer its quality. Also, the 
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client may observe the output but not the advisor’s actions, thus making 
it difficult to evaluate the recommendation’s quality. 
P2. The problem of diverging goals: Advisors are agents in at least two 
principal-agent relationships (organization and client) and thus under 
contract with two principals who may provide them with potentially 
conflicting goals (interest asymmetry). Such conflicts may encourage 
moral hazard of advisors. Advisors may take advantage on information 
and knowledge asymmetries that inhibit the client of monitoring or 
verifying his actions. For example, advisors may opportunistically invest 
insufficient effort in the solution-finding process in order to improve 
“efficiency” or over-provide products that increase their earnings but are 
inadequate in respect of the client’s needs.  
P3. The problem of undissolved advisory complexity: The quality of advice is 
a function of the solution matching with the client’s needs, goals and 
preferences. Clients may find such information difficult to express and/or 
may be enabled to develop them only in the very process of elicitation. 
Furthermore, mapping the obtained client information to the advisor’s 
solution space may be incomprehensible for the client for two reasons; 
firstly, the client may experience a gap between her articulated needs and 
the advisor’s solution because of hidden information and hidden action; 
secondly, and quite inversely, the client may not be able to understand 
the mapping because of bounded rationality, i.e., her lack of knowledge 
and/or information overload.  
P4. The problem of low controllability: Advice and recommendation emerge 
from client-advisor interaction and are thus co-created from inputs of 
both parties. Due to information and knowledge asymmetries (or advisor 
opportunism), however, the lay client may not be able to control the co-
creation process and contribute as much as necessary to co-create an 
individual solution; thus, control over most activities and choices is left 
to the advisor, de facto making him the primary decision maker. 
In general, agency theory suggests two main solutions for a principal to 
address agency problems [Eisenhardt 1989]. Firstly, the principal may 
contract on the outcomes of the agent’s behavior and co-align the agent’s 
preferences with those of the principal. However, as outcomes are only 
partly a function of behavior, this uncertainty introduces risks that are 
transferred to the agent. In consumer-service provider relationships, risk 
sharing between principal and agent may be achieved with price mechanisms 
[Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000:152]. Consumers who are interested in high 
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quality services will be willing to pay price premium as a way of decreasing 
opportunism of the provider; while opportunism may seem advantageous for 
agents in the short-term, they risk loss of price premiums if their 
opportunism is revealed by customers. However, such conditions do not help 
to reduce information asymmetry experienced by the principal, but merely 
allow him to cope with ambiguity [Singh and Sirdeshmukh 2000:153] and, 
thus, are only addressing the problems of diverging goals and implied moral 
hazard.  
Secondly, principals may attempt to monitor the agent’s behavior, e.g., by 
investing in information systems – in organizational management (focusing 
mainly on employer-employee relationships), it has been suggested to 
control agent opportunism using information systems such as budgeting 
systems, reporting infrastructures, boards of directors and additional layers 
of management [Eisenhardt 1989:64]. Such information systems, however, 
seem to mainly address agent opportunism towards the organization – in 
service exchange settings, the client may not have the power to introduce 
further information systems to monitor her advisor. However, as we suggest 
in the next section, information systems that mediate advisor-client 
interaction may play an important role in alleviating agency problems in 
advisory encounters by enabling transparency. 
7.3 Transparency as General Solution Approach 
The notion of transparency has been discussed in different research fields 
with various meanings and levels of concreteness. In economics, for 
example, market transparency has been defined as the “level of availability 
and accessibility of information about products and market prices” 
[Granados et al. 2008:730], and “complete transparency” described as a 
feature of perfect competition. In the domain of management science and 
corporate governance, for Bessire [2005:426] transparency is another – 
however, not frequently used – notion for “information asymmetry”.  
A comprehensive, yet more specific and therefore more appropriate 
definition in the context of this essay, however, comes from political science 
research [Mahoney and Webley 2004:5]: “Transparency refers to the 
accessibility of the processes involved in decision making in addition to the 
outcome and to information itself. Transparency also involves proactive 
dissemination to the consumer of this information, knowledge and access.” 
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7.3.1 Effects of Transparency 
The definitions above at least imply that increasing the process and 
information transparencies of one party in a relationship should increase 
control and comprehensibility of the other. We argue that information, 
knowledge and interest asymmetries in principal-agent relationships should 
justify transparency (in respect of increased comprehensibility) as an end in 
itself. Furthermore, research suggests that individuals show a general 
preference for transparency and that a lack of it may have significant 
negative effects on relationships, e.g., regarding the client’s satisfaction and 
her perceived trustworthiness of the provider.  
The general (and sometimes irrational) preference for transparency has been 
discussed in the behavioral finance literature as “ambiguity aversion” 
[Camerer and Weber 1992:325], meaning that individuals appreciate 
“ambiguous” situations (having no information about the probability 
distribution) less than “risky” situations (knowing the probability distribution 
of the event), and are normally willing to pay to avoid ambiguity [Stracca 
2004:382]. Carter and Curry [2010] find similar evidence in their research on 
transparent pricing, showing that individuals prefer products with transparent 
prices (showing allocation of costs to different supply-side parties) over their 
non-transparent counterparts and are willing to pay premium prices for such 
products.  
Andersson and Holm [1998] theoretically explain this behavior with the 
improved falsifiability of transparent information (analogous to Popper's 
postulation that scientific theories need to be falsifiable). The authors 
provide a resolution to the paradox of Ellsberg [1961], who had 
demonstrated that individuals – having to choose from two alternatives, e.g., 
two lotteries – will in most cases prefer the alternative where the probability 
distribution is known. Such preferences, however, may violate the 
independence axiom of expected-utility theory. Andersson and Holm [1998] 
associate such “paradoxical” preferences with an individual’s suspicion in 
situations where transparency is not warranted, and hypothesize that 
individuals are more inclined to suspect manipulation when falsification of 
the information at hand is more difficult. 
Recently, first research has empirically investigated effects of transparency 
on (dyadic) interaction such as it occurs in client-advisor relationships. 
Positive effects of transparency reported or proposed in the literature are 
mostly related to increased satisfaction and increased perceived trust and 
fairness.  
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For clients in service encounters, Inbar and Tractinsky [2011] propose that 
establishing transparency (sharing information) may reduce the client’s 
uncertainty and lead to favorable perception of the service provider’s 
fairness and integrity as well as increase trust and satisfaction. In an 
empirical investigation of buyer-vendor relationships, Eggert and Helm 
[2003] found that relationship transparency, i.e., being informed about 
relevant actions and properties of an interaction partner, contributes to the 
overall success of a business relationship and increases customer 
satisfaction. Positive relations of transparency and trust have also been 
suggested by Adomavicius and Tuzhilin [2005:90] for personalization 
technologies in respect of explanations of recommendations – in their 
research on recommender systems, however, Cramer et al. [2008] did not 
find such effects. In the domain of e-government, Welch and Hinnant [2003] 
found that transparency is positively associated with citizen trust in 
government. Similar relations have been empirically supported for 
organization-employee relationships by Rawlins [2008]. Finally, Angluin 
and Scapens [2000] investigated levels of transparency of accounting in UK 
universities and found that only resource allocations with a high degree of 
transparency are likely perceived to be fair. 
7.3.2 Transparency as Antidote against Asymmetries 
Mahoney and Webley’s [2004:5] definition already includes the most 
important concepts of how transparency may be applied to address the 
problems of client-advisor encounters; (1) accessibility of information 
(addressing hidden information); (2) accessibility of the process (addressing 
hidden action). Their definition also emphasizes that transparency involves 
these information to be disseminated proactively. 
Let us first consider information transparency. In context of value co-
creation, Prahalad and Ramaswamy [2004:9] suggest that firms’ exploitation 
of information asymmetry between them and the individual consumers 
inhibits a meaningful dialog; for them access and transparency of 
information constitute central building blocks of co-creative interaction. 
Emphasizing on the interaction between advisor and client, Nussbaumer and 
Schwabe [2010] define information transparency as the degree of the client 
being enabled to monitor the information used as the basis of decision 
making. This facet of information transparency relates to the provision of 
relevant information for the client-advisor dialog. 
Another facet of information transparency relates to the disclosure of 
information use. In respect of investment advisory services, Buhl et al. 
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[2007:15] argue that such information transparency may counteract privacy 
concerns of clients: if the provider reveals what information will be gathered 
(and for what purpose) prior to the consultation, the client may decide which 
(personal) information she is comfortable to provide. In the same vein, 
although in the domain of online personalization, information transparency 
has been conceptualized as giving consumers “access to the information a 
firm has collected about them, and how that information is going to be used” 
[Awad and Krishnan 2006:14].  
We may summarize these two facets of information transparency in the 
context of advisory as follows: 
Information transparency := (I) the quality of information provision 
regarding the advisory information relevant for decision making, and (II) 
the degree of disclosure regarding what information is gathered and how 
it is used (i.e., for what purpose and what effect). 
As suggested by the definition of Mahoney and Webley [2004:5], 
transparency also refers to the “process of decision-making”, i.e., how a 
decision or recommendation is arrived at. We argued above that the current 
state of affairs in client-advisor encounters lacks such transparency (problem 
of hidden action) and thus impairs the client’s comprehensibility of the 
process and its results as well as facilitates a high degree of advisor 
opportunism.  
The importance of such process transparency has been stressed also by 
Eggert and Helm [2003:101] who subsume it under their concept of 
relationship transparency as “an individual’s subjective perception of being 
informed about the relevant actions and properties of the other party in the 
interaction”. Information about actions and explanation has also been found 
to be important for recommender systems [Adomavicius and Tuzhilin 
2005:90], which are – in a way – the technological equivalent of advisors. 
Finally, in context of human-computer interaction, Grote et al. [1999:145] 
recognize process transparency as a premise of user control over information 
systems, i.e., the user’s ability to see through the goals the realization of 
activities as well as to foresee the process (in terms of knowing when and 
how to interact). Such requirements have also been introduced for 
interaction transparency between user and computer system [Bardram and 
Bertelsen 1995]. 
Building on these conceptions and applying them to the context of client-
advisor interaction, process transparency lends itself to address the problem 
of hidden action, i.e., opening the “black box” of advisory and showing what 
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the advisor is doing as well as how he is doing it. Taking this conception, we 
may thus define process transparency as follows: 
Process transparency := the degree of disclosure regarding how and why 
activities are performed.  
Finally, as suggested above, making transparency the antidote of information 
asymmetries also requires proactive dissemination of information. At a first 
glance this seems rather straightforward and basically to involve 
implementing the first facet of information transparency: actively provide 
the client with all relevant information. Given the potential complexity and 
amount of relevant information, however, the crux of this simple solution 
reveals itself at the question of how. Clearly, the complexity of transparency 
requirements (e.g., transparently explaining the advisory process and its 
activities, their underlying information base as well as their effects while 
mapping the client’s problem space to the advisor’s solution space) will 
increase with the complexity of the advisory domain. Complexity may 
further increase with the premises that advisory encounters should be 
collaborative efforts (joint decision-making) and that, in order to make 
communication and cooperation between client and advisor effective, clients 
and advisors must be enabled to operate within a shared model of decision-
making [Jungermann 1999:10]. To address such complexity, research has 
long-since pointed to collaborative information technology (IT) support (see 
next section), which we will apply as the basis of our solution approach to 
enable transparency. 
We have argued above that transparency may be the antidote to asymmetries 
in client-advisor interaction. There are, however, some limitations to this. As 
a matter of fact, transparency may not solve the problem of diverging goals 
(and moral hazard) but may only influence their consequences in presence of 
the client. If it has adverse effects on the advisor’s and organization’s goal of 
maximizing profits, why would they want to increase the client’s 
comprehension? Firstly, it should not be presumed that organizations and 
advisors act opportunistically as a rule. Neither is a product yielding profit 
for its provider inherently “bad” or unsuitable for the client. Transparency 
merely challenges advisors and organizations to optimize the product-client 
fit, and either to improve their products or put more effort into the solution-
finding process. Given the proposed effects of transparency on the 
relationship between client and advisor (or organization), however, this loss 
should be compensated by the possible gains. Problems of diverging goals 
may also be addressed by an alignment of incentives, e.g., separation of 
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advice and its implementation and providing independent but fee-based 
advice. For investment advice such solutions are frequently discussed 
[Oehler and Kohlert 2009]. FSPs, however, have been countering such 
models by, e.g., bringing forward that clients lack the willingness to pay for 
advice [Mogicato et al. 2009]. 
Countering problems of moral hazard with transparency also shows 
philosophical implications. Even though the notion of transparency is 
predominantly used with positive connotations, there are also critics that call 
attention to its negative aspects. Bessire [2005], for example, warns against 
the most extreme form of transparency, panopticism, i.e., complete 
surveillance of individuals, probably without their knowledge. She finds that 
the most popular goal of transparency – inhibiting opportunism of 
individuals by discipline – in fact may have adverse effects on their behavior 
and the emphasis on opportunism create a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
“Transparency is assumed by its advocates to increase morality, but in fact it 
relies on a conception of man (a calculating and opportunistic individual), 
which appears in contradiction with this aim” [Bessire 2005:430]. There 
have been other proponents who challenge the premise of individuals 
behaving inherently opportunistic; such a conception of individual behavior 
has been countered with stewardship theory [Davis et al. 1997] that views 
agents as “good stewards” and replaces assumptions of opportunism and 
conflict of interest with those of cooperation and coordination [Shapiro 
2005:268]. 
We emphasize that our solution approach is compatible with both views. Our 
conception of transparency primarily targets at comprehensibility of the 
process and its information for the client as an end in itself (and as a possible 
antecedent of increased control and satisfaction) – even if we drop the 
assumption of opportunism and moral hazard, the concept should be useful 
in dissolving information and knowledge asymmetries and improving the 
client’s decision making. However, we also find that transparency may be an 
appropriate means to curb advisors from acting opportunistically against 
their client’s interests (even if this was an exception to the rule). 
7.3.3 Transparency and Collaborative IT Support 
To capture complexity of shared task-solving and decision-making in the 
related domain of group work, research on computer supported cooperative 
work (CSCW) has long-since pointed to collaborative information 
technology (IT) support [e.g., Fjermestad and Hiltz 2000; Mittleman et al. 
2008; Nunamaker et al. 1996]. In this body of research, collaboration 
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generally refers to people working together as part of a team for a common 
purpose and goal [Scaife et al. 2002]. Related research on design 
requirements to support such group work in both co-located [Arvola 2006; 
Isenberg and Carpendale 2007; Scott et al. 2003; Stewart et al. 1999] and 
remote settings [Baker et al. 2001; Pinelle et al. 2003] explicitly or implicitly 
assume symmetry of the actors’ interests and goals.  
Scaife et al. [2002], however, find a different kind of collaboration in sales-
based transactions. Here, collaboration tends to be asymmetrical, with actors 
– customer and sales agent – following different but interdependent goals: 
“the agent wants to sell something to the customer and give them a 
satisfactory service, and the customer wants to get the best product that suits 
their needs” [Scaife et al. 2002:123]. To achieve their respective goals, the 
actors have to exchange information and collaborate. Scaife et al. [2002:124] 
find several differences of such collaboration compared to team-based 
collaboration: typically, in such service settings collaboration is rather one-
sided, with one party (i.e., the agent) taking over the work and thus leaving 
the other party (i.e., the customer) highly dependent on him. Also, 
collaborators may be complete strangers (e.g., in the first service encounter) 
but have to build a shared understanding and mutual trust in a relatively 
short period time.  
Based on such differences between service encounter collaboration and 
“traditional” team or group work, other research has focused on potential use 
of shared IT artifacts between customers and agents, e.g., for the domain of 
travel counseling [Halloran 2002; Novak and Schwabe 2009; Rodden et al. 
2003]. In such settings, shared IT artifacts have been proposed to be useful 
to decrease both physical asymmetry as well as representational asymmetry 
between the actors [Inbar and Tractinsky 2011; Novak 2009; Rodden et al. 
2003]. Physical asymmetry refers to the common practice in service 
encounters that information sources like software applications are positioned 
in front of the agent, typically disallowing the customer to see or interact 
with them. Enabling physical symmetry gives way to representational 
symmetry, providing shared “informational resources” that both the 
customer and the sales agent can refer to and make sense of [Rodden et al. 
2003]. 
By mediating the transparent and traceable assignment of customer needs 
and preferences to product or service characteristics, such shared 
informational resources may also increase collaborative interaction and 
contribution of the client [Inbar and Tractinsky 2011; Novak 2009], 
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therefore supporting concepts of value co-creation between service providers 
and customers [Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004; Vargo and Lusch 2004]. 
In this essay, we contribute to this latter strand of research by investigating 
the feasibility and usefulness of shared IT artifacts in co-located service 
encounters. Specifically, we provide an in-depth account of asymmetric 
collaboration in advisory contexts, presenting a novel solution approach for 
agency issues in advisory service encounters based on principles of 
transparency. We also present the first account of such a system for the 
domain of investment advisory services.  
7.4 The Case of Investment Advisory Services 
For the purpose of analyzing how transparency may be implemented in 
client-advisor interactions as well as evaluating their effects, we will 
exemplarily investigate investment advisory services in Switzerland. We 
focus on addressing asymmetry and transparency issues in such service 
encounters, and exclude other perspectives (e.g., user experience [Novak and 
Schmidt 2009], advisor training [Schmidt-Rauch and Geiger 2010] or 
financial literacy [Mitchell and Lusardi 2011]).  
In this essay, we focus on investment advisory services for affluent private 
clients (with an approximate investment amount of 50’000 to 500’000 CHF). 
This segment marks the bottom end of the private banking market but is, 
given its potential growth, increasingly considered a lucrative market by 
FSPs [Molyneux and Omarini 2005]. To serve this client segment, most 
Swiss FSPs have established dedicated, structured investment processes 
[Mogicato et al. 2009]. These advisory processes provide assistance in 
defining strategic asset allocations according to the client’s needs and risk 
preference as well as their tactical implementation with financial products.  
While particular advisory practices of FSPs as well as relevant laws and 
regulations in other countries might be similar (e.g., for Europe) or not (e.g., 
for United States), our observations and conclusions should be generalizable 
to other countries in respect of general asymmetry issues between client and 
advisor (e.g., Germany [Hackethal et al. 2012; Oehler and Kohlert 2009], 
Austria [Hanke et al. 2006], United States [Krishnan et al. 1999; 
Mullainathan et al. 2011]). 
7.4.1 Problems in Investment Advisory Encounters 
Financial service providers (FSP) are facing fundamental challenges in 
performing their services – not only since the latest turmoil(s) in the 
financial markets. The avenue of new technological possibilities of service 
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provision such as Internet-based offerings has led to higher (market) 
transparency of service supplies and permitted a substantial reduction of 
costs, therefore also lowering barriers of market entrance [Buhl and 
Kundisch 2003].  
To persist in the resulting competition, the most promising strategy has been 
found in differentiation against competitors [Buhl and Kaiser 2008; Porter 
1998], which may be achieved by offering highly personalized, individual 
services [Buhl et al. 2007; Buhl et al. 2000; Dziarstek et al. 2004; Eberhardt 
and Zimmermann 2007], for these cannot easily be compared or imitated due 
to their dynamics and complexity. However, since the fundamentals of such 
services have not yet been established [Buhl and Kaiser 2008; Mogicato et 
al. 2009], FSPs have been counteracting cost pressure resulting from 
competition by optimizing their advisory services towards efficient and 
effective product sale rather than individualized advice. As a consequence, 
the quality of advisory services has been perceived as rather low and 
dissatisfying for customers [Evers et al. 2000; Jungermann and Belting 2004; 
Mogicato et al. 2009; Nussbaumer et al. 2011; Oehler and Kohlert 2009]. 
The main critique lies in the lack of transparency regarding the advisor’s 
information and activities; clients perceive their advisors as a “black box” 
[Oehler and Kohlert 2009:93], and, maybe as a consequence, show little trust 
in them [Ennew and Sekhon 2007; Mogicato et al. 2009; Nussbaumer et al. 
2011]. 
Legal frameworks have been developed to address execution transparency in 
financial advisory services and establish uniform regulations for consumer 
protection. For European markets, the most prominent example is the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive [MiFID; European Commission 
2004]. Basic duties of allegiance, due diligence and information disclosure 
have also been defined for Swiss FSPs [FINMA, Eidgenössische 
Finanzmarktaufsicht 2008; Roth 2009]. Such legal duties require, for 
example, that the advisor collects all relevant client information and in turn 
provides her with all relevant information for the potential investment 
decision [Oehler and Kohlert 2009:98]. However, research has frequently 
pointed to weaknesses and failures of the legal frameworks [Jungermann and 
Belting 2004; Kohlert 2009], arguing that they show little effect on advisory 
practice because of their generic nature – being neither comprehensive nor 
specific enough – and their unrealistic assumptions regarding the client’s 
prior knowledge and ability to comprehend the provided information [Oehler 
and Kohlert 2009:98–99]. 
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In spite of the equivocal reputation of investment advisory services, they are 
used by the majority of investors [Cocca et al. 2009; Ernst et al. 2009]. As 
for other decisions, individuals seek financial advice for different reasons; 
e.g., lack of (up-to-date) knowledge regarding the financial markets, to 
receive reassurance or because of lack of interest or lack of time [Financial 
Services Authority 2002:15–17].  
In the following, we will discuss issues of client-investment advisor 
encounters and relate them to the general problems of client-advisor 
relationships presented above. For this purpose, we shall start with a short 
characterization of how investment service encounters typically take place in 
Swiss banks. We base these observations on investigations of 37 Swiss 
financial service providers [Mogicato et al. 2009], including interviews with 
advisors, sales managers and IT managers as well as client focus groups and 
online surveys.  
First encounter: In an exemplary investment advisory consultation, the client 
and the advisor meet in a designated consultation room. In the case of 
prospect clients, the advisor has minimal information about the specific 
needs of his vis-à-vis. Thus, for the first few minutes he will engage in small 
talk to gather basic information about the client (financial situation, needs 
and wishes), taking notes on his notepad. Throughout the remainder of the 
encounter, the advisor tries to gather as much information about the client’s 
financial situation, her risk preferences, investment experiences as well as 
her interests in particular asset classes. Building upon this information, he 
will then suggest an investment strategy that proportionally attributes the 
client’s investment to different asset classes (e.g., shares, bonds, money 
market). After some iterations of adapting this strategy to the client’s 
preferences (e.g., increasing the amount of bonds and decreasing the amount 
of shares), the first encounter is finished (typically after up to 90 minutes). 
The advisor will propose to prepare a product portfolio for the agreed 
strategy, which will be either sent to the client (including material for 
establishing the contract) or discussed in a subsequent encounter. 
Recurrent encounters: Once the client is satisfied with the specific product 
allocation, it will be implemented by the FSP and its performance regularly 
reported to the client. Typically, the client may either opt for an asset 
management mandate, where the FSP is in charge of all further decisions 
regarding product allocation and which is charged with an all-in fee, or 
actively adapt her portfolio herself (or by consulting her advisor), which is 
normally coupled with transaction-based charging. While in both cases the 
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advisor and client will meet at least once a year to review the portfolio’s 
performance, only in the latter case will the client be able to actively 
influence and adapt the product allocation. During such a review meeting, 
adaptations to the portfolio are decided (e.g., selling of products and 
substitution by others) and implemented by the advisor, of which the client 
will be notified by an updated portfolio statement.  
As most clients of investment advisory encounters are laypersons, the 
problems of information and knowledge asymmetry, i.e., concealment of 
information and actions, are fundamental (P1). In investigations of advisor-
client interaction (e.g., in mystery shopping episodes [Mogicato et al. 2009]), 
we found that advisors literally speak a different language with an extensive 
use of technical terms. Relating the client’s problem space of needs, goals 
and preferences to the advisor’s vocabulary is further hampered by their 
intrinsic complexity (P3); typically, clients that seek advice have no concrete 
conception of their needs nor how to assign them to potential solutions [see 
also Oehler and Kohlert 2009:100]. For the discussion of appropriate 
investment strategies, the problem of bounded rationality and potential 
information overload emerges almost immediately: for each of the generic 
asset classes (e.g., shares or bonds), hundreds of sub-classes are defined; 
thus, the client is challenged to state her preferences regarding markets 
(home market or emerging markets?), industries (agriculture, manufacturing 
or construction?) or currencies (euros or US dollars?).  
The “burden of choice” [Schwartz 2005] further increases when deciding on 
specific products from the myriads that are available for each asset class. 
Here, the advisor’s task is to explain and – building on the client’s needs, 
preferences and goals – reduce the solution space, so the client may choose 
from a smaller set of adequate solutions (products) (P3). This premise, 
however, gives way to the problem of diverging goals (P2). The client might 
not be able to understand the relation between her needs and the advisor’s 
activities – are the proposed solutions in the client’s best interest or does the 
advisor attempt to sell products he is obliged to by the bank’s management?  
Not understanding and comprehending the process and its results hamper the 
clients’ contributions to the co-creation process (P4), i.e., taking her role of 
the primary decision maker. This also leads to the client’s notion that she is 
not in control of the advisory process and the resulting solutions [Mogicato 
et al. 2009; Schwabe and Nussbaumer 2009]. 
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7.4.2 Introducing Transparency to Investment Advisory Encounters 
Given these issues of invest advisory services and the failure of the legal 
framework [Oehler and Kohlert 2009] to address them “top down”, in this 
essay we suggest to improve the services at the locus of most issues – the 
client-advisor encounter. We will show how we iteratively developed shared 
IT artifacts to address these issues applying the general solution approach of 
transparent information representation.  
The idea of applying IT to address advisory quality issues in advisory 
services is not particularly new. In recent years, Swiss FSPs have placed 
considerable efforts in trying to acknowledge the customers’ critique by 
supporting advisors with standardized advisory processes and supportive IT 
systems; however, the lack of enforcement and monitoring leads to low 
adoption of the processes and their tools – especially for client encounters, 
IT tools consequently fail to be accepted [Schwabe and Nussbaumer 2009].  
The newest IT systems also have little impact on the advisory quality 
perceived by their customers for mainly two reasons: they are either used in 
absence of the client (i.e., used by advisors to prepare consultations and 
evaluate them afterwards) and thus fail to provide transparency of the 
advisor's actions, or they are not used at all because of FSP’s lack of 
enforcement and the incentives of the advisor [Schwabe and Nussbaumer 
2009]. In practice, these IT systems are mostly related to customer 
relationship management (CRM) or portfolio optimization and simulation, 
targeting advisors as the sole users.  
In scientific discourse, some focus has also been set on supporting advisors 
with mapping the customer requirements to appropriate investment strategies 
and products [Dziarstek et al. 2004; Eberhardt and Zimmermann 2007; 
Meier et al. 2007]. The (mandatory) use of such systems may in fact restrict 
the advisor from taking advantage of hidden action (e.g., recommending 
products not suitable for the client but attractive to the advisors in terms of 
provisions). However, these systems are designed to be used solely by the 
advisor and therefore do not contribute to enhanced transparency towards the 
client. Consequently, such systems do not fully address information and 
potential interest asymmetries.  
As discussed above, however, information technology might play an 
important role in establishing transparency in client-advisor encounters, 
especially for complex advisory domains such as investment advice. IT-
supported, shared information representations may mediate advisor-client 
interaction by providing relevant information regarding advisory content as 
well as process activities and their interrelations. This may allow for 
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enhanced transparency towards the client, while restricting the advisor to 
engage in hidden information or hidden action, paving the way for more 
suitable and satisfying advisory services. 
7.5 First Build-and-Evaluate Iteration 
The entry point of our first “design and build” iteration was problem-
centered [Peffers et al. 2007:52], i.e., it started with an in-depth analysis of 
the status quo of investment advisory services. From interviews and 
discussions with advisors and clients (including interviews of 21 advisors 
from 19 FSPs, client focus groups totaling 28 participants as well as a client 
survey with 136 participants) [Mogicato et al. 2009], we could derive 
generic design considerations for transparent and interactive service 
encounters [Nussbaumer and Schwabe 2010].  
Based on these considerations, we implemented an early proof-of-concept 
prototype with a group of four students as part of their Master’s project [à 
Porta et al. 2009]. This application already featured the basic transparency 
design of the first prototype. To evaluate its design rationales, we discussed 
the prototype and its underlying concepts with representatives of four major 
Swiss banks. Their unanimously positive feedback encouraged us to enhance 
and functionally extend our prototype in order to evaluate it with real users. 
To get directions in revising the prototype and finding additional functional 
requirements, we conducted three focus groups of overall 15 domain experts 
(one focus group each for investment advice experts, financial software 
developers as well as interaction design experts). Based on their input, we 
built a functional revision of the student prototype that we will report on in 
the following. Design and evaluation results of this prototype in respect of 
process transparency and controllability are based on their presentation in 
Nussbaumer and Matter [2011] and, partly, Nussbaumer et al. [2012b], 
whereas in this essay we also present results regarding the clients’ perceived 
quality of information provision (information transparency I). 
7.5.1 Solution Objectives 
In design research endeavors, solution objectives relate to the question of 
what a better artifact would accomplish [Peffers et al. 2007:54]. In general, 
our research seeks to solve the organizational problem of low client 
satisfaction in advisory services, which we ascribed to four problems of 
client-advisor encounters summarized in Section 7.2.3. We argued that 
problems of concealment (hidden information, hidden action; P1) negatively 
affect dissolution of advisory complexity (P3) and inhibit client contribution 
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to the process and its results (P4). These issues may be intensified in the 
presence of diverging goals (P2). As discussed above, however, the problem 
of diverging goals may not fundamentally be solved by IT artifact design. 
Making information and action transparent, however, should effectively 
restrict moral hazard at least in presence of the client.  
The basic solution approach of transparency strives to alleviate concealment 
of information and action as the principal issues of advisory encounters, thus 
also increasing the client’s comprehension and control.  
For the design of the solution artifact, we define four solution objectives 
(SO). 
SO1. Increase process transparency. Relating to our definition of process 
transparency as “the degree of disclosure regarding how and why activities 
are performed”, this solution objective addresses the following problems:   
 Problem of concealment (P1): Increasing process transparency relates 
to making the process activities and the advisor’s actions transparent, 
i.e., allowing the client to monitor and better comprehend them. 
 Problem of diverging goals (P2): Constricting the advisor in 
concealing his actions and making them transparent for the client 
deters moral hazard in the advisory encounter. 
 Problem of undissolved advisory complexity (P3): Increased process 
transparency implies the provision of comprehensible representations 
of relevant information regarding advisory activities. 
Comprehensibility relates to the representations dissolving the 
inherent complexity of the advisory process activities and increasing 
the client’s comprehension thereof.  
SO2. Increase information transparency. We have defined information 
transparency above as being related to (1) quality of information provision as 
well as (2) the degree of disclosure regarding what information is gathered 
and how it is used. As a starting point for our first design iteration, we 
focused on the first aspect of improving information provision of advisory 
content for the client, thus addressing the following problems:  
 Problem of concealment (P1): Providing clients with access to the 
advisor’s information counteracts the problem of concealed 
information.  
 Problem of undissolved complexity (P3): Providing information in a 
way that is comprehensible and useful for the client helps to dissolve 
the complexity of information and its use.  
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SO3. Increase controllability. Arguably, increasing process and 
information transparency, i.e., improving the client’s comprehension of 
advisor activities and their information and thus reducing advisory 
complexity, should also better enable her to actively contribute to activities 
and co-create advisory results. While such transparency can be seen as a 
premise of such co-creation [Prahalad and Ramaswamy 2004], we intend to 
further address the problem of low controllability (P4) in our design. Thus, 
we include increased controllability as a solution objective. 
SO4. Increase overall client satisfaction. In general, our solution seeks to 
address the issues of client-advisor encounters in order to solve the business 
problem of low client satisfaction. Thus, designing solutions to attain SO1-
SO3 should also help to attain increased client satisfaction.  
7.5.2 Design and Development 
The solution objectives define what the solution artifact should accomplish. 
From our theoretical considerations (see above) as well as focus groups with 
investment advisory experts we defined several design requirements (DR) of 
what the solution artifact has to afford in order to fulfill the solution 
objectives. Like solution objectives address different facets of several 
problems, a particular design requirement may address several solution 
objectives. As we define SO4 as a consequence of SO1-SO3, our design 
requirements explicitly address only the latter.  
7.5.2.1 Design Requirements 
We have already argued that information asymmetries between the actors 
may be addressed with shared informational resources that both client and 
customer can refer to and make sense of, promoting joint exploration and 
planning [Rodden et al. 2003:59]. As such, we argue that shared information 
spaces are a premise of shared information provision and access (SO2, SO3) 
and allowing the client to observe and monitor the advisor’s actions (SO1): 
DR1. Provide shared information spaces  
Clients perceive advisors and their actions as somewhat unpredictable 
(“black box”). Thus, they should be enabled to better comprehend the 
performed activities and their succession and to keep track of the progress 
(SO1). Such increased transparency has been proposed to also positively 
influence satisfaction [Inbar and Tractinsky 2011]. However, in order to 
integrate well into the advisory encounter, the shared representation should 
not constrict the advisor in adapting the advisory process (e.g., order of 
activities) to a specific client, nor restrict the client in contributing to the 
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process (SO3). In the past few years, organizations have been trying to 
establish advisory process guidelines and respective IT tools in order to 
standardize advisory activities [Mogicato et al. 2009; Schwabe and 
Nussbaumer 2009]. While some advisors find such prescribed processes and 
tools supportive for their advisory practice and helpful in adhering to 
organizational requirements, others feel that such prescribed processes and 
tools are a means of organizational control, restricting their advisory practice 
and negatively affecting their interaction with clients [Schwabe and 
Nussbaumer 2009]. Such notions of control are reminiscent of Suchman’s 
[1994] observation that system design may carry with it “an agenda of 
discipline and control over organization members’ actions” [p. 177]. To 
minimize advisor disapproval of such systems on grounds of organizational 
control and restriction, the supportive artifact should allow appropriate 
degrees of freedom for the advisor and client to adapt system use to the 
situational needs of the encounter. We constrain our design requirement by 
this observation:  
DR2. Provide comprehensible visualizations of activities and their 
relationships 
Constraint 1: Allow actors to customize the course of advisory 
To attain SO2, the solution should provide relevant advisory information, 
i.e., counteract their concealment by making them available to the client and 
visualizing them in a way that is comprehensible and helps the client to 
dissolve its complexity: 
DR3. Provide comprehensible visualizations of relevant advisory 
information 
The transparent and shared informational resources should ease the client’s 
contribution to the solution-finding process in order to increase her control 
of the process and its results (SO3). This also includes simplifying the 
client’s obtainment of relevant information [Agnew and Szykman 2005:57] 
(DR3), enabling her to develop needs and preferences during the encounter, 
as well as easing comprehensibility of their mapping to the solutions while 
preventing information overload: 
DR4. Enable the client to control the process and its results 
7.5.2.2 Implementation 
To enable shared information representation (DR1), we implemented the 
prototype application for a multi-touch tabletop device (Microsoft Surface). 
The tabletop device mediates and supports the most important activities of 
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the advisory encounter, which were based on actual advisory practice of 
Swiss FSPs. In doing so, relevant activities and their respective data 
architecture were elaborated and discussed with domain experts as well as 
key users (advisors, clients). As a general rule, and thus following the 
requirements of transparency (DR2, DR3), the system incorporated all 
activities and information directly or indirectly influencing the final 
recommendation. We included activities and information related to the 
following main phases of investment advisory sessions: needs elicitation, 
gathering of personal and financial client information, risk profiling and 
definition of investment strategy. 
 
Figure 7-2: Interaction with the tabletop system 
The tabletop device grants advisor and client with equal and transparent 
information access (DR3) and permits them to observe each other’s actions, 
also allowing the client to take control and influence the process and its 
results (DR4). As we were equipping a situation traditionally based on pen 
and paper, we also assumed that the tabletop device would be perceived as 
less intrusive and less disruptive for social interactions compared to desktop 
or laptop PCs. Figure 7-2 gives an impression of how the tabletop 
application integrates into the advisory encounter and the suggested seating 
positions of advisor and client (based on the most frequent seating positions 
in the traditional advisory setting). A detailed account of the usage scenario 
between advisor and client can be found in Appendix A1. 
We implemented the shared information representation (DR1) to only 
provide “public” information and activities, other than suggested by some 
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CSCW literature [Scott et al. 2003]. For client-advisor encounters, we argue 
that featuring private or semi-public spaces for the advisor – not observable 
by the client – would allow for concealment of information and action and 
thus weaken transparency. 
 
Figure 7-3: Basic design of application front end 
In order to address the requirement of process visualization and 
comprehensibility (DR2), we designed the front end of the shared 
information space upon the rationale of “representational guidance” [Suthers 
and Hundhausen 2003], a concept originating from computer supported 
collaborative learning (CSCL). There, visual representations such as process 
models [Carell et al. 2005] have been applied to support and enhance the 
organization of communication processes. Such a representation provides 
basic means of orientation and supports the cooperative enactment of the 
process, which should lead to increased knowledge exchange and integration 
[Carell et al. 2005] and may also serve as an external memory [Suthers and 
Hundhausen 2002:473] and enable cognitive offloading [Halloran 2002:5]. 
Thus, to support and organize the shared activities of the client and the 
advisor, we decided to implement a “map” representation of the advisory 
process, which can be monitored and controlled by both parties (Figure 7-3). 
To further increase comprehensibility and predictability of the process and 
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its activities, we decided to make it an anchor point of the application’s 
information and interaction design, being always visible on top of the shared 
information space. 
Navigation through activities is achieved either through the shortcuts 
provided in the advisor cockpit (Figure 7-3, “next” and “previous”), if the 
advisor wants to progress along the “standard” process, or through the 
process map to enter specific activities. The application allows for different 
starting points as well as revisiting activities, allowing for changes and 
adaptations at any time. The visualization implies but does not enforce a 
specific process order (DR2, Constraint 1). In principle, any course of 
activities may be implemented without considering interdependencies. The 
application, for example, permits to create an investment strategy without 
having previously configured the client’s risk profile in the respective 
activity. Even though eliciting the client’s risk preference is an important 
cornerstone of investment advice, in certain cases such a course of actions 
may be perfectly valid. For more experienced clients, for example, risk 
preference may be determined without the provided questionnaire or in 
conjunction with defining the investment strategy. As the information space 
is also observed by the client, however, the advisor is inhibited to “skip” the 
activity altogether. As such, the process depiction also fulfills the function of 
a reminder or “nudge” to perform important activities, while leaving “how” 
and “when” to the actors. 
The implementation of the shared representation addresses comprehensible 
information disclosure (DR3) and increases the client’s contribution and 
control in several ways (DR4). Division of the process and step-by-step 
enactment of activities should reduce the amount of concurrently processed 
information, as the visualizations only provide information relevant for the 
specific activity. Figure 7-3, for example, shows the visualization and 
interaction possibilities of defining an asset allocation strategy for a given 
investment amount while accounting for risk-return trade off. As novel 
information visualizations may create learning overhead and thus outweigh 
cognitive benefits [Cox and Brna 1993; Halloran 2002:6], we also based the 
visualizations (graphs, pie charts) on conventional information 
representations that are also used in client information of Swiss FSPs.  
Proceeding through separate activities should also decrease the burden of 
choice as the solution space narrows along the process. For example, the 
client’s financial situation and goals as well as her risk preference will 
narrow the range of potential investment strategies. However, the process 
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depiction allows revisiting activities at any time to adapt decisions and 
supports the development of the client’s needs and preferences during the 
process. To increase comprehensibility of the solution-finding process, we 
also provide the client with means of comparison. To compare her current 
situation with the optimized solution that is created in the encounter, for 
example, a visualization of the projected growth – based on the information 
provided by the client and contextualized with her goals – may be accessed 
at any time (Figure 7-2, right). 
7.5.3 Evaluation 
The goal of evaluating a designed artifact is to investigate whether it 
achieved the solution objectives [Peffers et al. 2007:54]. We expect the 
benefit of the artifact to be twofold; firstly, we hypothesize that the artifact 
achieves its solution objectives of increasing both the client’s perceived 
process and information transparency of the investment advisory encounter, 
as well as her perceived controllability thereof. Second, we also assume that 
improving transparency should increase the client’s overall satisfaction with 
the client-advisor encounter. It has previously been suggested that 
individuals prefer transparent situations over their untransparent counterparts 
[Andersson and Holm 1998; Carter and Curry 2010], such that establishing 
transparency should lead to favorable perception of the vis-à-vis and increase 
satisfaction [Eggert and Helm 2003; Inbar and Tractinsky 2011].  
In order to evaluate the utility of our design artifact in achieving these 
improvements, the evaluation was aimed to compare artifact-supported 
investment advisory encounters with traditional pen and paper investment 
advisory encounters, corresponding to current advisory practice in 
Switzerland. Thus, the study explores the artifact’s utility in accomplishing 
its solution objectives by investigating the client’s perception of the artifact-
supported encounter with the traditional, unsupported encounter. 
7.5.3.1 Method 
Participants. The within-subjects evaluation was conducted with 4 advisors 
and 12 clients. We recruited the client participants by convenience sampling 
through postings on a university forum, therefore 8 of 12 participants were 
university students. Each client participant received 30 Swiss francs 
(equivalent to 34 USD at the time of the evaluation). The participants were 
between 21 and 50 years of age (M = 30.17, SD = 9.23), half of them were 
female, and five participants already were experienced with investment 
advisory services. All clients reported high proficiency in computer use, with 
6 participants categorizing themselves as professional users and 5 as 
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advanced users; only one participant reported to use computers only 
occasionally. 
The advisory sessions were carried out by four investment advisors of a 
single Swiss bank (3 male, 1 female). Their age ranged from 31 to 40 years 
(M = 34.50, SD = 4.04) and their advisory experience ranged from 4 to 7 
years (M = 5.25, SD = 1.26). All of them classified themselves as being 
advanced IT users. 
Procedure. On arrival, clients received written and verbal explanations 
about the test procedure. Each client participated in two test settings. One 
setting corresponded to the traditional advisory situation (pen and paper) that 
is typically performed by Swiss FSPs; the other setting was supported with 
the prototype application. To counterbalance the test settings, participants 
were randomly assigned to either start with the traditional or the artifact-
supported setting (50% of participants each). 
For both settings, client participants were asked to adopt the role of a 
customer in her first encounter with a new advisor. Their task involved the 
investment of a specific amount of money ranging from 250’000 to 500’000 
Swiss francs (equivalent to approx. 279’000 USD to 559’000 USD), while 
considering two specific wishes and goals, e.g., purchasing an apartment or 
planning further education. The clients were provided with a profile 
including their role’s key figures and assumed financial situation. To 
increase plausibility of the high investment amounts, the fictive financial 
backgrounds included large amounts of money the participants had inherited, 
been endowed or won in the lottery. To avoid advisor participants to 
familiarize with the settings, each client participant’s financial background 
differed regarding the available assets as well as her needs and goals. Both 
the artifact-supported and traditional test sessions were limited to 30min. 
On their arrival, advisors received a 30min hands-on training with the 
prototype software system. The advisors’ task was to compile an appropriate 
investment strategy for the client’s financial situation and goals using the 
prototype system at least once in the encounter. As portfolio compilation 
(i.e., implementing the strategy) is typically only accomplished in the second 
or third advisory encounter, for the test sessions the according functionality 
was deactivated and thus not used by advisors. The advisors took turns in 
advising clients in the traditional setting and the artifact-supported setting, 
such that in each setting clients were advised by a different advisor. For the 
traditional setting, advisors were asked to bring along supportive materials 
they would use for real client encounters. Some advisors supported the 
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traditional encounter with (standardized) presentations and brochures, while 
others only brought along their (analogous) notepad.  
Data was collected through in-situ observations in both settings; in addition, 
the artifact-supported setting was videotaped and the advisory encounter 
audio-taped for the traditional setting. After their trials, clients and advisors 
were presented with questionnaires and debriefed in semi-structured one-to-
one interviews. In this essay, we will focus the results of the client 
questionnaires and debriefings, referring to advisor feedback only to provide 
a different perspective on particular results. 
Apparatus. Evaluations were conducted using the Microsoft Surface 
tabletop system (1
st
 generation) to run the software prototype in the artifact-
supported setting. In the traditional situation, advisors used their own 
advisory material and were also provided with notepad and pen. 
Design and Analysis. The evaluation used a within-subjects design with 
setting (artifact-supported, traditional) as the main experimental factor.  
According to the solution objectives, in the questionnaires clients were asked 
to assess the two investment advisory settings in respect of their perceived 
process transparency, information transparency and controllability as well as 
their overall satisfaction. The according metrics and measurements used in 
the evaluation are summarized in Table 7-2. Items were measured once for 
each advisory setting (traditional and artifact-supported) with seven-point 
Likert scales (1 = “I strongly disagree”, 7 = “I strongly agree”). 
We defined process transparency above (Section 7.3) as the “degree of 
disclosure regarding how and why activities are performed”. To support this 
notion, our artifact design aimed to open the “black box” of advisory 
encounters and increase the client’s comprehension of the course of activities 
and comprehend their results. As a first exploratory metric, we decided to 
measure process transparency along the respondents’ subjective assessment 
of their comprehension of the process order, i.e., why a specific course of 
activities is followed, as well as their comprehension of how the activities 
have been achieved. We operationalized the latter as the client’s 
comprehension of how the final process results have been achieved. 
Focusing on the first facet of information transparency (quality of 
information provision), we were interested in whether our artifact design 
could improve the client’s perception of the information provided by the 
advisor compared to the traditional situation. We asked our participants to 
assess the provided information in respect of their perceived helpfulness, 
trustworthiness, usefulness and correctness. 
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Table 7-2: Summary of metrics and measurements used in the first iteration evaluation 
Metric Measurement 
Perceived process 
transparency 
 2-item comprehensibility scale regarding process order and results 
measured on a seven-point Likert scale 
 Items 
o Comprehensibility of process order: “I could comprehend at any 
time why the activities of the advisory session were following a 
specific order.” 
o Comprehensibility of process results: “I do comprehend how the 
results of the advisory session have been achieved.” 
Perceived 
information 
transparency 
(information 
provision) 
 4-item scale on perceived information provision measured on a 
seven-point Likert scale 
 Items: “Information provided in the encounter …” 
o “… was helpful.” 
o “… was trustworthy.” 
o “… was useful.” 
o “… was correct.” 
Perceived 
controllability 
 2-item scale on perceived influence and participation measured on a 
seven-point Likert scale 
 Items 
o Perceived opportunities to participate: “Overall, the advisory 
situation enabled me to participate in activities.”  
o Perceived influence on process: “Overall, I was able to influence 
the solution finding process of the advisory process.” 
Overall satisfaction 
with encounter 
 5-item satisfaction scale measured on a seven-point Likert scale 
[Briggs et al. 2008] 
We based our metric of the client’s perceived controllability on the notions 
of their perceived opportunities to participate (as a premise of control) and 
their perceived actual influence on the solution finding process. 
Finally, we used the metric and measurements of the Yield Shift Theory of 
Satisfaction of Briggs et al. [2008] to measure overall client satisfaction with 
the advisory settings.  
All Likert scale items were tested in respect of their internal consistency 
using Cronbach’s alpha (Table 7-3). While the metrics of information 
transparency and satisfaction showed high construct reliability for both 
settings with all scores greater than the suggested cut-off value of 0.7 
[Nunnally and Bernstein 1994], process transparency and controllability 
showed ambiguous reliability, with low Cronbach’s alphas either for the 
traditional (controllability) or the artifact-supported setting (process 
transparency). Thus, averages of participants’ responses were only computed 
for information transparency and satisfaction, while we evaluated the single 
items of the other metrics (process transparency and controllability). We 
qualitatively assessed construct validity [Straub 1989] by comparing 
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questionnaire responses with related open-ended questions in the interviews 
– within-subject answers regarding transparency, controllability and 
satisfaction between the different methods (questionnaire, interviews) 
showed high convergent validity. 
Table 7-3: Scale reliability of metrics used in the first iteration evaluation 
Likert scale metric 
Avg. rating 
traditional 
situation 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Avg. rating 
artifact-
supported 
situation 
Cronbach'
s alpha 
Perceived process transparency 5.25 0.799 4.79 0.517 
Perceived Information 
transparency  
(information provision) 
5.65 0.923 5.21 0.917 
Perceived controllability 5.33 0.218 4.25 0.937 
Satisfaction 5.37 0.979 4.90 0.939 
Except for the comprehensibility of results, all Likert scale and item data 
was significantly normally distributed according to Shapiro-Wilk tests on the 
differences between the settings’ scores. Thus, for comparisons of scale or 
item data by setting (traditional vs. artifact-supported), we used dependent t-
tests
23
 (two-tailed) to test our hypotheses. To compare the ratings regarding 
the clients’ comprehensibility of results, we conducted a Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test (two-tailed).  
All p-values were corrected for multiple hypotheses testing using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure [Benjamini and Hochberg 1995]. The 
correction also accounted for the tests with non-significant results. To 
provide an objective measure of their importance, we also calculated the 
effect size for all scales revealing significant differences.  
Throughout the evaluation, the client-advisor encounters of both settings 
were independently observed and protocolled in writing by two observers. 
They took notes regarding the interaction between client and advisor with an 
emphasis on their use of the software artifact (in the artifact-supported 
setting). To examine cases of contradictory protocol notes, the encounters’ 
video and audio recordings were consulted. 
The semi-structured participant debriefings contained questions regarding 
the overall perceptions of the advisory settings as well as further questions 
regarding the quantitative metrics to gather insights on the reasons of their 
ratings. All debriefings were audio-taped. To analyze them, we transcribed 
                                           
23
 We therefore implicitly assume that the data can be treated interval. 
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the recordings and summarized all answers in a spreadsheet, where columns 
related to the questions of the interview guideline and each row represented 
one interviewee’s answers. Similar to what has been discussed as thematic 
coding in qualitative content analysis [Flick 2007:402], we then analyzed the 
answers in two steps; first, we searched for topics and themes in single 
interviews (e.g., regarding perceived transparency, usability, satisfaction 
etc.). In a second step, we then compared and aggregated the topics for each 
question (column) and defined their central thematic structure (e.g., 
“perceived transparency generally lower for IT-supported setting”). 
7.5.3.2 Results 
Perceived process transparency. Clients overwhelmingly provided positive 
comments on the shared visualization features of the prototype application, 
especially appreciating the possibility to compare the current and optimized 
situation regarding their potential growth of wealth. In respect of our 
solution objectives, however, the artifact-supported encounter did not live up 
to our expectations. Regarding the client’s perceived comprehensibility, their 
understanding of the course of activities (process order) was rated slightly 
lower for the artifact-supported setting (M = 5.00, SD = 1.54) as compared to 
the traditional setting (M = 5.08, SD = 1.31). Comprehensibility of the 
process results was rated similarly, with much higher ratings for the 
traditional setting (M = 5.42, SD = 1.51) compared to the artifact-supported 
setting (M = 4.58, SD = 1.98). All differences, however, were not significant. 
In the semi-structured interviews after their trials, clients brought forward 
several reasons for these unexpected results. Client participants found that 
the explanations of the advisor were better in the traditional setting, reporting 
that in the artifact-supported setting it was rather unclear how the charts and 
results of the IT artifact came about. Similar feedback was provided by the 
advisors – they reported that they had difficulties in explaining the visualized 
information, especially when charts contained multiple information 
dimensions.  
Some client participants voiced critique regarding the high pace of the 
conversation in the artifact-supported setting, leading to information 
overload; another client found that the application required too much 
knowledge – this was confirmed by advisors who pointed out that clients 
were asking more specific questions, which were difficult to answer because 
of the clients’ lack of knowledge. In the traditional setting, only two clients 
reported to have been overwhelmed by information provided by the advisor, 
five clients even arguing that the traditional setting’s conversation was more 
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consistent and “smooth” and avoided interruptions caused by the use of the 
IT artifact. Hence, seven participants found the traditional setting more 
personal, perceiving the advisor being distracted by and putting too much 
focus on the artifact in the artifact-supported setting. Similar arguments were 
raised by the advisors, which found it difficult to maintain conversation 
while operating the application. This is consistent to our observations of the 
artifact-supported advisory situation, where we frequently found the advisor 
to be distracted by the application and neglecting face-to-face 
communication.  
Information transparency. Regarding the provision of information the 
clients again rated the traditional situation (M = 5.65, SD = 1.06) higher than 
the artifact-supported situation (M = 5.21, SD = 1.30), but not significantly. 
As already indicated above, even though the visualization of information 
was generally found helpful, some clients argued that the provided 
information was difficult to interpret without advisor explanations. In 
contrast, they found explanations better in the traditional situation, where 
advisors could not rely on visualizations provided by the artifact.  
Controllability. The client’s perceived influence on the process was rated 
lower for the artifact-supported setting (M = 4.00, SD = 1.60) than the 
traditional setting (M = 5.50, SD = 1.00), showing a significant difference 
with large effect size (t(11) = 2.691, p = .021, d = 1.15). Also, clients found 
less opportunities to participate in the artifact-supported setting (M = 4.50, 
SD = 1.68) than in the traditional setting (M = 5.17, SD = 1.40), but not 
significantly. 
In their feedbacks, only three clients believed that they could better influence 
advisory results in the traditional setting. Clients and advisors ascribed the 
lack of influence and control to their perceived authority of the visualized 
advisory process, feeling that they had to oblige the depicted course of 
advisory and that the encounter’s solutions were restricted to those supported 
by the application. Indeed, our observations show that most users followed 
the depicted process and only a minority used the process depiction for 
alternate entry points or revisiting activities. 
Satisfaction. Finally and – given the generally low ratings of the artifact-
supported encounter – rather unsurprising, overall satisfaction with the 
advisory encounter was rated lower by the client participants for the artifact-
supported (M = 4.90, SD = 1.30) compared to the traditional setting (M = 
5.37, SD = 1.51). The differences, however, were not statistically significant. 
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Nevertheless, half of the clients stated that they preferred the artifact-
supported setting.  
7.5.4 Discussion 
As we can see from our evaluation results, our first design iteration failed to 
accomplish the design objectives of increasing process and information 
transparency and thus improving the client’s controllability. Indeed, quite the 
contrary proved to be true. Clients and advisors admittedly found the 
application helpful in supporting them with dynamic visualizations. 
However, visualizing the process map as an anchor point of the application 
led to a perception of the system “enforcing” the depicted process and 
constricting it to the given activities. Furthermore, visualizing one activity at 
a time and implying interrelations only through the process depiction failed 
to enhance the client’s comprehensibility of the overall advisory process. In 
summary, our design was perceived as constraining control and disturbing 
conversation: 
Perceived constrained control. Our basic design rationale of 
representational guidance was perceived by the actors as a script they had to 
adhere to, affecting their autonomy [Dillenbourg 2002]. Advisors 
experienced the system as being authoritative, feeling obliged to use the 
application’s functionalities in the exact order of the depicted process, thus 
restricting interaction with the client to the set of supported activities. Along 
the same line, clients felt that the process was deterministic regarding the 
course of action and coverage of content and activities. Obviously, and in 
contrast to its intent of considering the specified constraint of DR2, our 
implementation was still perceived as carrying “an agenda of discipline and 
control” [Suchman 1994:177]. Furthermore, for the users the system seemed 
to confine their problem space to the type of problems the system could 
tackle, concluding that what they saw was all they could get.  
Interruption of conversation. Our implementation of shared information 
representation shifted the attention of both the client and advisor to operating 
and monitoring the system. Feeling obliged to the advisory process depicted 
and supported by the application, the advisors experienced difficulties in 
dissolving from the system and maintaining face-to-face communication. 
7.6 Second Build-and-Evaluate Iteration 
Our first design approach clearly failed to accomplish our design objectives. 
Thus, we decided to initiate a second design iteration by revising and 
complementing our research objectives with the results and experiences from 
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the first. In order to increase input and feedback of actual users, we 
contextualized the second iteration with methods of scenario-based 
development [Rosson and Carroll 2002], which enabled us to iteratively 
refine the artifact requirements and their implementation. The iteration’s 
demonstration of design requirements and their implementation partly builds 
on their presentation in Nussbaumer et al. [2012b]. 
7.6.1 Solution Objectives 
The first iteration could not fulfill its solution objectives of increasing 
process transparency (SO1), information transparency (SO2) as well as 
controllability (SO3) and also failed to increase overall client satisfaction 
(SO4). Thus, we maintained these objectives also for the second build-and-
evaluate iteration, with the goal to revise the requirements of how to 
accomplish them as well as their specific implementation.  
For the second iteration, we complemented SO2 with the second facet of 
information transparency as defined in Section 7.3, i.e., the degree of the 
client being able to comprehend what information is gathered for what 
purpose and what effect. Thus, SO2 further addresses the dissolution of 
complexity of advisory encounters (P3) and increasing the client’s 
comprehension thereof. 
7.6.2 Design and Development 
The solution objectives define what the designed artifact should accomplish. 
We ascribe the first iterations failure to accomplish its objectives on 
incomplete design requirements as well as their improper instantiation. 
Based on the results of the first iteration and the extension of SO2, we 
revised and extended our design requirements and their implementation as 
follows. 
7.6.2.1 Design Requirements 
As our conceptualization of transparency builds upon the notion of 
information sharing, transparent informational resources are fundamental. 
However, as the evaluation results of the first iteration show, the shared 
artifact seemed to influence the client-advisor interaction similar to a third 
party joining the encounter. Face-to-face communication between client and 
advisor shifted to operating the application and thus affected the social 
interaction between the actors. Thus, we introduced the constraint of 
acknowledging the sociable use of the shared information spaces and 
supporting rather than replacing face-to-face communication: 
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DR1. Provide shared information spaces 
Constraint 1: Enable sociable use of the shared information spaces 
Our findings of the first iteration suggested that building transparency upon 
rigid process visualizations may further the perception of authority and 
determinism. Also, the depiction of one activity at a time seemed to 
counteract our objective of increasing the client’s comprehension of the 
activities’ relationships. We therefore added two constraints to the second 
design requirement:  
DR2. Provide comprehensible visualizations of activities and their 
relationships 
Constraint 1: Allow actors to customize the course of advisory 
Constraint 2: Avoid rigid representations of the process  
Constraint 3: Avoid process visualizations that visualize only one activity 
at a time 
In the first iteration, the solution objective of information transparency 
(SO2) focused on the quality of information provision and the client’s 
according comprehension of the advisor’s information base to dissolve 
advisory complexity. To also address the second facet of information 
transparency (disclosure of information use) in our extended second solution 
objective, we revised the third design requirement as follows:  
DR3. Provide comprehensible visualizations of relevant advisory 
information and their use 
While feedback on visualization possibilities regarding the comparison of 
future developments was unanimously positive, the first iteration’s design 
did not improve comprehensibility of the solution-finding process. 
Furthermore, the client’s perceived influence on the process and its results 
was rather low. We ascribe this perception of low control to our 
implementation of rigid representational guidance in the first design 
iteration, which was deemed authoritative and deterministic. Even though 
the process representation of the first artifact allowed for several entry points 
and different courses of activity operation, the basic design seemed to imply 
a specific order of activities that advisors and clients felt obliged to follow. 
Thus, we constrained the fourth design requirement as follows: 
DR4. Enable the client to control the process and its results 
Constraint 1: Avoid rigid representational guidance  
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7.6.2.2 Implementation 
We found one main cause of the first design’s failure in its basic rationale of 
visualizing the shared information representation, which seemed to 
“enforce” transparency while restricting the users’ actions. Thus, in the 
second design iteration, we aimed at providing a more “casual” transparency 
design, which was inspired by Shneiderman’s “visual information seeking 
mantra” [Shneiderman 1996]. The “mantra” suggests using the tasks of 
“overview first”, “zoom and filter” and “details on demand” as a starting 
point for the design of graphical user interfaces. The application uses these 
tasks as basic metaphors for visualization and navigation.  
Analogous to our first iteration, we implemented the second prototype 
application for the Microsoft Surface tabletop device, providing the same 
interaction scenario as depicted in Figure 7-2. Appendix A provides a 
detailed demonstration of the artifact’s usage scenario.  
Importantly, the artifact generally supports the same activities (and builds on 
the same data and information architecture) as the first iteration prototype, 
which are related to needs elicitation, gathering of personal and financial 
client information, risk profiling and the definition of investment strategy. 
Thus, most relevant design changes relate to the visualization of and 
interaction with the according information. 
From representation of activities to “informational guidance”. We 
fundamentally revised the design from the first iteration’s explicit towards a 
more implicit process communication. The most evident change relates to 
the abandonment of the process representation (Figure 7-4). Instead, we 
address DR1 and DR2 by visualizing the shared information space with 
different levels of overview. In place of representational guidance regarding 
the supported activities (e.g., gathering personal information, needs analysis, 
risk profiling), we emphasize the relevant information blocks of advisory 
(e.g., personal information, needs, risk tolerance). Each information block 
may be “zoomed” in to allow more detailed levels of discussion. Basically, 
the application provides three levels of discussion that differ in their degree 
of detail and complexity. 
The first and most abstract level contains a generic depiction of the advisory 
process (Figure 7-7 in Appendix A) – this level provides a common entry 
point to advisory and may be used to explain the general advisory approach 
and its relevant activities. The second and main level of the application 
provides an overview of information relevant for investment advice (e.g., 
regarding the client’s cash flow, existing assets or risk tolerance), whereas 
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all information blocks are depicted as “widgets” around a central 
visualization of the projected assets growth (Figure 7-4).  
 
Figure 7-4: Basic front end design of second iteration 
The third level of discussion is provided by the “detail view” of each 
information block (shown for cash flow information in Figure 7-4). While 
the second level (widget overview) may be used to quickly add or change 
aggregated information, the detail view allows for an accurate investigation, 
e.g., to uncover inadequacies or missing information. Similar to the second 
level, changes or additions in the detail view will have immediate effects on 
the central visualization of the projected assets growth.  
From progress by activity to progress by information. In opposition to 
our first design, displaying information blocks should not imply any 
restriction on the available activities to operate on them (DR2, Constraint 2). 
Such a presentation should avert the user’s perception of observation or 
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control [Suchman 1994]. Rather than guiding them through a series of 
activities, the revised design provides indications of which information 
blocks the users should attend to. Changes of the risk preference, for 
example, might affect the investment strategy – if so, the application will 
notify the users that the strategy does not conform to the adjusted risk, thus 
suggesting that the users should attend to adapting the configured strategy.  
To further enable adaptability in advisory progression (DR2, Constraint 1) 
and increase transparency of information and its effects (DR3), we 
introduced the principle of “overrides”. In the second level view, the 
widgets’ aggregated values may be “overruled” at any time, i.e., the 
calculated values (from the third level, detail view) may be changed to 
quickly simulate different scenarios or to express uncertainty (e.g., if no 
exact figures can be provided for existing assets or cash flow, the estimated 
aggregated values may be used as the basis of other widgets). This allows 
quickly changing specific information (widgets) and assessing related 
effects, while implying no specific order of progression and minimizing 
initial efforts of data entry. 
From single to adaptable focus. Our initial design visualized information in 
respect of the displayed activity. The design coerced displaying and focusing 
particular information, while concealing other information as well as their 
possible interrelations. The “overview” design of the second iteration, 
however, allows for an unobtrusive way of providing all relevant 
information on the same screen and letting the actors decide on which 
particular information to focus. The overview also allows showing their 
relations between information and the activities performed on them (as 
demanded by DR3 and DR2, Constraint 3). Changing the aggregated value 
of the cash flow, for example, will have immediate visible effects on the 
central visualization, changing the projected growth of the client’s assets; 
analogously, adding a financial need or goal in the respective widget will 
immediately add and contextualize it to the projection of the client’s assets. 
As depicted in Figure 7-4, focusing a particular information block (i.e., 
accessing its detail view) causes other blocks (widgets) to display relevant 
context information. For example, when advisor and client discuss the details 
of the client’s cash flow, relevant information from widget “assets” (e.g., 
mortgage payments affecting the cash flow) and “personal information” 
(e.g., marital status and domicile, which will affect the cash flow in terms of 
taxation) are shown – in this way, the actors are provided with the relations 
between information blocks and may quickly assert whether all important 
information are available and/or correct. Focus might further be adapted by 
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increasing the size of information blocks as to emphasize on specific 
information, “stacking” information items that are currently not needed or 
even “pushing” them to the screen’s margin to take them out of sight.  
From advisor-system to client-advisor interaction. Regarding the sociable 
use of the system (DR1, Constraint 1), our design of a shared, transparent 
and adaptable information space should better support face-to-face 
communication by reducing “representational asymmetry” [Rodden et al. 
2003:59] and therefore “preserve the salience of important social-
interactional cues like attention, gaze and gesture” [Halloran 2002:29]. To 
ease the advisor’s interaction with the application, we made comprehensive 
use of the tabletop’s natural user interface and interaction features. 
Widgets could be freely oriented and moved with one finger, while their size 
could be continuously increased and decreased using a “pinch” gesture 
(pinching two fingers or spreading them apart on the respective widget). 
Furthermore, the main screen may be rotated using a gesture of two fingers 
at any time to orient all information elements simultaneously. This allows for 
360 degree interaction, regardless of the user’s seating positions. 
To switch from the widget overview to the detail view the user would 
perform a “double tap” on the widget’s title bar. Switching between the 
abstract level of process discussion (depicted in Figure 7-7, Appendix A.2) 
and the overview of widgets is accomplished by accessing a “hidden” menu 
(putting one finger anywhere on the screen for at least three seconds). Also, 
this menu includes invoking the “clean up” functionality which will set back 
all widgets’ placement, size and orientation to the initial configuration.  
In contrast to the first iteration, we also incorporated the advisor’s physical 
notepad into the advisory situation. The rationale of this decision, however, 
is not grounded on creating an additional “semi-public” information space, 
but to allow phases of face-to-face communication without using the artifact. 
The advisor may engage in a dialogue with the client and make notes of 
relevant facts (which the client is able to monitor similar to the traditional 
situation) and then turn to the artifact to visualize information relations and 
effects. Such procedure, for example, should ease initial small talk and needs 
elicitation that could be distracted by the artifact. 
To further strengthen the client-advisor interaction and communication, we 
also provide the advisor with an explicit gesture of “deactivating” the 
tabletop application; when putting his physical notepad (or any sheet of 
paper) on the tabletop screen, the screen grays out and is locked, i.e., 
prohibiting interaction with the displayed information. Also, in the training 
sessions, we provided the advisors with “best practices” of how to prevent 
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too much focus on the artifact or how to shift the client’s attention from 
monitoring the artifact to facing the advisor. We found, for example, the 
advisor simply leaning back in his chair a strong communicative gesture to 
attract such client attention. 
The application’s design should also help improving the client’s contribution 
and controllability (DR4). Progressing by information rather than activities 
and showing the immediate effects should improve the client’s 
comprehension of the advisor’s actions while limiting the perception of 
predefined processes and limited activities. To further increase 
comprehensibility of effects, the application offers different means of 
comparison. In addition to the central visualization presenting the projected 
growth of current versus optimized situation, the concept of “overrides” 
allows easy and fast simulations of alternate scenarios. Such functionality 
should enable the client to better reflect on her preferences and goals and 
thus support their elicitation and adaptation throughout the encounter. 
Furthermore, the improved interaction further supports the sociable use of 
the artifact (DR1, Constraint 1) as its usage consumes less time and 
attention.  
As to better enable the client to monitor the information space and the 
advisor’s actions, all information items are by default oriented to the client. 
This should positively influence the client’s affordance of interpreting the 
visualizations and interaction possibilities, which has been shown to be 
affected by the viewing position [Wigdor et al. 2007]. Also, information 
items may be moved and scaled individually to put context-dependent focus 
and orient and move important information blocks to the client. Such 
dynamic orientation allows for strong communicative gestures [Kruger et al. 
2004]. The free arrangement of information further enables adaptability 
(DR2, Constraint 1), supporting different work styles and enabling the 
creation and maintenance of basic mental models, which might be unique to 
the individual pair of actors [Isenberg and Carpendale 2007:1234].  
7.6.3 Evaluation 
Similar to our first design iteration, we evaluated the implemented artifact in 
respect of its four solution objectives; therefore, we maintained the 
associated hypotheses that the artifact-supported encounter would increase 
the client’s perceived process transparency (SO1) and information 
transparency (SO2) as well her perceived controllability (SO3). We further 
maintained our hypothesis that increased transparency and controllability of 
the encounter will also increase client satisfaction (SO4).  
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Analogous to the first iteration, we tested our hypotheses in evaluation using 
experimental techniques, comparing the clients’ assessment of artifact-
supported investment advisory encounters with their traditional pen and 
paper counterparts. 
7.6.3.1 Method 
Participants. In our first iteration evaluation, we over-estimated the 
artifact’s effect on the client participant’s perception of the advisory 
encounter, leading to many non-significant results. Thus, in order to increase 
test power, we increased the sample size to 12 advisors and 24 clients.  
The client participants were recruited by convenience sampling, 6 of the 24 
clients were students. The clients’ compensation was 50 Swiss francs 
(equivalent to 56 USD) for a total effort of 2.5 hours. Clients were between 
21 and 64 years of age (M = 38.17, SD = 13.88), whereas 7 of them were 
female and 10 reported to have some experience with investment advice. 
Regarding their proficiency in computer use, 10 participants characterized 
themselves as professional users, 12 participants as advanced users and only 
one participant reported to use computers only occasionally. 
The advisory sessions were again carried out by professional investment 
advisors from a single Swiss bank (10 male, 2 female) with their age ranging 
from 26 to 47 years (M = 37.58, SD = 6.64) and advisory experience ranging 
from 3 to 20 years (M = 12.46, SD = 5.85). Three advisors classified 
themselves as professional computer users, 7 as advanced users and only two 
advisors as occasional users.  
Procedure. Using the same procedure as the first iteration, clients received 
written and verbal explanations about the test procedure. Each client 
participated in two test settings. One setting corresponded to the traditional 
advisory situation (pen and paper), the other setting was supported with the 
prototype application. To counterbalance the test settings, participants were 
randomly assigned to either start with the traditional or the artifact-supported 
setting.  
Equivalent to the first evaluation, client participants were asked to adopt the 
role of a customer in her first encounter with a new advisor, involving the 
task of investing a specific amount of money while considering two specific 
personal financial goals or needs, e.g., purchasing an apartment or planning 
further education. The clients were provided with a profile including their 
role’s key figures and assumed financial situation. To increase plausibility of 
the high investment amounts, the fictive financial backgrounds included 
large sums the participants had inherited, been endowed or won in the 
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lottery. To avoid time pressure in the advisory settings, the duration limit 
was extended from 30min (first iteration evaluation) to 45min. 
Each advisor performed two client consultations in each setting, advising a 
total of four clients. Advisors took turns in advising clients in the traditional 
setting and the artifact-supported setting such that clients were advised by 
different advisors in each setting. For the traditional setting, advisors were 
asked to bring along supportive materials they would use for real client 
encounters (presentations, brochures, etc.). In order to increase the advisors’ 
familiarity with the artifact, training was extended to include 60min of 
training 2-3 days prior to the tests, as well as 90min of hands-on training on 
the evaluation day. The training also included “best practices” of using the 
artifact with the client, such as avoiding too much focus or encouraging and 
activating the client to increase their contribution (see demonstration in 
Appendix A.2).  
Data was collected through in-situ observations in both settings; in addition, 
the artifact-supported setting was videotaped and the advisory encounter 
audio-taped for the traditional setting. After their trials, clients and advisors 
were presented with questionnaires and debriefed in semi-structured one-to-
one interviews. We will focus on the results of client questionnaires and 
debriefings, reporting results of advisor interviews only to provide further 
support for particular findings.  
Apparatus. Analogous to the first iteration, evaluations were conducted 
using the Microsoft Surface tabletop system (1
st
 generation) to run the 
software-prototype in the artifact-supported setting. However, in the artifact-
supported encounter, advisors were additionally provided with notepad and 
pen. For the traditional situation, advisors again used their own advisory 
material and were additionally provided with notepad and pen. 
Design and Analysis. Equivalent to the first evaluation, the evaluations 
followed a within-subjects design with setting (artifact-supported, 
traditional) as the main experimental factor.  
In the questionnaires, clients were asked to assess the two investment 
advisory encounters for their perceived process transparency, information 
transparency and controllability as well as their overall satisfaction. The 
according metrics and measurements used in the evaluation are summarized 
in Table 7-4 and Table 7-5. Items were measured once for each advisory 
setting (traditional and artifact-supported) with seven-point Likert scales (1 = 
“I strongly disagree”, 7 = “I strongly agree”). 
 
7. Essay II: Designing for Transparency in Client-Advisor Encounters 
159 
Table 7-4: Summary of metrics and measurements used in the second iteration 
evaluation 
Metric Measurement 
Perceived 
process 
transparency 
 7-item process perception scale measured on a seven-point Likert scale, 
based on notions of process comprehensibility, predictability and ability to 
see through of Grote et al. [1999] 
 Items 
o Comprehensibility of procedure: “I could comprehend the course of 
the advisory session.” 
o Comprehensibility of process results: “I do understand how the 
results of the advisory session have been achieved.”  
o Ability to see through activities: “I could see through how the activities 
have been performed.” 
o Ability to see through activity goals: “I could see through the goals of 
the performed activities.” 
o Ability to see through activity interdependence: “I could see through 
the interdependences between the performed activities.” 
o Predictability of when to intervene: “I could understand when to 
intervene in the performed activities.” 
o Predictability of how to intervene: “I could understand how to 
intervene in the performed activities.” 
Perceived 
information 
transparency I 
(information 
provision) 
 9-item scale on perceived information provision measured on a seven-
point Likert scale, based on items regarding completeness, 
representation, and composite information quality from Arazy and Kopak 
[2011] and items regarding relevancy from Lee et al. [2002] 
 Items  
o Completeness 
 “The advisory situation included all necessary information.” 
 “The information provided in the advisory situation was complete.” 
o Representation: “The information provided in the advisory situation 
was …”  
 “… clear and easy to understand” 
 “… presented consistently.” 
 “… formatted concisely.”  
o Composite information quality: “The information provided in the 
advisory situation…” 
  “… was of high quality.” 
 “… provided a good description of the topics.” 
o Relevancy: “The information provided in the advisory situation was 
…” 
 “… helpful.” 
 “… relevant.” 
Perceived 
information 
transparency II 
(comprehension 
of use) 
 2-item scale on comprehensibility of information use based on 
conceptualizations from Awad and Krishnan [2006]  
 Items 
o Comprehensibility of what information is gathered: “I could 
comprehend which information was gathered during the course of the 
advisory session.” 
o Comprehensibility of gathered information use: “I could comprehend 
for what purpose the information was gathered.” 
 
7. Essay II: Designing for Transparency in Client-Advisor Encounters 
160 
Table 7-5: Summary of metrics and measurements used in the second iteration 
evaluation (ctd.) 
Metric Measurement 
Perceived 
controllability 
 3-item scale on perceived influence and participation measured on 
a seven-point Likert scale 
 Items 
o Perceived influence on process: “Overall, I was able to 
influence the course of the advisory session.” (adapted from 
first iteration) 
o Perceived opportunities to participate: “Overall, the advisory 
situation enabled me to participate in activities.” (from first 
iteration) 
o Perceived influence on information use: “Overall, I could 
influence what information was used in the advisory session.” 
Overall satisfaction 
with encounter 
 5-item satisfaction scale measured on a seven-point Likert scale 
[Briggs et al. 2008] 
Differences to the first evaluation relate to refined and extended metrics. We 
especially sought to improve the first iteration’s exploratory metric of 
process transparency, which had shown ambiguous reliability. Thus, we 
constructed a new metric of process transparency – to cover further relevant 
aspects and to increase content validity [Straub 1989], we included 
additional notions of process comprehensibility, predictability and ability to 
see through. In the field of human-machine interaction, Grote et al. [1999] 
suggest these aspects to be premises of human control over technology.  
Analogous to the first iteration, we measured comprehensibility as the 
client’s subjective comprehension of the advisory process and its results; we 
operationalized the client’s subjective ability to see through in respect of the 
activities, their goals and the interrelations between the activities. 
Finally, we measured the subjective predictability of the encounter regarding 
the client’s understanding of how and when to intervene in the advisory 
encounter. 
Regarding the information provision aspect of information transparency, we 
improved our previous metric by basing them on existing items of 
information quality research. We chose to measure the clients’ perceived 
completeness, representation and composite quality of information [Arazy 
and Kopak 2011] as well as their relevancy [Lee et al. 2002]. To measure the 
second aspect of information transparency (comprehension of information 
use), we constructed items based on conceptualizations of Awad and 
Krishnan [2006]. In their research, they relate information transparency to 
the customers’ perceived importance of whether a company allows finding 
out what information it keeps about the client for what reason. To cover this 
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aspect of information use also in our metric of controllability and increase 
the metric’s content validity, we added a further item on the client’s 
perceived influence on information use.  
Equivalent to the first evaluation, we used the scale of the Yield Shift Theory 
of Satisfaction of Briggs et al. [2008] to measure overall client satisfaction 
with the advisory encounters. 
All Likert scale items were tested in respect of their internal consistency 
using Cronbach’s alpha (Table 7-6). All scales showed high reliability for 
both settings with all Cronbach alpha scores greater than .755. We therefore 
computed the scale averages of the participants’ responses. Qualitative 
assessment of construct validity by comparing the respondents’ assessments 
of the main constructs in questionnaires and interviews showed high 
convergent validity. 
According to Shapiro-Wilk tests on the differences between the settings’ 
scores, the Likert scales of process transparency, information transparency I 
(information provision) and satisfaction were significantly normally 
distributed. Thus, for comparisons of these scale data by setting (traditional 
vs. artifact-supported), we used dependent t-tests (two-tailed) to evaluate our 
hypotheses. To compare the ratings of information transparency II 
(comprehension of use) and controllability, we applied Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test (two-tailed). 
All p-values were corrected for multiple hypotheses testing using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure [Benjamini and Hochberg 1995]. The 
correction also accounted for the tests with non-significant results. To 
provide an objective measure of their importance, we also calculated the 
effect size for all scales revealing significant differences. 
Throughout the evaluation, the client-advisor encounters of both settings 
were independently observed and protocolled in writing by two observers. 
They took notes regarding the interaction between client and advisor with an 
emphasis on their use of the software artifact (in the artifact-supported 
setting). To examine cases of contradictory protocol notes, the encounters’ 
video and audio recordings were consulted. 
The semi-structured client debriefings contained questions regarding the 
clients’ overall perceptions of the advisory settings as well as further 
questions regarding the quantitative metrics to gather insights on the reasons 
of their ratings. Analogous to the first iteration, all debriefings were 
audiotaped, transcribed and summarized in a spreadsheet, which was then 
used to analyze the central themes emerging from the answers.   
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Table 7-6: Scale reliability of metrics used in the second iteration evaluation 
Likert scale metric 
Avg. rating 
traditional 
situation 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Avg. rating 
artifact-
supported 
situation 
Cronbach'
s alpha 
Perceived process transparency 5.28 0.879 5.54 0.911 
Perceived information 
transparency I (information 
provision) 
5.13 0.900 5.70 0.942 
Perceived information 
transparency II (comprehension 
of use) 
5.71 0.755 5.71 0.921 
Perceived controllability 5.57 0.766 5.19 0.864 
Satisfaction 5.33 0.953 5.72 0.972 
7.6.3.2 Results 
With the new artifact, the clients’ assessments of encounter transparency and 
controllability were en par with the traditional setting.  
Perceived process transparency. Perceived process transparency – the 
client’s perceived comprehensibility of the process and its activities – was 
rated rather positive for both the traditional (M = 5.28, SD = 0.97) and the 
artifact-supported setting (M = 5.54, SD = 1.01). Even though the latter was 
evaluated slightly better, the differences between the settings showed no 
statistical significance. In their feedback, clients remarked that process 
transparency was positively influenced by the shared representation. Ten 
client participants found the artifact-supported setting to be more transparent, 
as the artifact provided a comprehensible overview of available information 
and provided them with immediate feedback. Only six clients clearly stated 
to prefer the traditional setting, arguing for its simplicity of presentation. 
Perceived information transparency. In respect of the quality of 
information provision (information transparency I), the client participants 
significantly preferred the exposition of information provided by the artifact-
supported setting (M = 5.79, SD = 0.97) over the traditional setting. The 
differences were statistically significant with large effect size (t(21) = -3.387, 
p = .002, d = 0.73). 
The comprehensibility of information gathering and its purpose (information 
transparency II) was rated very positively for both the traditional (M = 5.71, 
SD = 1.15) and the artifact-supported encounter (M = 5.71, SD = 1.25), 
showing no significant difference. This perception was also mirrored in the 
clients’ interview feedback, where they stated that they could easily 
understand why the advisor needed particular information. 
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Perceived controllability. Clients rated their perceived controllability in the 
artifact-supported setting rather low (M = 5.19, SD = 1.34) compared to the 
traditional setting (M = 5.57, SD = 1.14). In the interviews, however, clients 
generally perceived their influence to be equal in both settings; five clients 
stated that controllability was increased in the artifact-supported situation, 
whereas only two clients remarked that controllability of the traditional 
setting was superior. Regarding their perceived participation, some clients 
found more opportunities to ask questions in the artifact-supported setting. 
This matches also our observations that – due to the availability and 
visualization of information – discussions in the artifact-supported setting 
were more detailed and also more client-driven. This is also reflected in the 
duration of the encounters – while traditional encounters in general were 
finished after 20 to 30 minutes, the artifact-supported encounters often even 
exhausted the time limit of 45min. 
Satisfaction. Overall, 60% of the clients preferred the artifact-supported 
setting over its traditional counterpart. In line with this preference, most 
clients also rated encounter satisfaction higher for the artifact-supported 
setting (M = 5.72, SD = 1.22) than the traditional setting (M = 5.33, SD = 
1.10). These differences, however, were not significant. Generally, the 
clients preferred the artifact-supported encounter because of its clarity, 
improved information provision as well as its “playfulness”, making the 
encounter more exciting. Compared to the traditional situation the artifact-
supported setting was also perceived as “more professional” by some clients. 
Only five clients remarked in their feedback that the artifact somewhat 
disturbed their interaction and communication with the advisor, due to focus 
on operating the artifact or perceived limitation by the artifact’s 
functionality. Some clients also remarked that the availability of additional 
information in the artifact-supported setting was sometimes demanding or 
distracting; clients, however, did not report information overload to be an 
issue.  
While these feedbacks matched our observations, we found major 
differences regarding our observations of interaction efficiency and usability 
and the client’s subjective assessments. Most strikingly, in our observations 
we found that interaction with the tabletop device was rather error-prone and 
sometimes troublesome. Users exhibited problems with both (1) correctly 
applying the gestures to the designated information elements as well as (2) 
unintentional interaction.  
Regarding the first aspect, we found our hidden gestures to be very 
demanding in respect of their mapping on interface elements. Especially, the 
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“double tap” gesture to access detail views of information items seemed 
problematic. Due to technical restrictions of the tabletop device (low 
resolution), enactment of the gesture was very error-prone – in absence of 
any system feedback, users seemed unsure whether their actions failed or 
they were using the wrong gesture. Often, this led to awkward situations 
with the advisor trying but failing to enter detail views and instead 
unintentionally moving or scaling information items, thus disorganizing the 
information space. Correspondingly, the single most used functionality was 
to “clean up” the screen, i.e., rearrange all items to their original positions.  
Second, these interaction problems were aggravated by further unintentional 
interaction. Due to technological restrictions, the tabletop device could not 
discriminate between touch interaction initiated by a human finger or any 
other object of the same size. This led the application, for example, to 
recognize the contacts of the advisor’s shirt-sleeve as interaction. Thus, 
advisors often unintentionally moved information items or reoriented the 
screen as well as accessed tools (calculator, further information, etc.) from 
the radial menus in the corners of the screen.  
However, we were surprised to find that the majority of clients did not 
comment on such interaction problems – only four clients remarked that the 
advisor’s interaction might be improved but ascribed the perceived problems 
to a lack of training. Similar feedback was provided by the advisors as the 
main users; while the majority of them reported to have had at least some 
problems with operating the system, they also ascribed it to their lack of 
experience, finding that these problems would diminish with frequent use. 
7.6.4 Discussion 
With adapting the basic design rationales of the application, we could 
successfully address the first iteration’s issues of perceived determinism and 
restriction as well as the artifact gaining too much focus. In the evaluation, 
the artifact-supported encounter could also draw even with the traditional 
setting in respect of the client’s perceived controllability. Interestingly, the 
second iteration basically provided the same functionality and information as 
the first one; however, grounding visualization upon information blocks 
rather than activities seems to have had less negative effects on the client’s 
perception of control.  
The new design, however, did not only affect the client’s perception of the 
process but also improved interaction between actors. Similar to what has 
been reported by Halloran [2002], we found that the shard information space 
improved the quality of discourse, enabling more detailed and stimulating 
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discussions between advisors and clients as compared to the traditional 
situation. We ascribe this to the richer decision base that provided actors 
with detailed and dynamic contextual information. This is also supported by 
the clients’ significantly higher rating of information provision for the 
artifact-supported setting compared to the traditional setting. 
We also suggest that our design choice of providing “public only” 
information, along with the semi-public use of the advisor’s physical 
notepad, further supported communication and interaction between the 
actors: For initial small talk or in more comprehensive discussions, the 
advisor would use his notepad to write down important information in order 
not to disturb the ongoing dialogue. Whenever the advisor wanted to 
contextualize this information with the application’s visualizations, he would 
enter the data together with the client. While intuition suggests this 
redundancy to be annoying for both parties, we found that advisor and client 
were shifting quite fluently between discussions (and the advisor taking 
notes) and jointly investigating their effects using the system. These two 
levels proved to be a very good compromise to prevent actors from focusing 
on the system too much.  
One may argue that it is already a success that the artifact-supported 
encounter accomplished to draw level with the traditional situation, given the 
large differences of advisor experience with the traditional situation (M = 
12.5 years) compared to their experience with the prototype application 
(180min of introduction and training prior to the test encounters). However, 
the application could neither fully attain our main solution objectives of 
increasing transparency and improving the client’s influence on the process, 
nor significantly increase client satisfaction with the encounter.  
From observations, we suggest that this may also be highly related to the 
application’s inadequate usability; failures in enacting gestures as well as 
frequent unintentional interaction were very prominent. These disturbances 
greatly affected the flow of client-advisor communication and put the actors’ 
attention and effort to correct interaction with the system rather than the 
interactions’ effects. We suggest that these interaction breakdowns also 
concealed interactional cues in respect of the advisory course and 
informational effects, potentially affecting the client’s perception and 
comprehension of the advisor’s actions, i.e., the encounter’s transparency.  
Interestingly, we found no direct support for this argumentation in the client 
participants’ feedback – compared to the traditional encounter their 
perception of transparency regarding the artifact-supported encounter was 
rather modest but clients did not bring forward explicit reasons for this, 
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neither did they suggest improvements. To the contrary, some of them even 
downplayed interaction issues, arguing that such problems would diminish 
with increased advisor practice. However, to further investigate the 
suggested importance of “interactional transparency”, i.e., users being 
enabled to easily follow each other’s interactions with the system, we 
decided to initiate a third design iteration.  
7.7 Third Build-and-Evaluate Iteration 
Our first design iteration was initiated with defining the general issues of 
investment advisory encounter (problem-centered initiation); the second 
iteration targeted the same research problem with extended solution 
objectives and revised design requirements. Based on the objectives and 
requirements of the second iteration, the third iteration mainly focused on 
improving particular design aspects of the application, corresponding to a 
“Design & Development Centered Initiation” according to the taxonomy of 
possible research entry points by Peffers et al. [2007].  
The demonstration of the third iteration’s design requirements and 
evaluation results builds on their presentation in Nussbaumer et al. [2012b]. 
7.7.1 Solution Objectives 
While the second iteration demonstrated promising results towards 
accomplishing its solution objectives, the designed artifact could not 
significantly improve the client-advisor encounter. Ascribing the artifact’s 
failure to meet its solution objectives in the second iteration mainly to flaws 
in the interaction design, we attempt to accomplish the initial solution 
objectives of increasing process transparency (SO1), information 
transparency (SO2) and controllability (SO3) as well as overall client 
satisfaction (SO4) with extended design requirements and their adapted 
implementation. 
7.7.2 Design and Development 
The general artifact design of the second iteration showed some promise in 
improving the client-advisor encounter as compared to the traditional setting. 
Thus, the design and implementation of the third iteration focused on 
alleviating artifact issues related to its interaction design. 
7.7.2.1 Design Requirements 
Based on the results of our second design iteration, we suggest that 
transparency of advisor-application interaction may influence the 
comprehensibility of the encounter as perceived by the client. This 
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“interactional transparency” is not to be confused with the concept of 
interaction transparency in HCI research [Bardram and Bertelsen 1995], 
referring to users wanting to think about their tasks and not about the 
computer artifact they are using. In our context of dyadic interaction 
mediated by IT artifacts, we mean the comprehensibility of one party’s 
system interaction as perceived by the other party. 
We have suggested above that the second iteration’s use of error-prone 
gestures might have affected the comprehensibility of the advisor’s actions. 
The client’s comprehension may have been further limited by the gestures’ 
implicit or hidden nature – as learning the meaning of different gestures (one 
finger vs. two fingers, “single tap” vs. “double tap”) was already difficult for 
the trained advisor, it is improbable that the incidental client user may easily 
map gestures to their proposed effects. 
Therefore focusing mainly on the interaction with the artifact, we define the 
requirement of providing “interactional transparency” between users and the 
artifact to further the comprehensibility of interaction. As this requirement 
addresses the particular implementation of the shared information spaces, we 
add it as a constraint to our first design requirement:  
DR1. Provide shared information spaces 
Constraint 1: Enable sociable use of the shared information spaces 
Constraint 2: Provide interactional transparency  
7.7.2.2 Implementation 
In our revised interaction design, we aimed at more comprehensible system 
interaction for both the user and the immediate observer. We introduced a 
physical token that – when being placed on the screen – could be used to 
more explicitly change information levels and application states and thus 
allow for increased attention and awareness of the observer. Placing the 
token on the screen activates a radial menu, mostly containing functionalities 
that were previously only accessible with hidden gestures. 
For example, the menu allows switching between the abstract process 
representation level (see also Figure 7-7.1 in Appendix A1) and the overview 
level (Figure 7-5) as well as “cleaning up” the screen, i.e., resetting 
orientation and placement of the information widgets. Rotating the physical 
tag will rotate the screen, allowing for more intuitive screen orientation. 
Also, we included access to the advisor tools (calculator, information 
browser, session summary) into the radial menu, as their prior position (top-
left and lower-right corner of the screen) caused frequent unintentional 
interaction.  
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To improve interaction with information items, we also replaced the “double 
tap” gesture with a tree menu on top of every widget that allows switching 
between detail view and overview. 
 
Figure 7-5: Basic front end design of third iteration 
7.7.3 Evaluation 
To test the third iteration’s prototype application against our solution 
objectives, we conducted evaluations similar to the second iteration. We 
sought to test the same hypotheses as in the previous iterations, relating to 
improved transparency, controllability and client satisfaction in the artifact-
supported investment advisory encounter compared to the traditional setting. 
7.7.3.1 Method 
Participants. We recruited 24 client participants by convenience sampling, 
14 of them were students. Clients were between 20 and 52 years of age (M = 
28.04, SD = 9.12), whereas 7 of them were female and 10 reported to have 
some experience with investment advice. Regarding their proficiency in 
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computer use, 11 participants characterized themselves as professional users, 
another 11 participants as advanced users and only two participants reported 
to use computers only occasionally. 
The advisory sessions were carried out by professional investment advisors 
of a single Swiss bank (10 male, 2 female) with an age ranging from 27 to 55 
years (M = 38.00, SD = 8.55) and advisory experience ranging from 2 to 30 
years (M = 11.58, SD = 8.20). In respect of their proficiency in computer 
use, three advisors categorized themselves as professional users, seven as 
advanced users and two as occasional users. 
Procedure. The evaluation applied the same procedure as the previous 
iteration, with two notable differences. To further increase the available time 
in the artifact-supported setting, we adapted the client’s scenarios such that it 
included only one goal (e.g., buying a car) rather than two. In the same vein, 
the scenario specified that the client was already having an account with the 
FSP (so her existing assets were already available in the system) but utilizing 
the FSP’s investment advisory service for the first time. 
Apparatus. The same apparatus was used as in the second iteration 
evaluation. The artifact-supported setting was provided with the Microsoft 
Surface tabletop system (1
st
 generation) running the software prototype. 
Additionally, advisors were provided with notepad and pen. For the 
traditional situation, advisors again used their own advisory material and 
were additionally provided with notepad and pen. 
Design and Analysis. The evaluation mirrored the design of the second 
iteration, using the very same questionnaires and metrics as well as 
observation and debriefing guidelines (see above). Table 7-7 provides the 
metrics’ scale reliabilities. All Likert scale items showed high reliability for 
both settings with all Cronbach alpha scores greater than .731. We therefore 
computed the scale averages of the participants’ responses. Furthermore, 
qualitative assessment of construct validity showed high convergent validity 
of participant responses from questionnaires and interviews. 
Shapiro-Wilk tests on the differences between the settings’ scores revealed 
that all Likert scales were normally distributed, except for information 
transparency II (comprehension of use). We therefore used dependent t-tests 
(two-tailed) to compare the scale data of process transparency, information 
transparency I (information provision), controllability and satisfaction, while 
we applied a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (two-tailed) to 
compare the ratings for information transparency II.  
 
7. Essay II: Designing for Transparency in Client-Advisor Encounters 
170 
Table 7-7: Scale reliability of metrics used in the third iteration evaluation 
Likert scale metric 
Avg. rating 
traditional 
situation 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Avg. rating 
artifact-
supported 
situation 
Cronbach's 
alpha 
Perceived process transparency 5.27 0.926 6.05 0.919 
Information transparency I 
(information provision) 
5.02 0.945 6.38 0.923 
Perceived information transparency II  
(comprehension of use) 
5.46 0.917 6.42 0.818 
Perceived controllability 4.83 0.731 5.96 0.833 
Satisfaction 5.16 0.890 6.32 0.924 
All p-values were corrected for multiple hypotheses testing using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg procedure [Benjamini and Hochberg 1995]. The 
correction also accounted for the tests with non-significant results. As for the 
previous evaluations, we also calculated the effect size for all scales 
revealing significant differences.  
Analysis of the qualitative feedbacks followed the same strategy as the first 
two iterations. Again, the debriefings were audiotaped, transcribed, 
summarized and the answers analyzed for central themes. 
7.7.3.2 Results 
With improving usability and interactional transparency of the system, we 
observed advisor-system interaction to be much more fluent and 
comprehensible, allowing for more attention and focus on content rather than 
on how to operate the system. This is also reflected in the client’s 
assessments of the artifact-supported encounter, showing all ratings being 
significantly higher as compared to the traditional setting.  
Perceived process transparency. Clients assessed process transparency of 
the artifact-supported encounter (M = 6.05, SD = 0.98) to be highly increased 
compared to the traditional situation (M = 5.27, SD = 1.28), showing a 
statistically significant difference with large effect size (t(22) = -3.847, p = 
.011, d = 0.69). Similar to the second design iteration, clients found the 
shared representations and its visualizations greatly improving 
comprehensibility of the situation.  
Perceived information transparency. Also, the assessment of perceived 
information transparency was increased. As in the second iteration, the 
quality of information provision (information transparency I) was 
significantly improved when using the IT artifact (M = 6.36, SD = 0.65) 
compared to the traditional situation (M = 5.02, SD = 6.36). The difference 
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between the settings was statistically significant with large effect size (t(22) 
= -5.100, p < .001, d = 1.41). 
Furthermore, and in contrast to the second iteration, clients also reported 
increased comprehensibility of information gathering and its purpose 
(information transparency II) for the artifact-supported setting (M = 6.42, SD 
= 0.75), rating the traditional situation comparably low (M = 5.46, SD = 
1.44). This difference showed to be significant with a large effect size (Z = -
3.222, p = .004, r = -.47). Clients argued that this was mainly to the 
information representation that allowed them to enter client information 
whenever and they were relevant.  
Perceived controllability. Regarding controllability, clients perceived 
increased influence and opportunities to participate for the artifact-supported 
setting (M = 5.94, SD = 1.04) compared to the traditional setting (M = 4.83, 
SD = 1.27). The difference was statistically significant and showed a large 
effect size (t(22) = -3.553, p = .003, d = 0.96). In their feedbacks, clients 
related their increased influence to the interactive development of the 
solution as well as the artifact’s “playfulness” in allowing changing and 
adapting “everything” to their preferences. 
Satisfaction. Overall, clients were more satisfied with the artifact-supported 
(M = 6.32, SD = 0.74) than the traditional encounter (M = 5.16, SD = 1.30), 
showing a significant difference with large effect size (t(23) = -3.564, p = 
.003, d = 1.14). Furthermore, 87.50% of the clients reported that they 
preferred the artifact-supported setting over its traditional counterpart 
(4.17% reporting no preference). Clients brought forward the following 
reasons for their preference: better comprehensibility and overview, 
innovativeness and “fun”. However, the two clients who preferred the 
traditional setting argued that they were granted more speaking time, making 
the encounter more pleasant. 
As compared to the second evaluation, the third evaluation’s sample of 
participants was younger (mean age of 28.04 vs. 38.17 in the second 
evaluation) and consisted of more students (14 of 24 participants vs. 6 of 24 
in the second evaluation). Thus, we investigated a potential sample bias 
towards IT support based age and occupation (student/non-student).  
To investigate effects of the former, we computed the correlations between 
age and the main scales. For both the second and third evaluation the tests 
revealed no significant Spearman correlations (two-tailed) for our main 
metrics.  
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Regarding the influence of occupation, we tested both data sets (second and 
third evaluation) for different ratings between students and non-students 
(using independent t-tests where both groups were normally distributed, and 
Mann-Whitney U tests otherwise). The tests revealed no significant 
differences. 
7.7.4 Discussion 
Looking at the results, improving usability and interactional transparency 
greatly improved advisor-system and client-advisor interaction. Simplifying 
advisor-system interaction and replacing hidden gestures with interaction 
primitives more easily to be followed also increased the client’s 
comprehension of the advisory encounter.  
Introducing the physical token and the information widgets’ tree menus 
served two purposes; firstly, it allowed us to increase usability of performing 
previously error-prone actions. Secondly, and maybe more important, the 
token allowed more explicit enactment of the underlying actions and 
provided stronger interactional cues; in this way, the token drew the client’s 
attention to important advisor interactions and thus may have increased her 
comprehension of interaction effects and consequences. The revised 
interaction may also have led to our observed increased sociability of the 
client-advisor encounter, as the explicit interactional cues allowed the 
advisor to better shift and focus client attention. 
Overall, the results suggest that the design rationales of process and 
information transparency are only effective if coupled with sufficient 
interactional transparency, i.e., sufficient client comprehension of the 
advisor’s interaction with shared information representations. Interestingly, 
the majority of participants of the second iteration did not deem such 
transparency to be important – introducing this requirement was mainly 
based on our own sense-making of observations of advisor-system and 
client-advisor interaction. 
7.8 An Initial Design Theory of Transparency 
In this essay, we have suggested that client-advisor encounters are inherently 
strained by transparency issues, which show several negative effects on 
client-advisor interaction and client perception of the encounter. For these 
issues, we devised a general solution concept of improving transparency 
with shared IT artifacts. We instantiated and refined the concept in three 
build-and-evaluate iterations and showed its efficacy for the particular case 
of investment advice.  
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In the following, we will investigate the applicability of our design principles 
for general asymmetric client-advisor encounters, aiming to devise an initial 
design theory of improving transparency.  
As demonstrated in Section 7.1.2, the components of such a design theory 
may be built on different activities of the design science research process. 
Based on the results and experiences of our three build-and-evaluate 
iterations, we suggest that our work is consistent with the requirements for 
design theory suggested by Gregor and Jones [2007]. Below we will 
summarize evidence from our current research for each of their proposed 
eight components, as they have been presented in Table 7-1. 
1. Purpose and scope. This component specifies the type of artifact to 
which the theory applies, i.e., the goals and boundaries of the design theory. 
The purpose and scope of our initial design theory of transparency relate to 
shared IT artifacts addressing the main issues of client-advisor encounters as 
discussed in Section 7.2, i.e., the problems of concealment, diverging goals, 
undissolved advisory complexity and controllability; it applies to shared 
artifacts that enable transparency of information and action between clients 
and advisors.  
While the design theory’s scope explicitly includes addressing the problem 
of diverging goals in client-advisor encounters (i.e., potential conflicts of 
interests regarding the goals of client and advisor), the design theory and its 
design principles may also be applicable for advisory services not or being 
less strongly affected by such interest asymmetry (e.g., fee-based advisory 
services that separate advice from implementation, medical advice or other 
services emphasizing information aggregation and provision). 
2. Constructs. The design theory’s main entities of interest refer to process 
transparency (comprehensibility of advisory activities, their order and their 
results) and information transparency (quality of information provision and 
comprehensibility of information use). We have suggested these constructs 
to be semi-independent components of the design theory, in that their 
designs may be carried out with some degree of independence.  
The design theory also relates to the construct of controllability (the degree 
of the client being able to influence and control the advisory encounter and 
its results), which we argue to have some dependencies to the transparency 
constructs, both conceptual and design-wise. Conceptually, we have 
introduced transparency as a premise of controllability; only if the client is 
aware of the underlying mechanisms, will she be able to purposely take 
influence and control. In respect of the design, this dependence was reflected 
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in our focus on designing for transparency first and then – based on the 
overall transparency design – optimizing for controllability. 
3. Principles of form and function. This component relates to the abstract 
“blueprint” that describes an IS artifact. Therewith, principles of form and 
function describe or prescribe how to design a solution artifact in order to 
achieve its objectives. 
In our three build-and-evaluate iterations, we have defined and refined 
several design requirements to achieve our solution objectives. Based on our 
experiences of implementing and evaluating artifacts based on these 
requirements, we devise the design principles as technological rules [van 
Aken 2004] which should to be considered when developing IS artifacts to 
increase transparency in client-advisor encounters. 
1. Increase encounter transparency by providing the advisor and client with 
shared information spaces that both actors may access and monitor.  
The shared information spaces should be implemented such that they 
enable actors to gain shared understanding of the problem and its potential 
solutions, while allowing them to monitor their respective actions and thus 
alleviating opportunism and hidden action. Thus, the information spaces 
should be shared and observable at any time. Being the basis of process 
and information transparency (see Principles 2 and 3), the shared 
information spaces should also allow the client to better co-create the 
solution and take influence on the solution-finding process.  
2. Increase the users’ comprehension of each other’s interactions with the 
shared information spaces by providing strong and easily identifiable 
interaction gestures.  
Actors should be enabled to easily follow each other’s interactions with 
the shared artifact. Thus, hidden interactions should be avoided in favor of 
more explicit interactions. 
3. Increase the client’s comprehension of the advisory process by visualizing 
relevant encounter activities, their interrelations and results, but avoid 
rigid visualizations that may appear authoritative and deterministic. 
Implementing process transparency should enable the client to monitor 
and comprehend the advisor’s actions; thus, she should better understand 
the advisory results. From an advisor’s perspective, the process-
transparent artifact should ease explaining and arguing for specific 
activities and results.  
In order to prevent perception of authority and determinism, process 
transparency may have to be implemented implicitly, e.g., avoiding 
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visualizations that might be perceived as overly rigid (such as process 
flow charts or similar representational guidance). 
4. Increase the client’s comprehension of advisory information by 
visualizing and dynamically adapting information relevant for advisory 
activities as well as their effects. 
The implementation of information transparency in a shared IT artifact 
should include comprehensible provision of relevant information and their 
effects on the advisor’s actions and advisory results. While the relevancy 
and comprehensibility of information may depend on domain and specific 
context, the continuous visualization of relevant information and 
immediate illustration of effects of informational changes (adding, 
removing, altering data) may ease comprehension of their purpose.  
5. Increase sociable use of the shared artifact and encourage face-to-face 
communication by allowing flexible artifact inclusion and exclusion from 
the client-advisor dialog. 
Actors should be prevented from too much focus on the shared IT artifact 
at expense of face-to-face communication. Implementations of this 
principle may include the provision of several entry and exit points to the 
artifact’s functionality such that artifact use may alternate with client-
advisor interaction and dialog. Furthermore, autonomy of the actors 
should be supported by avoiding the shared artifact to explicate or imply 
rigid order of activities.  
4. Artifact mutability. This component of a design theory refers to changes 
in the state of the artifact that may occur.  
The specific implementation of the design principles in a shared artifact may 
be affected by several conditions. First, the instantiations may be highly 
dependent from the advisory domain. Requirements in respect of 
implementing process transparency and information transparency, for 
example, may vary regarding the complexity of the domain and the intensity 
of information, knowledge and interest asymmetries. 
Another aspect of mutability also relates to the implementation of the shared 
artifact using specific technology. While our expository instantiations have 
been implemented for a multi-touch tabletop system, the design principles 
restrict use of other technology only by implication (e.g., given that the 
artifact and its information should be shared between client and advisor, 
some restrictions regarding visualization and interaction may apply). Their 
implementation, however, may be highly dependent from underlying 
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technology’s characteristics such that the principles may have to be 
differently instantiated for different technologies. 
Finally, artifact mutability does not necessarily refer only to technical 
changes of the artifact (such as feature extensions) or its potential application 
in other domains, but may also encompass the artifact’s adaptability 
regarding actual usage. While our first iteration featured low adaptability to 
different user requisites (e.g., regarding free order of activities), our revised 
design immensely increased the user’s possibilities to adapt the usage of the 
artifact to their specific needs and preferences. The design itself shows high 
mutability regarding its adaptability to different work practices. 
5. Testable propositions. This component relates to propositions or 
hypotheses about the artifact against which it can be tested. We have tested 
three artifact iterations in evaluations using experimental techniques in order 
to test four hypotheses regarding the artifacts’ effects compared to the 
traditional, unsupported situation. Based on these hypotheses, we propose 
that systems implementing the design principles will improve the client’s 
perception of encounter process and information transparency. Furthermore, 
we propose that providing shared transparent IT artifacts may positively 
affect the client’s perceived control of the encounter as well as increase her 
overall encounter satisfaction. 
6. Justificatory knowledge. A design theory’s justificatory knowledge 
relates to the underlying knowledge or theory that explains the artifact 
design. We have based our solution approach on several research fields (as 
discussed Section 7.2 and Section 7.3), built our artifact designs on existing 
collaboration literature and refined and adapted the respective requirements 
in three build-and-evaluate iterations. 
7. Principles of implementation. This component entails the description of 
processes for implementing the design theory in specific contexts. In this 
essay, we have presented a design science approach to implement the theory 
in the domain and context of investment advisory encounters.  This 
implementation process was based on the DSRM of Peffers et al. [2007] and 
used design methods suggested by Rosson and Carroll [2002]. The most 
important underlying principles of implementation relate to iterative 
development and concatenation of findings. 
8. Expository instantiation. Expository instantiations of the artifact assist in 
representing the theory. In developing and refining our proposed design 
theory, we have developed three different artifact instantiations. The third 
artifact iteration may serve as an expository example of a successful 
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instantiation of our proposed design principles for the domain of investment 
advisory service encounters. 
7.9 Conclusion 
In this essay, we have suggested that client-advisor encounters exhibit 
agency problems of principal-agent relationships, which negatively influence 
the actors’ collaborative solution-finding process. We addressed these 
problems along two main contributions. Firstly, we have demonstrated how 
we developed and refined design requirements of transparency in the 
exemplary domain of investment advice. Presenting our research findings 
along three consecutive design cycles, we emphasized on the strength of 
multi-loop, concatenated design processes in exploring solutions and their 
iterative refinement. Secondly, we have proposed a design theory that 
generalizes the requirements to design principles of addressing transparency 
issues in client-advisor encounters. Based on our evaluation findings, these 
principles do not only include patterns of improving transparency in client-
advisor relationships but also “anti-patterns” of approaches probably to 
avoid.  
Table 7-8 summarizes our three design iterations along their solution 
objectives, design requirements as well as the derived design principles. 
While all iterations shared the same solution objectives, the design 
requirements to achieve these objectives evolved with evaluating the design 
solutions. Findings of previous iterations were incorporated into following 
iterations as constraints regarding how requirements should be implemented. 
Based on three iterations of requirement refinement and implementation we 
then derived several design principles of how to best design for transparent, 
shared advisory support. 
While our design iterations circle around implementing the design principles 
using shared IT artifacts, they do not necessarily imply any (information) 
technological imperative. For less complex scenarios, our transparency 
principles may also be implemented, e.g., on paper; the principles aim to 
improve the comprehensibility of the encounter through shared information 
spaces – as such, however, they do not make assumptions on how to 
(technologically) implement them. For the domain of investment advisory 
encounters, we have successfully built shared information spaces upon one 
particular technology (Microsoft Surface tabletop device); as these 
instantiations are domain-specific, they must remain exemplary – 
appropriate technologies and instantiations in respect of visualization and 
interaction may greatly vary across domains.  
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Table 7-8: Summary of design iteration objectives and requirements, and derived 
design principles 
 Iteration 1 Iteration 2 Iteration 3 
Solution Objectives 
What should the 
artifact accomplish? 
SO1. Increase process transparency 
SO2. Increase information transparency 
SO3. Increase controllability 
SO4. Increase overall client satisfaction 
Design 
Requirements 
What should the 
artifact afford to 
accomplish the 
solution objectives? 
DR1. Provide shared information spaces (SO1, SO2) 
 Constraint 1: Enable 
sociable use 
Constraint 1: Enable 
sociable use 
Constraint 2: Provide 
interactional transparency 
DR2. Provide comprehensible visualizations of activities and their 
relationships (SO1) 
Constraint 1: 
Allow actors to 
customize 
advisory course 
Constraint 1: Allow 
actors to customize 
advisory course 
Constraint 2: Avoid 
rigid representations of 
the process 
Constraint 3: Avoid 
process visualizations 
that visualize only one 
activity at a time 
Constraint 1: Allow actors 
to customize advisory 
course 
Constraint 2: Avoid rigid 
representations of the 
process 
Constraint 3: Avoid 
process visualizations that 
visualize only one activity 
at a time 
DR3. Provide comprehensible visualizations of relevant advisory 
information (SO2) 
Advisor 
information base 
Advisor information 
base & information use 
Advisor information base 
& information use 
DR4. Enable the client to control the process and its results (SO3) 
  Constraint 1: avoid rigid 
representational 
guidance 
Constraint 1: avoid rigid 
representational 
guidance 
Design Principles 
How should 
transparent shared 
advisory support be 
designed? 
DP1. Increase encounter transparency by providing the advisor and 
client with shared information spaces that both actors may access and 
monitor. 
DP2. Increase the users’ comprehension of each other’s interactions 
with the shared information spaces by providing strong but easily 
identifiable interaction gestures. 
DP3. Increase the client’s comprehension of the advisory process by 
visualizing relevant encounter activities, their interrelations and results, 
but avoid rigid visualizations that may appear authoritative and 
deterministic. 
DP4. Increase the client’s comprehension of advisory information by 
visualizing and dynamically adapting information relevant for advisory 
activities as well as their effects. 
DP5. Increase sociable use of the shared artifact and encourage face-to-
face communication by allowing flexible artifact inclusion and exclusion 
from the client-advisor dialog. 
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In this essay, we have demonstrated how such instantiations may be 
developed and refined using an iterative design process [Peffers et al. 2007]. 
For instantiating transparency implementation requirements in other domains 
of principal-professional relationships, we suggest that our design principles 
may provide a useful starting point. 
Our research has implications for advisory practice regarding several 
aspects. With our conception of encounter transparency we address 
fundamental agency problems inherent in most client-advisor relationships. 
In contrast to other solution approaches discussed in the literature, our 
transparency approach intends not to compensate existing asymmetries with 
appropriate contracts but to more directly address and alleviate them by 
opening the “black box” of advisory encounters. Transparency may not only 
increase the client’s comprehension of the advisory information and 
activities – and, thus, strengthen her decision making authority – but may 
also positively influence her perception of the overall advisory experience 
and improve satisfaction.  
In this essay, we have mainly argued for the need of transparency from the 
client’s perspective. Clearly, for advisory encounters previously aligned to 
be opaque in order to be profitable, introducing transparency also shows 
some ramifications regarding the role of the advisor and the service 
company’s business model. For organizational stakeholders, transparency as 
a means to increase encounter comprehensibility may be a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, improving client comprehension may not only 
increase advisory and decision quality as well as client satisfaction, but may 
also strengthen the company’s position in respect of particular regulations on 
minimal information disclosure (e.g., European regulations for financial 
services [European Commission 2004]). On the other hand, such endeavors 
may counteract existing business models of cross-subsidizing “free-of-
charge” advice with product sales, partly building on information and 
knowledge asymmetries in order to be profitable. However, such business 
models are not necessarily in opposition to improving transparency.  
Increased client comprehension may compel companies and their advisors to 
be more convincing and persuading regarding their own products – at the 
advantage of potential competitive differentiation and increased client 
satisfaction. Also, as research has shown [e.g., Carter and Curry 2010], 
transparency may positively influence the clients’ willingness to pay for 
advice, paving the way to alternative business models, e.g., separating fee-
based advice from its implementation with products. 
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We will conclude this essay with some remarks on potential limitations. As 
in all research building on evaluations using experimental techniques, the 
validity of our findings is a function of the validity of the chosen test 
designs. We carefully designed our artifact evaluations to provide 
environments that are as realistic as possible. However, we acknowledge that 
many client participants were students rather than “real” investors. We 
argue, however, that preference for transparency should be a general feature 
of ambiguity-averse individuals [Andersson and Holm 1998], such that our 
results may also be applicable to the “population” of investors. Furthermore, 
we found no significant valuation differences between students and other 
client participants; neither did we find correlations between the participants’ 
age and their evaluation of the main scales. 
Another potential limitation relates to our transparency measurements. We 
only surveyed the clients’ subjective comprehension of the encounter’s 
information and activities; hence, we cannot know whether our transparency 
designs also increased their objective comprehension, e.g., in terms of 
learning. Anyhow, in the feedback interviews, we found no indications that 
the participant’s comprehension of the advisory situation was low in either 
setting.  
7.10 Appendix 
A1. Demonstration of Prototypes  
A.1.1 First Design Iteration 
In the artifact-supported encounter, client and advisor seat themselves at the 
tabletop device rather than a regular table. While engaging in initial small 
talk, the advisor is enabled to transparently add the client’s needs into an 
area at the center of the screen (Figure 7-6.1), assuring the client that her 
wishes, needs and preferences are taken seriously. To stimulate the client in 
thinking of her needs and goals, pictograms of basic categories (planned 
purchases, education, and housing) are readily available. Wishes and needs 
may be detailed with costs and contextualized with a timeline to express the 
desired period of goal fulfillment.  
After having gathered and entered the information about the client and her 
financial situation in the respective activity screens (Figure 7-6.2 and Figure 
7-6.3), the advisor and client will collaboratively discuss the client’s risk 
preference along a simple questionnaire (Figure 7-6.4). The client and 
advisor may then evaluate the questionnaire’s results and adapt it to the 
preferences of the client. The defined risk preference will then be used to 
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narrow down an appropriate investment strategy (Figure 7-3), which will be 
compiled by client and advisor along a defined investment amount and 
investment horizon.  
 
Figure 7-6: Screens of first iteration prototype; (1) Needs elicitation, (2) Personal data, 
(3) Financial situation and assets, (4) Risk preference questionnaire, (5) Simulation of 
future growth, (6) Summary of activities; product configuration omitted 
To assess the effects of an investment strategy (e.g., regarding 
accomplishment of the client’s goals), the projection of the potential growth 
of wealth may be accessed at any time (Figure 7-6.5). The advisor acts as a 
coach trying to map the client’s situation to appropriate strategies in order to 
fulfill her needs and goals. The dynamic visualization enables the advisor to 
comprehensibly argue for and against specific strategies, while the client can 
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immediately track the potential impacts on her financial situation and goal 
fulfillment.  
As the process overview is anchored to the application’s front end and 
allows navigation to all activities, the actors are enabled to refine and revise 
entered information at any time, allowing needs and goals to develop during 
the encounter rather than limiting their elicitation to a specific advisory 
phase. Having agreed on a strategy, the advisor may summarize the advisory 
session in a dedicated screen (Figure 7-6.6) that transparently shows all 
entered information and decisions made during the encounter. Based on this 
information and for a following encounter, the advisor may suggest a 
portfolio of products that may then be collaboratively discussed and adapted 
(not functionally implemented for the prototype and thus omitted in Figure 
7-6).  
A.1.2 Second and Third Design Iteration 
The general setup of the second and third prototype is similar to the first 
iteration – client and advisor seat themselves at the tabletop system, whereas 
in general the client will sit at the long side of the tabletop such that all 
information elements are oriented to the client by default. The second and 
third prototype share the same front end design and differ mainly regarding 
their interaction primitives. While the second prototype implements several 
interaction gestures (double tap, two finger zoom, two finger rotation), the 
third prototype shifts these hidden gestures to a radial menu that can be 
accessed by placing a physical token onto the screen.  
In the first few minutes of the encounter, however, the tabletop system will 
only be used as a table – client and advisor will engage in small talk, and the 
advisor will write down important information on his notepad. After this 
initial phase, the advisor will activate the tabletop system and present the 
general process overview to the client (Figure 7-7.1) to prepare the client in 
what to expect from the encounter and role of the IT artifact. Having 
discussed the general frame of the advisory session, the advisor may switch 
to the main overview (Figure 7-7.2) via a “hidden” menu that will appear 
whenever the advisor puts one finger anywhere on the screen for at least 
three seconds. In this overview, the advisor will briefly explain the 
visualized information, starting with client information (personal 
information, cash flow, assets), progressing with risk profile and investment 
strategy as well as explaining the role of the needs visualization and the 
projection of growth (central graph visualization).  
7. Essay II: Designing for Transparency in Client-Advisor Encounters 
183 
The advisor will then start to enter the information gathered in and noted on 
his notepad in the first few minutes of the session, verifying the entered data 
with the client and showing effects on either other information blocks or the 
central visualization. When accessing the detail view of some information 
blocks, relevant information from other blocks will be visualized (e.g., when 
accessing the cash flow detail view, cash flow-relevant expenditure or 
income from existing assets and important tax-relevant information will be 
displayed, Figure 7-7.3). Using such information, advisor and client may 
verify whether all relevant data has been entered and which effects 
additional data might have.  
After having discussed the client’s risk profile (Figure 7-7.4) and client 
goals, the actors will define an appropriate investment strategy (Figure 
7-7.5). As all relevant information is visible at any time, changes and their 
effects can be immediately assessed (e.g., effects of investment strategy on 
projected growth; effects of needs and goals on projected growth; effects of 
changes of client cash flow and assets). All information blocks may be 
accessed and adapted at any time – the application does not enforce any 
course of action.  
The advisor and client may access additional tools using two identical menus 
available on the upper left and lower right corner. In addition to a simple 
calculator, the actors may also retrieve explanatory information through a 
help browser and information prepared by the advisor in a digital briefcase, 
also providing a summary of all accomplished activities and gathered 
information that may be compiled at any time. The latter visualization will 
be used by the advisor at least once in the encounter, namely to recapitulate 
the advisory session and provide the client with a printout or digital 
representation of the summary. 
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Figure 7-7: Screens of second design iteration; (1) General process overview, (2) 
Overview of relevant information blocks, (3) Detailed gathering of financial situation 
(here: cash flow), (4) Risk profiling, (5) Definition of investment strategy, (5) 
Supportive tools (calculator, information browser, session summary)  
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8 Essay III: Designing for Cost Transparency in 
Investment Advisory Service Encounters 
Abstract  
Investment advisory services of financial service providers (FSPs) exhibit 
several characteristics that are detrimental to advisory quality. The 
interaction of advisor and client is strained by a lack of transparency 
regarding the advisory process (what activities are performed and why) and 
the information used therein (what information is used for what purpose and 
with what effect), as well as regarding the precise costs of the service and the 
recommended products. In prior research, we suggested that process and 
information transparency issues may be appropriately addressed with 
collaborative information technology (IT) artifacts. In this paper, we argue 
that collaborative, transparent artifacts may also be a premise of enabling 
cost transparency. To this end, we describe a complete research cycle of 
designing, implementing and evaluating a shared cost-transparent IT artifact 
to support client-advisor interaction in investment advisory encounters. 
Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of our design in improving the 
clients’ perceived cost transparency as well as increase their satisfaction and 
their willingness to pay for the received investment advice. These findings 
may also challenge the common belief of FSPs that transparent, fee-based 
advisory services would neither be accepted by clients nor be economically 
viable. Practical implications of these findings for designing advisory 
encounters with supportive IT are discussed. 
8.1 Introduction 
Investors are dissatisfied with their financial service providers’ (FSPs) 
investment advisory services [Mogicato et al. 2009]. Indeed, to counteract 
cost pressures resulting from fierce competition, FSPs have been optimizing 
their advisory activities towards product sale rather than provision of advice, 
leading to a poor quality of advice [Jungermann and Belting 2004]. For 
investment advisory services, research suggests several characteristics that 
are detrimental to advisory quality, including information asymmetry, 
interest asymmetry and ignorance of the client’s information needs [Oehler 
and Kohlert 2009]. Due to these asymmetries, the advisor might exploit the 
client’s less knowledge and experience to opportunistically pursue his own 
goals (e.g., by only superficially gathering relevant information or 
deliberately presenting information in a way that is incomprehensible for the 
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client). From a client’s perspective, such (possible) behavior is fostered by 
the lack of information disclosure, especially regarding the exact costs of 
both the investment advisory service and the products offered therein – thus, 
the client cannot be sure whether the advisor is optimizing the solution for 
the client’s best interest or, on the contrary, towards higher fees and 
provisions. 
Considering the clients’ general preference and demand for transparency 
[Lechner et al. 2009], especially regarding the cost of advisory services 
[Mogicato et al. 2009], the revenue models of FSPs lead to a paradoxical 
situation; while FSPs are trying to confront competition by designing cost 
structures to be highly non-transparent and difficult to compare [Carlin 
2009], they are at the same time impairing the resulting service quality as 
perceived by their clients – potentially also affecting their satisfaction. 
Indeed, looking at the prevailing business models of Swiss FSPs and the 
resulting incentive systems of advisors, we argue that the lack of cost 
transparency may be a major source of client dissatisfaction.  
As legislative regulations trying to establish transparency “top down” do not 
hold up to their promises [Oehler and Kohlert 2009], in this essay we suggest 
a “bottom up” approach of introducing transparency at the locus of 
investment advisory services – the client-advisor encounter. We start our 
investigations by posing the question of why FSPs are still refraining from 
establishing cost transparency. Based on a comprehensive study of the status 
quo of investment advisory services in Swiss FSPs [Mogicato et al. 2009], 
we find two major reasons: 
(1) Given that information technology (IT) is hardly used in advisory 
encounters [Schwabe and Nussbaumer 2009], cost transparency of 
advisory results (i.e., product portfolios configured by the advisor and 
adapted to the client’s preferences) is very difficult to maintain – while 
it is complex enough to allow for ad-hoc changes of product allocation 
(e.g., replacing one product with another), it is virtually impossible to 
adapt and configure such portfolios while dynamically adjusting or 
accounting for changes in the cost structure, as the calculation of actual 
costs in such scenarios is too complex. Thus, the client is confronted 
with the actual costs of her decisions typically only after they have been 
made. 
(2) FSPs consider cost transparency being detrimental to existing business 
models, supposing – and thus following neoclassical theory’s intuition 
– that clients would always opt for the least expensive product from a 
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set of (perfect) substitutes (including products of competitors). The 
majority of FSPs find such client behavior problematic, as they – in 
order to provide their advisory services “free-of-charge” – have to 
cross-subsidize them with earnings from selling products, which in turn 
involve a multitude of subsidiary costs, such as management fees, 
transaction fees, etc. This constellation, however, exposes the client to 
serious conflicts of interests – will the advisor optimize the client’s 
portfolio according to her needs and preferences or rather to achieve 
cost coverage? 
In previous research, we have suggested that transparency issues in 
investment advisory encounters may be best addressed with shared IT 
artifacts [Nussbaumer and Schwabe 2010]. Providing shared information 
spaces, such artifacts may increase the client’s perceived transparency in 
respect of the advisory process as well as the information used therein 
[Nussbaumer, P., Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012b].  
In this essay, we present a complete design science research cycle [Hevner et 
al. 2004], in which we demonstrate that such shared artifacts may also bridge 
the complexity of enabling cost transparency (ad-hoc access to cost 
information and dynamic calculation of costs). Such procedure is also 
interesting from a transparency research perspective. While much literature 
is concerned with the theoretical benefits and effects of transparency, 
empirical investigations are rare, especially in terms of design research. We 
aim to contribute to this body of knowledge in two ways. First, we provide 
insights into the feasibility of incorporating facets of cost transparency into 
the design of shared IT artifacts; second, in an experimental evaluation we 
demonstrate the efficacy of such artifacts in actually improving cost 
transparency as well as investigate their practical impacts on client-advisor 
encounters. Based on the literature on cost transparency, we argue that 
introducing cost-transparent artifacts may – in contrast to the FSPs’ beliefs – 
not only have positive influence on the client’s satisfaction with the 
encounter but also on her willingness to pay.  
We addressed the feasibility of cost-transparent shared artifacts in the build 
cycle of our design science endeavor. In doing so, we based our solution 
artifact on previous design principles of establishing process and information 
transparency in investment advisory encounters [Nussbaumer and Matter 
2011; Nussbaumer, P., Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012b]. Conceptualizing 
cost transparency as a specific facet of information transparency, in this 
essay we show how we extended the design principles by features of cost 
information provision. We then provide insights into how the design may be 
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instantiated in a collaborative IT artifact mediating client-advisor interaction. 
To this end, we will present the prototypical software implementation of 
such an artifact for a multi-touch tabletop device. 
We evaluated our cost transparent artifact design in experimental evaluations 
using this prototypical artifact as follows: as to delimit the utility and 
efficacy of the cost transparency design from features regarding process and 
information transparency, we compared the cost-transparent artifact to a 
similar artifact that implemented general features of process and information 
transparency but lacked cost transparency features [Nussbaumer, P., Matter, 
I., and Schwabe, G. 2012b]. For this purpose, we conducted an experimental 
evaluation using a within-subject design with 12 clients and 2 advisors, 
where client participants passed two advisory settings (treatments) supported 
with the respective artifacts. Differences in client valuation between the 
settings could therefore be ascribed to the differences of the IT artifacts, 
which were only related to cost transparency features. 
The results of our experimental evaluation demonstrate our design’s efficacy 
in improving the client’s perceived understanding and comprehension of 
costs; they also show the positive influence of the artifact’s cost transparency 
features on the client’s general perception of the advisory encounter. On the 
one hand, clients show increased satisfaction with both the advisor and the 
advisory encounter in the cost-transparent setting. On the other hand, and 
supporting Carter and Curry’s [2010] notion of an individual’s economic and 
social perspective on product pricing, our results show that in cost-
transparent settings clients indeed tend to prefer less expensive products 
(economic perspective) but in turn exhibit an increased willingness to pay 
for such encounters (social perspective). Thus, our findings may also 
challenge the common belief of FSPs that transparent, fee-based advisory 
services would neither be accepted by clients nor be economically viable. 
The concept of cost transparency discussed in this essay initially emerged 
from a study on investment advisory encounters [Mogicato et al. 2009]; it 
was further developed in cooperation with à Porta [2010], in context of 
which the prototype system presented in this essay was implemented and 
evaluated. While the latter work focuses on the organizational ramifications 
of (cost-) transparent business models and their effects, this essay focuses on 
the principles of collaborative IT artifact design to enable cost transparency 
in client-advisor encounters. Evaluation results reported herein are based on 
entirely revised and extended analyses of experimental data also reported in 
à Porta [2010]. A shortened and adapted version of this essay was presented 
in Nussbaumer et al. [2012a]. 
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This essay is organized as follows. Section 8.2 introduces some background 
on issues arising from investment advisory encounters lacking (cost) 
transparency. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 present basic design principles of 
enabling transparency in investment advisory encounters with collaborative 
IT artifacts and shows how to apply them for cost-transparent designs. In 
Section 8.5, we will present the prototypical implementation of such a cost-
transparent collaborative artifact; it is then evaluated in Section 8.6. 
Evaluation findings will be discussed in Section 8.7. Finally, the essay will 
be concluded in Section 8.8. 
8.2 Transparency in Investment Advisory Encounters 
In this essay, we exemplarily investigate cost transparency in Swiss 
investment advisory services with a focus on affluent private clients (with an 
approximate investment amount of 50’000 to 500’000 CHF). We chose to 
investigate this segment as it marks the bottom end of the private banking 
market and is, given its potential growth, increasingly considered a lucrative 
market by FSPs [Molyneux and Omarini 2005]. Also, most Swiss FSPs have 
established structured advisory processes to target this growing segment with 
consistent and efficient services. These advisory processes provide 
assistance in defining strategic asset allocations according to the client’s 
needs and risk preference as well as their tactical implementation with 
financial products. We base our insights on investment advisory practice on 
investigations of 37 Swiss financial service providers [Mogicato et al. 2009] 
as well as in-depth interviews and observations in a major Swiss bank. 
8.2.1 Transparency Issues 
In investment advisory service encounters, client-advisor interactions exhibit 
several characteristics that are detrimental to advisory quality. Most 
prominently, the encounter is inherently impacted by information asymmetry 
and interest asymmetry, problems that are well established in scientific 
literature in context of the principal-agent problem [Golec 1992]. 
Information asymmetry results from the client being generally less 
knowledgeable than the advisor – thus, she cannot be sure whether the 
advisor actually gathers and provides all relevant information and 
recommends appropriate solutions for her financial needs. The relation 
between client and advisor can be additionally strained by conflicts of 
interests. Advisors might exploit information asymmetry by, e.g., 
superficially gathering and providing information or, even worse, 
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recommending products that are unsuitable for the specific client’s needs but 
profitable in terms of fees.  
From the client’s perspective, these issues may be characterized by the 
implied lack of transparency. For investment advisory service encounters, 
we may differentiate between process transparency, information 
transparency and cost transparency. Process transparency relates to “the 
degree of the client being able to follow and comprehend the performed 
activities (what constitutes an activity and why is it performed) and their 
succession in advisory [services]” [Nussbaumer and Matter 2011:280]. 
While this entails the comprehensibility of the advisory process, information 
transparency involves two aspects; (1) the clients’ comprehension of which 
information are recorded and for what purpose [Awad and Krishnan 2006], 
as well as (2) the degree of the client being enabled to monitor and 
comprehend the informational basis of decision-making [Nussbaumer, P., 
Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012b]. 
Regarding the recommendation of products (the ultimate goal of investment 
advisory services), we argue that cost transparency is highly relevant. When 
buying or selling financial products, the transaction costs as well as the costs 
associated to a specific product (including direct costs such as initial buy 
charges, sell charges, stamp duties and management fees as well as indirect 
costs like retrocessions or finder’s fees) play a vital role, since these costs 
directly influence the portfolio’s effective return. Providing the client with 
the exact costs of products rather than only with their exchange rates should 
thus allow for a more realistic assessment of product choices and their 
effects and better enable the clients to evaluate the advisor’s 
recommendations. 
In this essay, we conceptualize cost transparency as a facet of the discussed 
second aspect of information transparency, related to the client being 
enabled to monitor and comprehend the information base of the advisory 
encounter. This concept is closely related to price transparency, which is 
concerned with “information revealing the allocation among agents in a 
supply-chain of proceeds from the sale of a product or service” [Carter and 
Curry 2010:760]. Also acknowledging the transparency definition of Kraft 
[2008], we therefore may define cost transparency as the client’s perceived 
degree of information revelation regarding costs and their allocation.  
In investment advisory encounters, the degree of information revelation is 
typically low or inappropriate [Oehler and Kohlert 2009]; precise costs and 
prices are either not available in the encounter or not disclosed (e.g., because 
of interest conflicts), or may be represented in an overly complex manner 
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(inherent to the complex cost structures, e.g., Carlin [2009]). Thus, to 
establish cost information transparency, cost information (1) has to be made 
available in the advisory encounter and (2) be comprehensibly represented 
and included in decision-making.  
8.2.2 Effects of Transparency 
Looking at the diversity of research domains that are concerned with 
transparency, we find a rich body of literature on theoretical benefits and 
effects of transparency. Empirical investigations, however, are rare, 
especially regarding advisory settings. For IS research, we are not aware of 
theoretical, empirical or design-related accounts regarding cost transparency 
in investment advisory services or client-advisor encounters in general.  
For their concepts of increasing the customer’s involvement in service 
encounters, Inbar and Tractinsky [2011] propose that transparency may be 
increased by sharing information with IT. They suggest that establishing 
transparency may positively influence the client’s perception of the service 
encounter and provider (e.g., regarding fairness and integrity, trust and 
satisfaction). In their empirical investigation of buyer-vendor relationships, 
Eggert and Helm [2003] as well conclude that transparency contributes to 
the overall success of a business relationship, delivers value to the customer 
and increases satisfaction.  
Other practical implications may be drawn from the research of Andersson 
and Holm [1998]. They argue that decision makers who are guided by 
“Popperian epistemology” will have a preference for transparency – only if 
information is provided transparently, the individual will be able to 
potentially “falsify” them (analogous to Popper's postulation that scientific 
theories need to be falsifiable). Andersson and Holm [1998] associate such 
preferences with an individual’s suspicion in situations where transparency 
is not warranted, and hypothesize that individuals are more inclined to 
suspect manipulation when falsification of the information at hand is more 
difficult. 
In the behavioral finance literature, preference for transparency has been 
prominently discussed as a behavioral bias of investors, termed “ambiguity 
aversion” [Camerer and Weber 1992]. Research suggests that individuals 
appreciate “ambiguous” situations (having no information about the 
probability distribution) less than “risky” situations (the probability 
distribution of the event is known), and are normally willing to pay to avoid 
ambiguity [Stracca 2004:382]. Carter and Curry [2010] find similar evidence 
in their research on transparent pricing, showing that individuals prefer 
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products with transparent prices (providing allocation of costs to different 
supply-side parties) over their non-transparent counterparts and are willing 
to pay premium prices for such products. 
8.2.3 Cost Transparency 
In Switzerland, regulations on cost disclosure differ depending on the 
relation of client and FSP, i.e., whether the client maintains accounts and 
portfolios without making use of advisory services (“execution only”), 
taking advice but making her own decisions (“investment advice”) or 
completely transfers decision-making to the provider (“asset management 
mandate”) [Roth 2009]. While in all cases FSPs have to fulfill basic duties of 
allegiance, due diligence and information disclosure, they are obliged to 
provide detailed cost information (including financial recompensation) only 
for mandates [FINMA 2008]. 
For European financial markets, the European Commission [2004] passed 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) to establish uniform 
regulations with an emphasis on consumer protection. Generally focusing on 
principles of “best execution”, the directive also demands providing all 
relevant cost information [European Commission 2004:Art. 19, par. 3; Roth 
2007:39]. Oehler and Kohlert [2009] argue, however, that such regulatory 
requirements are too generic and must fail, as they are neither 
comprehensive nor specific enough and make unrealistic assumptions 
regarding the client’s prior knowledge and ability to comprehend the 
provided information [Oehler and Kohlert 2009:98]. The Swiss Federal 
Banking Commission [Eidgenössische Bankenkommission 2008] makes a 
similar point by questioning the usefulness of comprehensive information 
disclosure – indeed, critical analysis of the information would have to be 
performed by the generally less knowledgeable client. 
The clients’ preference for transparency and legislature’s efforts to create 
adequate regulations on transparency, however, seems not to be mirrored in 
FSP’s practice of investment advisory services [Mogicato et al. 2009]. To 
the contrary, Carlin [2009] shows that complexity of financial products tends 
to increase with competition – it is, in fact, a strategy of market participants 
to achieve higher profits. As most clients are not aware of a product’s 
associated costs and their influence on the portfolio’s return or not be able to 
(dynamically) estimate them, enabling transparency is timely – Finra [2009] 
finds this might be a quite general issue, reporting that the majority of 
private investors (in the US) have problems with assessing costs and prices 
of financial products. Thus, the responsibility for such considerations lies 
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with the advisor, who may (or may not) exploit the information asymmetry 
for his or the FSP’s self-interest.  
In a comprehensive study of advisory practice in Swiss banks [Mogicato et 
al. 2009], we found that clients are quite aware of the discussed transparency 
issues, especially concerning the cost structure of advisory services and 
financial products; consistently, in a recent survey, Lechner et al. [2009] 
found that 96% of private banks are aware that clients demand increased 
transparency from them. However, the prevailing lack of such transparency 
results in clients considering financial advisors as being rather untrustworthy 
and being not very confident that advisors present adequate solutions to their 
needs [Mogicato et al. 2009; Nussbaumer et al. 2011]. Indeed – as, for 
example, Bergstresser et al. [2009] have shown – products recommended by 
advisors tend to exhibit higher costs while featuring lower risk-adjusted 
return than products selected by investors themselves. 
The prevailing advisory business model of FSPs in Switzerland (and, 
incidentally, also in Germany and other European countries [Oehler and 
Kohlert 2009]) builds on cross-subsidizing advisory services through product 
and transaction costs (by direct and indirect costs, as discussed above) [Roth 
2007]; while this strategy allows providing advisory services “free-of-
charge”, the actual costs of advice – as included in the product costs – 
remain non-transparent. Though such lack of transparency might negatively 
affect the client-advisor relationship and the client’s resulting satisfaction, 
FSPs are still reluctant regarding alternative business models. Fee-based 
advice, i.e., the client being charged for utilizing advisory services, has been 
discussed long-since and suggested as a solution to interest asymmetries 
[Oehler and Kohlert 2009]. FSPs, however, have been countering such 
models by bringing forward that clients were accustomed to services 
provided free-of-charge and therefore lack willingness to pay for them – for 
a “first-moving” FSP, charging fees could result in competitive 
disadvantages [Mogicato et al. 2009]. 
8.2.4 Cost Transparency and Information Technology 
Cost transparency might also be inhibited by the lack of appropriate tools. 
While, e.g., costs of individual stocks may be easily evaluated according to 
up-to-date printouts of the according fact sheets, such assessments tend to 
get more complex for composite products such as mutual funds, featuring 
multiple cost types. When including the dynamic allocation of several 
products while accounting and optimizing for product and overall portfolio 
costs (including means of comparing different options and presenting their 
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effects for the client’s specific portfolio), the use of pen and paper is clearly 
limited.  
While the typical Swiss FSP provides the advisor with powerful tools to 
prepare client encounters and perform follow-up activities, IT support for 
advisor-client encounters is hardly found. For Swiss advisory practice, 
Schwabe and Nussbaumer [2009] found that none of the 37 surveyed FSPs 
provided their advisors with dedicated tools to be used directly with clients. 
The provided IT’s focus on supporting activities outside the actual client 
encounter is also reflected in standard software – most products lack of 
dedicated in-meeting support other than rotating the monitor screen to let the 
client behold of visualizations. Such setups of ad-hoc inclusion of IT may 
not only expatiate on the information asymmetry between the actors but may 
also increase the inexperienced client’s uncertainty as the visualizations are 
mostly intended for experts (i.e., the advisor) [Inbar and Tractinsky 2011]. 
Likewise, research on IT support of financial advisory services (of which 
investment advisory services are a subset of) often shows an implicit focus 
on supporting the advisor in preparing client solutions [Buhl et al. 2007; 
Eberhardt and Zimmermann 2007; Winkler 2006; Dziarstek et al. 2004]. The 
use of such systems may in fact restrict the advisor in respect to opportunism 
(e.g., recommending products not suitable for the client but attractive to the 
advisors in terms of provisions). However, these systems are designed to be 
used solely by the advisor outside the encounter, i.e., before or after the 
advisory session. As the client cannot actually monitor the advisor’s 
interaction with the information systems, they do not directly contribute to 
enhanced transparency for the client, e.g., in respect of advisory activities, 
the used information and its effects. We find this advisor-centricity to be in 
stark contrast to related domains of sales-based advisory services such as 
travel consultancy, where there has been some research effort regarding in-
situ IT support for joint decision-making of advisor and client [Halloran 
2002; Rodden et al. 2003; Novak and Schwabe 2009]. 
8.3 Transparent Design of Investment Advisory Encounters 
We suggest that the problem areas of investment advisory services (low 
comprehensibility and low perceived quality because of information and 
interest asymmetries) may be attributed to inherent transparency issues 
regarding the activities of the advisory process (process transparency), the 
information used therein and their impacts (information transparency) and, 
as a facet of such information, costs of the service and its products (cost 
transparency). In previous design cycles, we have already developed and 
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refined several design requirements for collaborative IT support to enable 
process and information transparency. Thus, we will base our considerations 
of cost transparency design on the main principles of such IT support 
[Nussbaumer, P., Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012b]. We will briefly 
present these principles and their basic rationales below. 
The most fundamental design principle (DP) relates to information sharing 
between the client and the advisor (DP1: Provide shared information spaces 
for advisor and client in order to allow information access and monitoring of 
actions) and represents the bottom line of enabling IT-mediated client-
advisor interaction. Thereby, the client and advisor should be provided 
shared “informational resources” that both can refer to and make sense of 
[Rodden et al. 2003]. As such, the client should be activated to participate 
and take more responsibility in the process, e.g., by enabling her to (maybe 
autonomously) adapt or change suggestions or recommendations of the 
advisor. 
To enable transparency in investment advisory encounters, the provision of 
shared information spaces is necessary but not sufficient. To cooperate (and 
co-create) with the advisor, the client has to understand and comprehend the 
means and ends, i.e., the advisor’s activities and their goals (DP2: Enable 
client comprehension of advisory activities and their goals in order to 
provide process transparency), e.g., how their initial inputs (needs, 
preferences, financial situation) are related to the final advice (e.g., product 
portfolio). The shared artifact therefore should visualize the activities so the 
client may comprehend intermediate results as well as the final solution to 
her investment problem. 
In traditional pen and paper encounters, advisors may not have complete 
information (e.g., fact sheets of all relevant products) or the latest 
information at hand (e.g., product performances). A supportive artifact 
therefore should enable access to all relevant information with the help of 
integrated information sources (DP3: Support client-advisor interaction with 
adequate information in order to provide information transparency). 
Furthermore, to address the client’s comprehension of information use, 
visualizations of relevant information should be provided as to give feedback 
regarding their purpose and possible effects. 
Clients may find it difficult to relate abstract concepts (such as risk and 
return of investment strategies) to practical impacts regarding their financial 
situation. Thus, the artifact should allow for relating the relevant concepts to 
each other and allow comparing different options (DP4: Provide means of 
comparison in order to enhance comprehension of the process and its 
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information). For example, the client should be enabled to compare the 
effects of her optimized investment strategy with her current situation, 
including the risk-return tradeoffs. This principle adds a further dimension to 
providing process transparency (reflecting the implicit solution strategy of 
advisory activities, i.e., optimization by comparison) and information 
transparency (visualizing effects of provided or adapted information by 
comparing their outcomes).  
Finally, the provided shared information spaces should not restrict clients 
and advisors in performing their favored structuring and enactment of the 
encounter processes, i.e., not imply standardized step-by-step processes but 
allow for adaptations of the advisory process flow according to the specific 
tasks (DP5: Allow actors to customize the advisory course).  
So far, we have been able to apply and refine these design principles in three 
consecutive design cycles, investigating designs and effects of process and 
information transparency [Nussbaumer and Matter 2011; Nussbaumer, P., 
Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012b]. We found advisory encounters provided 
with shared, transparent IT support to be superior compared to their pen and 
paper counterparts; IT support implementing the specified design principles 
relates to significantly improved process and information transparency as 
perceived by the client and significantly increased trustworthiness and client 
satisfaction [Nussbaumer, P., Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012b]. 
8.4 Designing for Cost Transparency 
We have argued above that issues related to cost transparency may also be a 
result of a lack of appropriate IT support in client encounters. With the 
typical product horizon of a FSP, paper-based access to relevant product-
related cost information as well as the dynamic calculation of aggregated 
costs might be too complex or time-consuming, therefore implying support 
with IT artifacts. To investigate our conceptualization of cost transparency, 
we initiated a design cycle based on the design principles presented in the 
previous section. We sought to design an IT artifact that follows the 
objective of addressing the two main requirements of cost transparency, i.e., 
(1) providing transparent cost information access and (2) comprehensibly 
represent and include such information in the advisory situation. Relating to 
the proposed effects of such transparency in the literature, such an artifact 
should positively influence the client-advisor interaction and improve the 
client’s perception thereof. 
While previous artifacts [Nussbaumer and Matter 2011; Nussbaumer, P., 
Matter, I., and Schwabe, G. 2012b] focused on supporting advisory activities 
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to define (strategic) investment strategies, the usage scenario of our cost 
transparency design cycle entailed the collaborative construction of (tactical) 
product portfolios according to a previously defined investment strategy. The 
goal was to allow the client and advisor to browse through available 
products, evaluate and compare them and jointly decide on which products 
to add to the client’s portfolio.  
Since the comprehensive inclusion of all financial products potentially 
available to a FSP client was not feasible for the purpose of prototyping, we 
simplified the artifact’s usage scenario and corresponding design to allow the 
composition and adaptation of product portfolios consisting only of mutual 
funds. Due to their rather uniform cost structure (initial charges, sell charges, 
stamp duties and management fees) and public availability of cost 
information, they also allowed for realistic implementation and evaluation of 
the artifact. In the following, we will re-examine the previous design 
principles from the perspective of cost transparency. 
To establish informational common ground and joint interaction, providing 
shared information spaces for advisor and client (DP1) is a prerequisite. 
While general transparency (e.g., regarding the process and activities) does 
not necessarily imply a technological imperative, we suggest that the 
complexity of dynamic provision of cost information requires this principle 
to be implemented using IT support. As such, cost transparency requires 
incorporation of DP1 in a technological shape to allow provision of dynamic 
cost information as well as to make them jointly available to advisor and 
client. This means that the client should not only be informed of actual costs 
but also be “activated” and enabled to act on the provided information, i.e., 
to incorporate costs in compiling her product portfolio. 
DP2 requires the transparent artifact to make advisory activities and their 
goals comprehensible. Such process transparency seeks to enable the client 
to comprehend the rationales that underlie the advisor’s activities, such as 
choices in product selection. In respect of cost transparency, this principle 
has the extended goal of enabling the client to also comprehend the advisor’s 
rationales regarding product costs. Providing means of advisor monitoring 
through shared information spaces is a prerequisite of clients to comprehend 
the advisor’s actions also regarding their implications on costs.  
Thus, to enable the client to transparently assess the financial impacts of 
decisions (e.g., buying or selling specific products), she must be enabled to 
monitor the specific costs of the emerging solution. DP3 generally seeks to 
transparently provide the client with the advisor’s informational basis (e.g., 
presenting internal information of the FSP as well as client information) and 
8. Essay III: Designing for Cost Transparency in Investment Advisory Service Encounters 
198 
the influence and effects of this information on the advisory process and its 
result. As such, the principle emphasizes on the implied increase of client 
comprehension, e.g., when providing information material on the mechanics 
of asset classes or interactively showing the influence of the client’s marital 
status on her tax burden. Thus, providing transparent cost information may 
facilitate client learning of cost structures of products in different asset 
classes. However, interactively presenting product cost effects (e.g., on total 
costs or net portfolio return) also effectively addresses one of the main 
problems of advisory services, i.e., the potential opportunism of advisors. 
Being provided with shared information spaces, the client is not only enabled 
to monitor the advisor’s action but also to evaluate them in terms of costs, 
restricting the advisor in, e.g., opportunistically recommending profitable but 
unsuitable products. Above, we have defined the provision of cost 
information as a special facet of information transparency – including cost 
information, however, extends the goal of DP3 of information provision for 
increased client comprehension towards client empowerment to evaluate 
(and thus “falsify”) the advisor’s recommendations. 
Putting an emphasis on the “falsification” of advisor actions and 
recommendations also affects DP4. In respect to process transparency and 
general information transparency, means of comparison allow the client to 
better comprehend the advisor’s actions and their rationale. For example, 
comparison of the projected risk and return performance of the current 
investment strategy with the projected performance of the recommended 
optimization provides the client with a general indication of potential effects. 
In contrast, cost transparency should allow comparison of recommendations’ 
definite effects by providing detailed cost information of individual products 
and aggregated costs for created portfolios.  
In respect of process adaptability required by DP5, introducing cost 
transparency should not interfere with the course of the advisory encounter. 
Transparency of costs should be enabled in a way that allows the client to 
monitor contextual cost information at any time and independent from 
advisory activities. 
8.5 Prototypical Implementation 
Analogous to previous design cycles [Nussbaumer, P., Matter, I., and 
Schwabe, G. 2012b], we instantiated the design principles discussed in the 
previous section in a software application for the Microsoft Surface tabletop 
device, supporting the interaction scenario depicted in Figure 8-1. While 
providing a shared application constitutes the basis of fulfilling the artifact’s 
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first objective – providing access to cost information –, the particular design 
of how to provide such access in an understandable and comprehensible 
way, as demanded by the second objective, is important. In the following, we 
will therefore provide some details on the design implementation along the 
underlying design principles. 
We designed the basic interaction of the artifact to allow collaborative 
creation of a product portfolio according to a specific (previously defined) 
investment strategy. To this end, client and advisor are provided with a 
shared information space (DP1) that mediates their encounter and allows 
both actors to interact on common ground and monitor each other’s actions.  
The application’s basic information space (Figure 8-2) is divided into the 
advisor’s solution space (products; Figure 8-2, B) and the client’s problem 
space (product portfolio with cost information; Figure 8-2, C) as well as a 
“transition space” for evaluating and comparing specific products (Figure 
8-2, A) before adding them to the client portfolio. Generally, both the client 
and the advisor may interact with all application spaces via touch interaction; 
as he is both the domain and the tool expert, however, it is assumed that the 
advisor is the application’s primary user and leads the client through the 
course of portfolio construction. Still, the shared information space allows 
the client to monitor the advisor’s actions and take corrective action at any 
time (DP1, DP2). 
 
Figure 8-1: Collaborative client-advisor interaction, mediated by Microsoft Surface24 
tabletop 
The application allows constructing individual portfolios by adding and 
removing products (mutual funds) according to different asset classes 
                                           
24
 http://www.microsoft.com/surface 
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(shares, bonds and real estate; Figure 8-2, B). When selecting an asset class, 
the associated products are presented in the “transition space” as cards that 
may be freely arranged and oriented (Figure 8-2, A). The cards are used to 
compare products (DP4) based on several information dimensions (see 
below). Once a product is selected, it is listed in the client’s product portfolio 
(Figure 8-2, C) along with the portfolio’s total costs. Thereby, the costs of all 
products in the portfolio are summed up and categorized into one-time and 
recurring costs. This allows showing effects of adding and removing 
products from the portfolio, enabling the client to better comprehend and 
understand the consequences of such changes (DP3). As for the client to see 
relevant portfolio cost information and include them into her decision 
making, the portfolio’s cost information is visible at any time.  
 
Figure 8-2: Overview of the prototype application – (A) product “cards” to compare 
different products, (B) selection of products, (C) current product portfolio 
As already indicated above, all available products of the different asset 
classes are displayed as cards (Figure 8-2, A) that feature several information 
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categories. To satisfy the general requirement of information transparency 
(DP3), each product card includes a short description and basic information 
about the exchange rates and net performance (Figure 8-3, II) as well as 
performance graphs (Figure 8-3, I). This information should support the 
client and advisor in evaluating the products’ appropriateness for the client’s 
portfolio, e.g., in regard to risk and return.  
 
Figure 8-3: Information provided by product cards - (I) performance view, (II) main 
view: general information (product description, figures on exchange rate and net 
performance) (III) cost structure 
Cost information is made available on a separate card tab (Figure 8-3, III), 
displaying the cost structure of the product with all relevant partial and 
aggregated costs (initial buy charges, sell charges, stamp duties and 
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management fees). Furthermore, the tab allows partial and total costs of a 
product to be calculated for a specific (adaptable) investment amount. Such 
calculation of effective product costs allows quick comparison (DP3) of 
products independent from the actual portfolio, i.e., without adding and 
removing products and changing the portfolio. To evaluate their actual 
influence on the total portfolio costs, however, the users may also easily add 
and remove products to and from the portfolio. Thereby, the client should be 
enabled to better assess the cost factors of different financial products and 
their differences, also stimulating her to discuss potential ambiguities with 
her advisor or “falsify” his recommendations.  
Our prototype design incorporates relevant cost information as contextual 
information that is attached to the advisory encounter’s main objects of 
interest, i.e., the products and the portfolio. While the current summary of 
portfolio costs is visible at any time, information on product costs on the 
respective cards has to be actively selected – it is in the actors’ discretion to 
investigate and discuss the information or not. As such, the integrated cost 
information does not require additional advisory activities or a particular 
order of activities (DP5). 
8.6 Experimental Evaluation 
In the previous sections, we have presented the build activities of our design 
cycle. We re-examined general design principles for client-advisor 
interaction to also account for cost transparency and demonstrated the 
feasibility of implementing them in a software artifact. 
Regarding the evaluate activity of design science endeavors, there is 
agreement among researchers that design science artifacts have to be 
rigorously evaluated by appropriate methods [Hevner et al. 2004; March and 
Smith 1995; Witte 1997] to demonstrate their utility, quality, and efficacy 
[Hevner et al. 2004:16]. Thereby, the artifact’s performance should be 
evaluated against its design goals and objectives rather than only its specific 
(technological) features [Hevner et al. 2004:78; Peffers et al. 2007:56; March 
and Smith 1995:254]. 
Several methods have been proposed such evaluation of design artifacts, 
including observational (case or field) studies, action research, surveys, 
analytical analyses, functional or structural testing, descriptive 
argumentation and experimental techniques such as controlled experiments 
or simulation [Hevner et al. 2004:18; Cleven et al. 2009:4; Riege et al. 2009; 
Siau and Rossi 2011]. To validate design artifacts against conjectures about 
the outcome the designer sought to improve, experimental techniques like 
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controlled experiments are useful; these allow measuring the degree to which 
the design objectives have been achieved [Briggs and Schwabe 2011]. In this 
context, conjectures contrast the value of some dependent variable (e.g., 
satisfaction) across treatments that instantiate differing values of an 
independent variable. In design science research, one treatment often relates 
to using the designed artifact, whereas other treatments may include 
previously designed technological artifacts or control conditions featuring no 
technological artifact [Briggs and Schwabe 2011:7]. 
We designed and implemented our software artifact along the design 
objective of enabling cost transparency in financial advisory encounters and 
according to conjectures regarding the positive effects of such transparency 
suggested by the literature. Experimental techniques provide appropriate 
means to evaluate the artifact and the associated conjectures of its efficacy 
and effects in a controlled environment. The experimental setting allowed us 
to simulate advisory encounters comparably well, as we could build 
scenarios that mirrored actual encounters between clients and advisors, 
including realistic tasks and their duration. By additionally employing actual 
investment advisors, we could evaluate the artifact in a quasi-natural but 
controllable environment. 
To be able to delimit the specific utility and efficacy of our cost-transparent 
instantiation from the general features of process and information 
transparency, we built our experiment upon two different settings 
(treatments). Thereby, one treatment related to using the artifact that 
instantiated cost transparency, whereas the second treatment related to an 
analogous software artifact that only instantiated the general principles of 
information and process transparency. Differences in client valuation 
between the settings could therefore be ascribed to the differences of the IT 
artifacts, which were only related to cost transparency features. 
8.6.1 Conjectures 
The presented artifact was developed along the design objective of 
improving cost transparency in client-advisor encounters. The most basic 
conjecture of our evaluation relates to the artifact’s fulfillment of this 
objective. As the designed artifact makes available all relevant cost 
information, it may be objectively referred to as being cost-transparent. 
Along our definition of cost transparency as the “client’s perceived degree of 
information revelation regarding costs and their allocation”, we assume that 
the designed artifact will also improve the clients’ subjective perception of 
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cost transparency, i.e., improve her understanding and perceived 
comprehensibility of cost information: 
C0: Clients advised with an IT artifact implementing cost transparency 
features will show improved understanding and perceived 
comprehensibility of product costs than clients advised with an IT artifact 
not implementing cost transparency features. 
Based on the discussion of proposed transparency effects in the literature 
(Section 8.2.2), we may also state some conjectures regarding the expected 
influence of the cost-transparent artifact design. Literature suggests that 
individuals will prefer transparent alternatives [Camerer and Weber 1992; 
Andersson and Holm 1998]. Furthermore, in our exploratory research we 
found that clients often ascribe their discontent with advisory services to a 
lack of transparency [Mogicato et al. 2009]; by implication, we assume that 
clients will prefer cost transparent advice over its non-transparent 
counterpart, and – along Eggert and Helm’s [2003] observation that 
(relationship) transparency might increase client satisfaction – find both the 
encounter as well as the advisor more satisfying. The according conjectures 
read as follows: 
C1.1: Clients advised with an IT artifact implementing cost transparency 
features will show higher satisfaction regarding the advisory encounter 
than clients advised with an IT artifact not implementing cost 
transparency features. 
C1.2: Clients advised with an IT artifact implementing cost transparency 
features will show higher satisfaction regarding the advisor than clients 
advised with an IT artifact not implementing these cost transparency 
features. 
FSPs are not very eager to provide cost transparent advisory services 
because of their implied effects on existing business models. Research on 
price transparency [Carter and Curry 2010], however, suggests that clients 
not only prefer transparent settings but may also be willing to pay premium 
prices compared to non-transparent scenarios. We therefore assume that 
clients will show higher willingness to pay for cost-transparent advisory 
settings: 
C2: Clients advised with an IT artifact implementing cost transparency 
features will show higher willingness to pay for the advisory service than 
clients advised with an IT artifact not implementing cost transparency 
features. 
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8.6.2 Method 
Participants. Our evaluation involved 12 clients and 2 advisors from a 
medium-size Swiss bank. We determined the sample size by applying power 
analysis as suggested in the literature [Baroudi and Orlikowski 1989; 
O’Keefe 2007]. We calculated the sample size of 12 client participants using 
G*Power 3 [Faul et al. 2007] according to an assumed large effect size of dz 
= 0.9 (with an assumed mean difference and standard deviation of 1 and 
correlation of 0.4), an error probability (α) of .05 and a test power (1-β) of 
.80.  
As getting access to FSPs’ affluent clients proved prohibitively difficult 
because of confidentiality issues, we chose to acquire the client participants 
by recruiting them from a university forum (offering 20 CHF as 
compensation for a test duration of approximately one hour). Such 
convenience sampling, where participants partake in studies based on self-
selection, is one of the most common sampling techniques [Lunsford and 
Lunsford 1995; Trochim 2006]. As opposed to random sampling, using 
convenience sampling does not provide all members of a target population 
an equal chance of being selected; thus, the participants may per se not be 
assumed to fully represent the target population. This may result in low 
external validity of a study. For our evaluation purposes – based on findings 
and propositions in the literature [Andersson and Holm 1998; Eggert and 
Helm 2003] – we argue that preference for transparency is a general feature 
of (ambiguity-averse) individuals and, thus, recruiting participants by 
convenience sampling should not excessively constrain (external) validity. 
The recruited participants (9 of them being students) were between 21 and 
48 years of age, 5 of them being female, 7 being male. All of them reported 
high proficiency in computer use (4 participants categorized themselves as 
being professional users, 8 as advanced users); only 5 of them indicated that 
they were experienced with mutual funds.  
Procedure. The test procedure consisted of two subtests. One test involved 
the usage of the prototype application presented in Section 8.5, providing all 
relevant cost information features (setting T1). The benchmark test (setting 
T0) involved a similar application, instantiating the basic design principles 
discussed in Section 8.4 and implementing the same GUI and interaction 
design as the artifact in T1, but not providing cost information features and 
associated functionalities: all cost information as shown in Figure 8-2 (C) 
and Figure 8-3 (III) were removed. 
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For both treatments, the clients and advisors received the task of compiling 
product portfolios of mutual funds with the prototype application (see 
below). The client participants passed through both settings, each being 
limited to 20min. After their trials, the client participants completed a 
quantitative questionnaire and were then asked to give feedback on their 
impressions. 
To effectively counterbalance potential biases in respect of the succession of 
treatments, we randomized the order of experimental conditions [Lazar et al. 
2010:50–51]. Thus, we randomly assigned one half of the client participants 
to the sequence T0T1 and the other half to the sequence T1T0. Thereby, they 
were also randomly assigned to a specific combination of advisor and setting 
(e.g., each client starting with “advisor 1 – T0” would afterwards be exposed 
to “advisor 2 – T1” and vice versa). Differences in client valuation between 
the encounters could therefore be ascribed, ceteris paribus, to the 
manipulation of the artifact’s provision of cost information features. 
On arrival, client participants received a short introduction (10min), 
including instructions about their task and financial profile. To allow for 
comparison and prevent participants from disclosing their actual financial 
situation, clients received key figures of a fictional financial background 
(Table 8-1).  
Table 8-1: Client Profile 
Investment sum CHF 200’000 
Investment horizon 10 years 
Investment goal Achieve returns that are as high as possible 
Risk preference 
Aggressive (on a 5-point scale “cautious – conservative – moderate – 
pro-active – aggressive”) 
Risk ability 
Increased (on a 5-point scale “low – limited – normal – increased – 
high”) 
Asset allocation 60% shares; 25% bonds; 15% real estate 
They were requested to perform their tasks according to these figures. 
Furthermore, they were advised that the sessions would “differ regarding the 
available information”. In the sessions, the client’s main task was to create a 
product portfolio of three mutual funds (one per asset class), matching the 
given asset allocation and achieving high returns. For each asset class, the 
client could choose between two funds that featured similar investment 
objectives, one being actively managed (and therefore more costly), and the 
other being passively managed. To establish realistic conditions, we based 
all information of the available products (12 in total) on existent mutual 
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funds, whereas we altered their names to avoid experienced clients 
recognizing them. 
To achieve variation in client product choice and minimize learning effects 
between the settings, we implemented the following alterations between the 
settings: for asset class “shares”, the client participants had to decide on one 
of three categories (Swiss market, global market, and emerging markets) 
before each session, whereas for each setting they had to choose a different 
category. For asset class “bonds” the actively managed product and for “real 
estate” the passively managed product was changed between the settings. 
The two participating financial advisors were briefed regarding the client 
profiles (information listed in Table 8-1) and the use of the software artifact. 
Their main task was to support (“advise”) the clients in choosing appropriate 
products according to their profile. The advisor’s goal for each session was 
to “satisfy” the client so she would recommend the encounter to others. Each 
advisor performed six advisory sessions in setting T0 as well as six in T1. 
For the different settings, the advisors were given the following additional 
tasks: 
 T0: avoid discussions about costs, try to sell actively managed 
products  
 T1: ensure that cost information is comprehensible for the client 
(making her aware that costs reduce overall returns) 
Apparatus. Both treatments of our evaluation were conducted using the 
Microsoft Surface 1.0 tabletop system (see also Figure 8-1). Thereby, each 
setting was supported with a dedicated tabletop system running the 
respective prototype application (providing cost information features / not 
providing cost information features).  
Design and Analysis. The experimental evaluation followed a within-
subjects design with the prototype version (providing cost information 
features / not providing cost information features) as the main experimental 
factor. We opted for this experimental design as it provides a more effective 
isolation of individual differences of the participants from the main effects. 
Compared to between-subject designs they are also considered more 
powerful, while requiring smaller sample size [Lazar et al. 2010:55–51]. 
The quantitative client questionnaire included measurements to test our main 
conjectures and client preferences (see below) as well demographic items 
(age, gender, job/education, advisory experience, IT skills). In addition to the 
quantitative questionnaire, we also asked the client participants to give 
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feedback on their impressions (differences, preferences) of the two settings 
as well as their experience regarding the sessions’ IT support.  
As suggested above, providing cost information through transparent shared 
information spaces already fulfilled the artifact’s first objective of making 
cost information accessible. To investigate the artifact’s efficacy in fulfilling 
the second objective – providing such access in an understandable and 
comprehensible way (Conjecture 0) –, however, the artifact’s utility in 
improving the clients’ cost-related perception had to be considered. We 
surveyed the clients’ perception of cost transparency using three Likert 
items. Thereby, the clients were asked to assess the different settings’ 
influence on (1) their subjective understanding of the product structure (“I 
understand the cost structure of the selected products.”), (2) their awareness 
of the actual product costs (“I am aware of what the selected products cost.”) 
as well as (3) their perceived comprehensibility of the provided cost 
information (“I found the cost information comprehensible.”). 
To measure satisfaction with each advisory session (Conjecture 1.1), we 
used items from the Yield Shift Theory of Satisfaction [Briggs et al. 2008]. 
The client’s overall satisfaction with the advisors of the two sessions 
(Conjecture 1.2) was operationalized with a single item (“Overall, I was 
satisfied with the advisor.”). All constructs were measured using as seven-
point Likert items (ranging from 1 = “I strongly disagree” to 7 = “I strongly 
agree”). The participants’ willingness to pay for each performed advisory 
session (Conjecture 2) was prompted with the following item: “How much 
of your investment amount of CHF 200’000 would you be willing to pay for 
the received advisory service?“. 
To investigate client preferences, the questionnaire also included conjoint 
measures. We conducted a rank-ordering conjoint-analysis on how the 
participants would trade-off the following aspects: (1) costs of advisory 
(“advisory session is free of charge” vs. “advisory service costs CHF 250 per 
hour”); (2) advisor’s interests (“advisor adheres to his own interests” vs. 
“advisor adheres to the client’s interests); (3) transparency of product costs 
(“product costs are not communicated” vs. “product costs are 
communicated”). The participant’s valuation of these aspects was tested 
using a complete factorial plan (2 x 2 x 2 = 8 different alternatives), where 
the participants were requested to sort the given alternatives according to 
their perceived utility (attributing “1” to the advisory alternative having the 
greatest perceived utility and “8” to the advisory alternative with the smallest 
perceived utility).  
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We analyzed the collected data as follows. To test our conjectures, we 
compared the ratings of the two treatments with dependent t-tests
25
 (two-
tailed) for normally distributed differences. All but two differences between 
the dependent scores proved to follow normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk, p 
> .081 for all differences). For items with non-normally distributed 
differences – “willingness to pay” (Shapiro-Wilk, p < .001) and “awareness 
of product costs” (Shapiro-Wilk, p = .02) – we applied Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks tests.  
All p-values of the statistical tests were corrected for multiple comparisons 
using the Benjamini-Hochberg procedure [Benjamini and Hochberg 1995]. 
The correction also accounted for non-significant results. To provide an 
objective measure of importance, we also calculated effect sizes for all 
statistical significant findings (Cohen’s d for dependent t-tests, r for 
Wilcoxon tests). To eliminate the alternative explanation that higher ratings 
were related to one advisor generally outperforming the other, we 
additionally evaluated the overall satisfaction of the participants with the two 
advisors. Since the ratings for the different advisors were not normally 
distributed (Shapiro-Wilk), we conducted a Wilcoxon test to investigate the 
differences. The rank-ordering conjoint-analysis was performed using the 
respective feature of SPSS 19.  
In addition to the quantitative questionnaire, all client participants were 
debriefed in semi-structured interviews that incorporated four questions, 
regarding (a) the perceived differences between the settings, (b) which 
setting they would recommend to others, (c) whether they asked the advisor 
about costs and why (not), and (d) their general experience regarding the 
provided IT support. The debriefings were audio-taped, transcribed and their 
answers summarized. Similar to the method of thematic coding [Flick 
2007:402], we analyzed the single participants’ answers for thematic 
structures and compared and aggregated the emerging topics for all 
interviews.  
8.6.3 Results 
We present the results of our evaluation along our conjectures regarding the 
clients perceived cost transparency, satisfaction and willingness to pay. We 
then provide results of the conjoint analysis and figures on differences in the 
total costs of the portfolios composed in the different advisory settings.  
                                           
25
  We thus implicitly assume that the responses to the Likert items can be treated 
interval. Non-parametric tests lead to the same results.  
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Perceived cost transparency. In our design considerations we assumed that 
making available cost information through the shared artifact should increase 
cost transparency. Indeed, in the evaluation client participants found that the 
costs of their selected products were more understandable in the cost-
transparent setting T1 (Figure 8-4; M = 6.00, SD = 0.85) compared to setting 
T0 which excluded all cost information features (M = 2.83, SD = 1.75). 
Results of a two-sided dependent t-test shows this difference to be 
significant with large effect size (t(11) = -5.162, p = .001, d = 2.44).  
 
Figure 8-4: Perceived understanding of cost structure 
Also, the participants’ agreement of being aware of the selected products’ 
costs (Figure 8-5; T0: M = 2.58, SD = 1.98; T1: M = 6.50, SD = 0.67) was 
significantly higher for the cost-transparent situation with large effect size, 
as confirmed by the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Z = -2.865, p 
= .008, r = -.58).  
Regarding the artifact design’s efficacy in providing cost transparency in an 
understandable manner, we also measured the client’s perception of the 
provided information’s comprehensibility. Supporting our conjecture, results 
show that client participants found cost information provision very 
comprehensible for the cost-transparent situation (Figure 8-6; T0: M = 2.42, 
SD = 1.83; T1: M = 6.00, SD = 0.95), showing a significant difference 
compared to the non-transparent setting with large effect size (t(11) = -5.555, 
p = .001, d = 2.58).  
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Figure 8-5: Perceived understanding of actual product costs 
To gain qualitative argumentation from the participants, we also asked them 
for feedback on their experience. Observing the sessions, we found that only 
three of six participants passing the sessions in the sequence T1T0 asked 
about costs in T0 (featuring no cost information). 
 
Figure 8-6: Perceived comprehensibility of cost information 
In their feedback, however, those who had asked for cost information voiced 
their dissatisfaction with the advisors’ answers. They criticized that the 
advisor just “read out some numbers from a sheet of paper”, which was 
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insufficient for them to make a decision. Two of the three participants, who 
did not ask about the costs in T0, said that they – after having already 
experienced T1 – felt confident of being able to estimate the costs 
themselves. Interestingly, most of the participants passing the sessions in the 
sequence T0T1 mentioned that they had not realized that the advisor of T0 
had kept back cost information until they passed T1. 
Satisfaction. Satisfaction with the advisory session (Figure 8-7; T0: M = 
4.60, SD = 1.39; T1: M = 5.98, SD = 0.79) as well as the overall satisfaction 
with the advisor (Figure 8-8; T0: M = 4.58, SD = 1.62; T1: M = 6.00, SD = 
0.74) were rated lower for T0 (non-transparent regarding costs) than for T1 
(cost-transparent). The results of the two-sided dependent t-test indicate 
significant differences for both satisfaction regarding the session (t(11) = -
3.718, p = .009, d = 1.26) and the overall satisfaction with the session’s 
advisor (t(11) = -3.559, p = .007, d = 1.20) with large effects. Hence, 
according to our data we may maintain conjecture C1.1 and C1.2. To 
eliminate the alternative explanation that higher satisfaction ratings might be 
related to one advisor generally outperforming the other, we sorted the 
participant’s satisfaction ratings by advisor (advisor 1: M = 5.75, SD = 1.14; 
advisor 2: M = 4.83, SD = 1.59). A Wilcoxon test did not show any 
significant differences between the advisor ratings, i.e., one advisor did not 
significantly outperform the other. 
 
Figure 8-7: Mean satisfaction regarding advisory session 
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Figure 8-8: Mean satisfaction regarding advisor 
In their feedbacks, all twelve participants indicated that they would clearly 
recommend the advisory session featuring all relevant cost information (T1). 
The specific explanations of their recommendation, however, were different. 
Four participants preferred T1 because they felt “better informed”. Two felt 
that T1 was “more transparent” than T0. One participant mentioned that, 
while in T0 the advisor “was beating around the bush”, session T1 better 
enabled advisor and client to “talk about facts”. Four clients based their 
recommendation on the perception that the advisor in T1 was more 
competent. 
Willingness to pay. Figure 8-9 shows the means of the participants’ 
willingness to pay for T0 and T1. While the average willingness to pay for 
T0 was CHF 503, the participants were willing to pay CHF 1’485 for T1. 
The large standard deviation of T1 (T0: SD = 616.13; T1: SD = 2’766.76) is 
salient, but can be explained by the large variations (the differences between 
T0 and T1 ranged from CHF 0 to CHF 8’000).  
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Figure 8-9: Willingness to pay 
If we exclude one outlier (difference between the two answers: CHF 8’000), 
the differences between T0 and T1 (Figure 8-10, T0: M = 366.36, SD = 
415.87; T1: M = 710.91, SD = 714.71) are significant (Z = -2.371, p = .020, r 
= -.48) with a large effect size. We therefore also may maintain conjecture 
C2. 
 
Figure 8-10: Willingness to pay without outlier 
Conjoint analysis. The rank-ordering conjoint analysis (see Figure 8-11) 
shows that the participants value the advisor’s interest the most (49%). 
Valued with 27.6%, also cost transparency seems to be more important for 
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the participants than the advisory service being free-of-charge (23.4%). 
Utilities of the different aspects are depicted in Table 8-2.  
 
Figure 8-11: Importance of advisory aspects as valued by the participants 
Though the sample size of the rank-ordering conjoint-analysis is too small to 
allow for general assumptions about the value systems of FSP clients, it 
provides interesting insights about how the participants trade off the different 
aspects.  
Table 8-2: Utilities of advisory aspects 
Aspect Utility Estimate Std. Error 
Interests advisor adheres to his own interests - 1.687 0.085 
  advisor adheres to the client’s interests 1.687 0.085 
Transparency product costs are not communicated -0.958 0.085 
  product costs are communicated 0.958 0.085 
Cost  free of charge 0.813 0.085 
  250 CHF per hour -0.813 0.085 
(Constant) 2.500 0.085 
For each advisory session the assembled portfolio was saved. Analyzing 
these portfolios, we find that for T0 63.9% of the chosen products were 
actively managed (and therefore more costly), whereas for T1 only 27.8% of 
the chosen products were actively managed (difference between T0 and T1: -
36.1%). Only considering portfolios of clients inexperienced with mutual 
funds, the amount of actively managed products decreases by -52% – for 
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experienced clients, however, we only find a difference of -13%. 
Accordingly, the calculated portfolio costs per year (including issuing 
commission and redemption commission; Figure 8-12) are higher for T0 
(T0: M = 6395.25, SD = 2839.56) than for T1 (T1: M = 3577.58, SD = 
2355.79). A two-sided dependent t-test indicated that this difference is 
significant (t(11) = 2.946, p = .017, d = 1.08) with a large effect size.  
 
Figure 8-12: Total costs of selected portfolios (Swiss francs per year) 
The participants’ feedback on the IT support was mainly positive, with only 
two participants stating that they disliked the tool. One of them regarded 
himself as “old-fashioned” and would have preferred a paper-based advisory 
service. The other criticized the low resolution of the tabletop device and 
thus also would have preferred a paper-based or PC-based advisory 
encounter. The remaining ten participants, however, showed a very positive 
attitude toward the provided IT support. One participant described the 
advisory encounter as being very goal-oriented, thus greatly simplifying the 
investment decision, whereas another one emphasized on the provided 
transparency and comprehensibility – enabling the client to observe the 
advisor’s actions at any time. Lastly, one participant expressed his attitude as 
follows: “Why such tools are not already used in the daily business?” 
8.7 Discussion 
In this essay, we have argued that issues of process, information and cost 
transparency may be adequately addressed with collaborative and transparent 
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IT artifacts. Instantiating design principles that have been developed and 
refined in previous design cycles, we presented how cost transparency may 
be supported by example of a prototypical tabletop application. We then 
investigated the efficacy and utility of our cost-transparent design in an 
experimental evaluation. 
Looking at the results, we can see that the cost transparency features of our 
artifact design indeed improved the clients’ understanding and perceived 
comprehension of costs. Also, we found that cost transparency also 
influences client-advisor interaction and the client’s perception thereof; 
supporting the client-advisor encounter with a cost-transparent artifact 
relates to significantly increased client satisfaction with the situation and the 
advisor as well as increased willingness to pay. Thus, we may maintain all 
conjectures posed in Section 8.6.1. 
Cost transparency. We defined the two main objectives of our designed 
artifact to (1) provide access to cost information and (2) to comprehensibly 
represent and include the information into the advisory situation. Based on 
several generic design principles, we have presented an artifact design that 
fulfills the first objective by providing shared information spaces, allowing 
clients to access cost information in the advisory encounter. Regarding the 
second objective, in our evaluation we could also show that the design also 
succeeded in providing cost information in a comprehensible way. While the 
large differences between the settings might seem quite obvious – after all, 
for the non-transparent setting clients rated their understanding and 
comprehensibility based on being provided no cost information at all –, also 
the absolute ratings of the cost-transparent setting’s comprehensibility were 
very high (with mean ratings of 6.00). 
Client satisfaction. We have argued that in investment advisory services 
cost transparency issues may inhibit advisory quality and may lead to client 
dissatisfaction [Mogicato et al. 2009; Oehler and Kohlert 2009]. Research 
suggests that clients might not only prefer transparent situations [Camerer 
and Weber 1992; Carter and Curry 2010], since they are less “ambiguous” 
and therefore easier to “falsify”, but also perceive them as more satisfying 
[Eggert and Helm 2003]. The results of our evaluation support such notions, 
showing that the presence of an artifact providing cost information may 
increase client satisfaction. Indeed, we find significant differences with large 
effect sizes in the client’s ratings of both the advisory session as well as the 
according advisor – in this regard, it is important to note that the clients’ 
satisfaction with the advisor increased with the cost-transparent setting, i.e., 
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their satisfaction was not based on specific characteristics of the advisor but 
the presence of cost information.  
Willingness to pay. Our results clearly support the conjecture that 
transparency might increase the client’s willingness to pay for advice – the 
evaluation shows that the client’s willingness to pay significantly increased 
in the advisory settings using our cost-transparent artifact. Looking at the 
large effects regarding the decrease of effective portfolio costs in the 
transparent setting, the willingness to pay is justified from an economic 
perspective. However, the client’s “social perspective” on pricing [Carter 
and Curry 2010] might also influence such behavior – from this perspective, 
the rather high willingness to pay may result from the client rewarding the 
advisor’s transparent and “fair” advice.  
The client’s willingness to pay may be one fundamental premise for FSPs to 
abandon today’s practice of cross-subsidizing advisory services with product 
and transaction costs. The participants of our evaluation were indeed willing 
to pay for the received advisory services, even for the setting that did not 
feature cost transparency. We cannot, however, estimate possible effects of 
the IT artifacts on the client’s perception – with 10 of 12 participants 
positively evaluating the artifacts, we cannot rule out positive effects on their 
willingness to pay for both settings. Furthermore, even though being 
significantly higher for the cost-transparent setting, the amount clients are 
willing to pay clearly fails to draw level with the FSP’s potential gains from 
the client’s portfolio costs (see Figure 8-12). However, as our conjoint 
analysis exemplarily shows, the clients might also be willing to pay for 
advice on a recurring basis (e.g., per hour). Indeed, compared to the 
advisor’s interests and cost transparency of the encounter, clients valued 
advisory costs as rather unimportant. These preferences are compatible with 
the participants’ reported willingness to pay: clients were willing to pay 
much higher fees for the encounter that was cost-transparent and thus less 
asymmetric. Contrary to the FSPs beliefs, this may indicate that the client’s 
willingness to pay is not the main obstacle of alternative business models. 
Furthermore, given that active clients typically seek advice several times a 
year, fee-based but transparent advisory models may indeed be economically 
viable (presuming that in such scenarios cross-subsidization will decrease).  
We conclude the discussion with some remarks on potential limitations. 
While the design principles have been developed and refined in several 
design iterations, they are general in nature and provide only few 
implications on their actual implementation in an IT artifact. For example, 
our artifact’s “card” metaphor to allow for comparison of multiple products 
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is only one of many possibilities to provide such functionality. It is therefore 
important to acknowledge that each instantiation of an artifact supporting 
collaborative, (cost) transparent client-advisor interaction may greatly differ 
in appearance and usability; furthermore, from our experimental evaluation, 
we may not conclude that our implementation was “optimal” or superior to 
other potential design instantiations. This also applies to the cost information 
we decided to implement and visualize – while we were eager to design the 
information architecture along standard FSPs brochures available to clients, 
the selection of relevant cost information was subject to our restriction on 
mutual funds. 
Other limitations are related to our evaluation design. We carefully designed 
our experimental evaluations regarding the test design and its estimated 
effects based on power analysis and controlled for the influence of 
advisor/setting combinations by balancing client assignment to the different 
treatments. We acknowledge, however, that the majority of client 
participants were students rather than “real” investors. We argue, however, 
that preference for transparency is a general feature of ambiguity-averse 
individuals [Andersson and Holm 1998], such that our results may also be 
applicable to the “population” of investors. Also, we did not find differences 
between the ratings of experienced clients and their inexperienced 
counterparts. To be sure, the test setting and the sample size are not qualified 
to reliably control for such effects – we suggest that further research should 
investigate possible variances according to such client characteristics. 
8.8 Conclusion 
In this essay, we have discussed several transparency issues that occur in 
investment advisory service encounters, putting an emphasis on cost 
transparency. Building upon tried design principles, we implemented a 
prototypical IT artifact, exemplarily enabling cost-transparent composition 
of product portfolios. We evaluated the application’s utility and efficacy in 
experimental evaluations and according to four conjectures. Results show 
that the artifact’s transparent provision of cost information indeed increases 
the client’s perception understanding and comprehension of costs, influences 
the client’s satisfaction with the advisory encounter (and the advisor) as well 
as relates to significantly increased willingness to pay for the service 
received. Analogous to similar evaluations [Nussbaumer, P., Matter, I., and 
Schwabe, G. 2012b], feedback on the IT artifact was very positive, 
suggesting that IT-supported advisory encounters may be accepted by 
advisors and clients alike. Clients showed significantly increased satisfaction 
8. Essay III: Designing for Cost Transparency in Investment Advisory Service Encounters 
220 
with the advisor in the cost-transparent setting, some of them even 
perceiving him as more competent. Thus, contrary to the popular 
argumentation of advisors that using IT in client encounters would 
negatively influence the client-advisor interaction [Schwabe and 
Nussbaumer 2009], IT might even improve the client’s perception of the 
advisor. 
We have motivated this essay from observations of Swiss investment 
advisory services. However, the design research question of cost 
transparency and its utility are not limited to the Swiss market. We argue that 
information and interest asymmetries are general features of investment 
advisory services – e.g., even fee-based advisory concepts (which are more 
prevalent outside of Switzerland) may be strained by principal-agent 
conflicts regarding cost information. Thus, we find that our findings may 
indeed have general implications for (investment) advisory services also 
outside of Switzerland. 
From our findings, we suggest several such implications for FSP practice of 
investment advisory service provision. Generally, we argue that for FSPs 
(cost) transparency should not only take a role in obeying regulations – in 
fact, they should actively seek realization of transparency as a means of 
competitive differentiation. In this essay, we have shown how this may be 
accomplished with IT. Not only are clients increasingly demanding IT 
support in service encounters [Schwabe and Nussbaumer 2009] but also may 
IT be key in addressing transparency issues which affect client-advisor 
interaction and, thereby, advisory quality.  
We find that establishing IT-supported transparency may be of value for 
almost all existing business models of FSPs; for clients seeking “execution 
only” services, IT may be used to show potential effects of client decisions 
and ensure their suitability – even though for “execution only” Swiss FSPs 
are not obliged to perform suitability checks, IT support would allow for 
such feedback in an efficient way, potentially increasing client satisfaction 
and retention. We find the greatest potential, however, in the support of 
“investment advice” encounters. Here IT may provide a common ground of 
client-advisor interaction and point of reference for their joint decisions. 
Thereby, IT may not only enable transparency and traceability as requested 
by regulations but also provide support for the advisor to better advise the 
client and increase comprehension of her investment decisions. 
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